

# The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identifications Among EU and Third-Country Citizens

# **Final Report**

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## Contents

Foreword	6
Ettore Recchi	
Cross-border mobilities in the European Union: An evidence-	
based typology	8
Ettore Recchi, Justyna Salamońska,Thea Rossi and Lorenzo G. Baglioni	
Introduction	8
Types of cross-border practices	8
Physical cross-border practices	9
Virtual cross-border practices	10
Data	12
Descriptive statistics: measures of cross-border practices in six European countries	14
Patterns of cross-border practices, latent class analysis results	16
Intersecting itineraries of mobility: qualitative profiles of mobile clusters	21
Local – a gendered account of immobility	21
Returnee – negotiating real and virtual journeys	22
Tourist – meeting difference	23
Visitor – looking for the personal touch	25
Virtual transnational – following the dear ones as time passes by	25
Transnational – the privilege of being everywhere	26
Conclusion	27
References	28
Cultural boundaries in Europe	31
Introduction	31
Tastes in food and in music in Europe	32
Cultural divisions in Europe	41
Multiple Correspondence Analysis	41
Data and Variables	42
Main cultural dimensions on the European space of tastes	44
Exploration of the cultural space	50
Conclusion	56
References	57

Patterns of social transnationalism in regional Europe  Dumitru Sandu	59
Methodology: Measuring social transnationalism (STNS)	60
Measuring development at NUTS 2 level	65
Data analysis	66
Living transnationally by European regions and countries	66
Multilevel roots of social transnationalism	68
Transnational social fields of Europe	71
Conclusions	76
Appendix	79
References	83
Supra-national identification among movers and stayers in	
Europe	84
Steffen Pötzschke and Michael Braun	
Introduction	84
Hypotheses	87
Data and methods	91
The dependent variables	91
The independent variables	91
Analytical procedure	93
Results	94
Descriptive information on the samples	94
Identification with different geographical entities	97
Multivariate analysis of European identification	97
Multivariate analysis of the difference between European identification and	40=
cosmopolitanism	105
Conclusions	109
References	110
Transnational solidarity and cross-border practices in Europe Irina Ciornei	114
National and transnational solidarity	114
Hypotheses	115
Shared identity and European solidarity	115
Operationalisation	116
European solidarity in the EUCROSS and EUMEAN surveys	117
European solidarity, identity and cross-border practices	119
A statistical assessment of European solidarity	121
Concluding remarks	124
References	125

Transnational mobility, attachment to the EU and political	
participation in Europe	127
Fulya Apaydin vom Hau and Juan Diez Medrano	
Introduction	127
Political attachments and national political participation in a supranational context	127
Political attachment	128
Attachment to the EU and participation in elections	128
Voting behavior in a supranational setting	129
New challenges	129
Socio-economic factors	130
Political orientation	131
Citizenship	131
Results  Furgness attachment and national political participation	132 131
European attachment and national political participation Conclusion	135
References	136
Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism: Europe and the	
global in everyday European lives	138
Adrian Favell, David Reimer and Janne Solgaard Jensen	
A note on reference literature	139
Quantitative findings	140
Qualitative findings	158
The Danes	158
The Spanish	161
The Germans	164
The British	165
Conclusions	166
References	167
Methodological report	169
Steffen Pötzschke, Irina Ciornei and Fulya Apaydin vom Hau	
Project overview	169
The quantitative EUCROSS survey	169
Sample definition	169
Questionnaire development, translation, pre-test Sampling method, fieldwork and realised sample sizes	170 172
The qualitative EUMEAN survey	175
Sampling	175
Guideline construction	177
Qualitative fieldwork	178
References	179
Appendix	181
I) EUCROSS questionnaire	181
II) EUMEAN guidelines (nationals)	222
III) EUMEAN guidelines (migrants)	230

#### Foreword<sup>1</sup>

This report presents the findings of a three-year research project titled *The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identities among EU and Third-Country Citizens* (EUCROSS) funded by the European Commission as part of the 7th Framework Programme. Between 2011 and 2014, the project has carried out an extensive collection of sociological data in six EU member states: Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain, and the UK. These data have two main sources. First, a large-scale, systematic and independent CATI survey (the EUCROSS survey) of 8500 interviews to nationals of these six countries and immigrants from Romania and Turkey. Second, a set of follow-up in-depth face-to-face interviews with 160 respondents (the EUMEAN survey).

These datasets advance existing studies on sociological Europeanisation by going beyond conventional data, such as Eurobarometer, and by taking its findings deep into a detailed breakdown of the changing everyday life and social practices of Europeans. Moreover, the project extends the realm of research on the internationalisation of European societies that has mostly been charted in social theoretical speculation rather than empirically established findings.

At a very general level, we address the theme of the sociological foundations of European integration. We tackle an argument that resonates strongly in the public discourse but is also echoed in much social science on the subject: namely, that European integration is 'an elite process' (Haller 2008). This argument has two strands. The first one, less problematic, holds that the EU (and its former institutional incarnations from the 1950s onwards) has been designed and advanced by a very small slice of the European population. By itself this should not be surprising: all new political regimes tend to be elite creations (Higley and Burton 2006). However, the second strand is much more contentious, even dangerous, and affects the chances of future European unity. It maintains that 'Europe' has become part of the life of the upper classes and a privileged segment of those classes who most directly benefit from European integration, while the rest of the populace is increasingly alienated from it. 'Elites and citizens live in different worlds', insists Haller (2008) – and only elites have a Europe-wide horizon. With some nuances, Fligstein reaches a similar conclusion in his book *Euroclash* (2008) – the EU population is split between a minority of Europeanized citizens and a majority of non-Europeanized ones, with national middle classes wavering in between.

The EUCROSS project sets out to test this argument: that is, discover more about the degree of 'horizontal Europeanisation' (Mau and Verwiebe 2010) of EU citizens, as well as an indicative sample of third country nationals, the Turkish. The project assumes that cross-border practices of all kinds, both physical and virtual, are the crucial aspect of the Europe in the making. Their spread or not across social categories – classes, cohorts, gender and nationalities – defines the degree of 'social exclusivity', so to speak, of sociological Europeanness. If low, the elite argument holds; if not, it doesn't. As committed empirical scholars, members of the EUCROSS team (from six different research institutions across Europe), endeavour to test to what extent such a cleavage divides Europeans in their everyday life.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Ettore Recchi.

The project focuses on practices (i.e., behaviour) but does not downplay the relevance of subjective dimensions of Europeanisation – a European 'identification' or, in a broader meaning preferred by EUCROSS researchers, 'sense of belonging' (Savage et al. 2005), as well as values, whether national or cosmopolitan. Indeed, broadly speaking, we expect that cross-border practices do indeed diffuse a sense of transnational belonging, in line with the 'transactional thesis' put forward initially by Karl Deutsch (Deutsch *et al.* 1957). But, again, this is submitted to empirical testing. Moreover, European belonging is unpacked into three different facets: a sense of cultural-territorial belonging to 'Europe', support and participation to the political project embodied by the EU, and solidarity with fellow Europeans.

This report is divided in two main sections. The first one, which comprises chapters 1, 2 and 3, maps out cross-border practices in different realms and forms. Chapter 1 describes types of mobilities and illustrates their combination in an empirically-based typology of Europeans. Chapter 2 delves into forms of cross-border cultural consumption, outlining the social configurations that structure them. Chapter 3 uses EUCROSS as a complement to Eurobarometer data to elucidate in greater detail the diverse spatial and historic-cultural rooting of cross-border practices, by country groups and by subnational areas. The second broad section of the report turns to more subjective aspects of Europeanization. Chapter 4 analyses self-declared European identification among national and non-national residents, highlighting the importance of cross-border friendship ties but also the persistent and prevailing grounding of Europeanness in nationally specific configurations. Chapter 5 turns to another aspect of belonging: political participation. It shows that higher cross-border activities do not alienate European citizens from voting. Chapter 6, bridging practices and values, looks at the relationship of transnational practices to cosmopolitan values, looking at how these vary by both nationality and social position. It also provides a first interpretative reading of qualitative data about the meanings of European mobilities in different member states. The report is concluded by a detailed methodological appendix which illustrates the various steps of data collection and the main data-generating instruments used.

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## Cross-Border Mobilities in the European Union: An Evidence-Based Typology<sup>2</sup>

#### Introduction

Globalization and individualization entail the expansion and diversification of the forms of physical mobility, alongside virtual mobility, i.e. mobility that does not involve a movement of people from one geographic place to another. Technological advances have facilitated the development and intensification of these new and diverse mobilities. Over the last decade or so, social theory has taken into account the rise and spread of mobility as game-changers in social life (Urry 2000 and 2007) and empirical research has paid renewed and multi-disciplinary attention to a large canvas of forms of international physical and virtual mobility: migrations (e.g. Recchi and Favell 2009; Krings et al. 2013), tourism (e.g. Urry 1990), shopping online (Perea y Monsuwé et al. 2004), abroad home ownership (e.g. Aspden 2005), virtual friendship (e.g. Mau 2010). Drawing on a variety of methodological approaches, these studies explore different facets of mobilities.

This chapter will seek to examine some of the cross-border movements described above – normally studied one by one - in an integrated way. Its focus will be on Europe and European citizens' cross-border practices that go beyond single nation-states. Therefore we start by proposing a classification of mobility practices. We then describe our dataset, drawing on the EUCROSS project, and the mixed-methods approach applied in this study. We use a combination of quantitative data and qualitative interviews with nationals in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain and the UK in order to map the patterns and experiences of mobility practices in everyday life. Our analysis links these movements in space (be it physical or virtual) to social categories and explores the way they combine, possibly overlapping, complementing or substituting one another. This goal is pursued by using latent class analysis. Our exploratory study distinguishes six most typical combinations of cross-border practices. The empirical classification emerging from latent class analysis gives an overview of different patterns of being mobile in Europe. In the second stage of the analysis we turn to qualitative material in order to illustrate each cluster with a qualitative profile and exemplify experiences and meanings associated with these cross-border practices.

#### Types of cross-border practices

To what extent Europeans live their lives beyond their nation states? How are cross-border mobilities adjusted into their everyday lives? Interest in mobilities was initially suggested by Urry (2000) in his thinking about 'sociology beyond societies'. In a working taxonomy of movements, physical movements of people and objects are taken as the most basic form of mobility. Urry's classification includes other important ways in which people move: virtually, in particular via internet-based interactive applications; and imaginatively, via passively consumed media, mainly television and radio (but now also the internet). While this taxonomy provides a the first reference for examination of mobilities, his work and that of many of his followers is mostly metaphor-driven, failing to provide an overarching picture of the spread of different mobility experiences in the population. In turn our attempt to map cross-border practices in Europe is intended to provide empirical evidence to the scale and patterns of European mobilities. Building on an earlier classification (Recchi 2014), we aim to

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ettore Recchi, Justyna Salamońska, Thea Rossi and Lorenzo G. Baglioni.

describe the breadth and patterns of cross-border practices. In the first place we make a distinction between physical and virtual mobilities. Further distinctions are then made between dimensions of each cross-border practices. Physical mobilities can be seen on the continuum from 'short' to 'long' permanence ones. For virtual mobilities it is the 'personal' or 'impersonal' aspect that is the basis of differentiation (Table 1).

Table 1 Classification of cross-border individual practices

Physical border crossing?	Dimensions	Indicator				
	High permanence					
		Long-term stay (>3yrs) abroad				
<b>Yes</b> → Physical		Medium-term stay (3months-3yrs) abroad				
mobility		Short stay (3weeks-3months) abroad				
		Holidaying, short trips abroad				
	Low permanence					
	Personal	Having a foreign spouse or family member				
		Having family/relatives in a different				
		country				
		Planning relocation in a foreign country				
		Having foreign friends/neighbours				
		Having friends abroad				
		Sending children abroad				
<b>No</b> → Virtual mobility		Having foreign business partners, clients,				
		colleagues				
		Adhering to international associations				
		Interacting with foreigners through social				
		networks				
		Making foreign investments (house, bank				
		account)				
	Impersonal	Buying foreign products online				

Mapping these cross-border practices is a new way of looking at European societies and their hybridization via individual social practices. In this vein, the paper focuses on crossing nation state borders as a way of mapping EU citizenship practices in their day-to-day reality.

#### **Physical border-crossings**

Mapping the landscape of European mobilities starts here with an analysis of international movements, of both longer and shorter duration. Firstly, international migration is traditionally the most researched form of long term physical mobility across borders. For a long time, migration has been framed as a move from a place of origin to a destination of (more or less) permanent character. Migration statistics reflect this approach, as they define migrants as persons who are resident in a country other than their country of origin for at least a year (following a UN-established convention). Yet a plethora of international moves do not necessarily last a year or more. Add to this that migration horizons are increasingly

broader and go beyond the origin and destination dichotomy, entailing step-wise subsequent resettlements from one country to another. This flexibility is a particular feature of intra-European mobility as one in six Europeans now reports to have resided in another EU country for at least three months (Salamońska et al. 2013). Recently published studies on intra-European migration in the EU15 focus on diverse motivations of people moving for better quality of life, for studies, for family, or simply because they fall in love with somebody residing in another country (Benson 2010; King 2002; King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003; Recchi and Favell 2009 for a comparative picture of intra-European migrants). In the aftermath of the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, population flows from East to West in Europe grew substantially. Although these new migrations are still largely regarded as labour migration (European Commission 2008), an emerging literature points to non-economic factors involved, including life-style issues, social networks, quality of life, and life course related rationales (Cook et al. 2011; Eade 2007; Grabowska 2003; Koryś 2003; Wickham et al. 2009; Recchi and Triandafyllidou 2010; Krings et al. 2013).

Equally, the EU free movement regime facilitates short term mobility of a more tourist-like character. In the simplest sense, the Schengen area passport-free facility and the Eurozone single currency make travel projects particularly smooth. Relative ease of traveling and also historically decreasing costs of travel resulted in tourism as leading to new social encounters and interactions (Hall 2005). Szerszynski and Urry (2006) notice how in the Western world travel has become a 'way of life': a claim corroborated by the numbers of people on the move, unprecedented in history. Tourists may travel for diverse reasons, as the World Tourism Organization defines them as people 'traveling to and staying in places outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes'. Tourist trips are possibly the most common form of short-term physical movements, but short trips for work trigger mobility as well. Hall (2005) and Koslowski (2011) document the blurring boundaries between tourism, recreation, leisure and work as the numbers of global mobility pick up.

The experience of travel, also within the EU, differs depending on who sets off for a journey, and with diverse motivations of commuters, tourists or migrants carrying different emotional loads (Löfgren 2008). Löfgren describes Swedes' 'travel fever', 'a nervous mix of anxiety and anticipation. It combines longing with fear and fascination of the unknown, the exhilaration (and dread) of 'letting go, moving out' (2008: 333). Burrell (2008) gives an illustration of migrant travels from well-known home towards an unknown environment taking the example of Polish migrants to the UK. Emotions of moving, fears, but also hopes and dreams may also be read from the possessions with which migrants set off for the journey. Quite against the rhetoric of a frictionless space of flows, people carry with them objects of biographical value, which at the same time impede mobility, in both material and emotional ways. Furthermore, Burrell describes the meanings of objects carried during the trips back and forth between the 'new' and 'old' home, like food which reflects transnational family relationships (see also Petridou 2001).

#### Virtual cross-border practices

Virtual mobility generates a particular type of experience (Woolgar 2002), which can be described as mediated, artificial or imaginative, but not as unreal — at least for its implications at the individual and collective level. Virtual relationships and communication

are subject to limitations imposed by the media that make them possible (phone, computer), but these limitations may also elicit an aspiration for corporeal mobility. Woolgar (2002) points out that, much like with physical mobility, focusing on the macro-level does not inform us about the day-to-day utilization and experience of new technologies. This is why there is a need to understand technology in a contextualised perspective, taking into account the social environment in which it is used. Furthermore, the virtual is interrelated with the real, but this interrelation can be either a replacement or a reinforce. Often virtual contacts trigger real actions. And finally, the perceptions of what technology is and related attitudes are not the same for different social categories.

Studies of transnational social networks were initially the domain of migration studies which explored how mobile people kept in touch with significant others back home. These illustrated 'travelling-in-dwelling' practices of communication by email or phone as they were becoming cheaper and more easily accessible (very much like travel) especially when compared with previous generations (e.g. Clarke 2005). However, migrants' practices are an extreme illustration of information and communication technologies' use linked to physical mobility. More generally, Eurostat data (2012) shows that connecting to the internet has become a daily practice for the large majority of European citizens. The bulk of Europeans use the internet to send and receive e-mails, over a third shares their profiles and their ideas on general social media (like Facebook or Twitter). Mau's work (2010) on social transnationalism based on a survey carried out in Germany demonstrates that almost half of German residents have social contacts that cross national borders, although the geography of these international social networks is not random, but embedded in specific geographical, cultural and historical contexts.

Non-physical mobility can become an imaginative movement when the travel takes place using TV set or radio (Urry 2000). Traditional and web-based social media allow traveling to distant places staying physically put (see for instance Tussyadiah and Fesenmaier 2008). But of course not all exposure to distant places via media turns into virtual mobility. To do so, such exposure must be interiorized, and possibly triangulated with experiences, to eventually be factored in as 'spatial competence'. In our analysis, we will tap this aspect referring to the 'familiarity' that individuals declare to have when imagining themselves in different countries.

Objects travel also in other ways, and in between real and virtual space. Migration scholars in particular have been interested in global flows of remittances (e.g. Mansoor and Quillin 2006; De Haas 2007), in terms of their directions, sizes and use. However, sending and receiving money is not limited to migrants and their households back home. Internet banking has made cash flows across borders easier, cheaper and faster than ever before.

What is more, shopping across borders has grown in importance in recent years. While for affluent classes this may mean buying second homes abroad (Aspden 2005), practices of online shopping have become more widespread (Li and Zhang 2002). Indeed online shopping is one of the most popular ways in which internet is used. Electronic commerce's added-value, compared to more traditional store retailing, consists in time saving and providing easily accessible information. However, online shopping activities may be more popular among those who are competent users of new technologies. And, again the EU may facilitate

online shopping, without custom duties charges that apply when shopping outside the EU borders. As a matter of fact, a primary shopping outlet like ebay.com has now implemented EU-wide search as a customary tool if surfing the web from a EU-based IP address.

So far we have drawn a broad yet hardly exhaustive picture of everyday cross-border practices, pointing to their possible intersections. Mapping these practices spatially requires attention to the fact that '[m]obility may well be the key difference and otherness producing machine of our age, involving significant inequalities of speed, risk, rights, and status' (Salazar and Smart 2011: 4-5). Consequently, one danger of taking on the mobility lenses is that of overlooking the determinants and meanings associated with *immobility*. This is why instead of drawing a dichotomy of mobile versus immobile people, we suggest thinking about a continuum of cross-border practices that form a kind of menu from which individuals select their own relation with physical and virtual spaces. These selections, we contend, are not random or entirely agency-driven, but rather reflect pre-existing structures and, in turn, cut across societies in a significant way. Thereafter, mobility patterns can affect future life chances and identities.

#### **Data**

This chapter is based on a combination of a quantitative and qualitative material. This mixed-methods approach allows mapping out patterns of cross-border practices based on a large scale survey dataset and interpreting these on the basis of in-depth qualitative interview data.

Quantitative data comes from the EUCROSS survey. As outlined in Pötzschke (2012), the EUCROSS survey focused on three dimensions of cross-border practices: physical mobility, virtual mobility and cosmopolitan consumption and competences. The EUCROSS sample consisted of EU residents, including nationals, mobile EU citizens (Romanian nationals), and third-country nationals (Turkish nationals). Here we focus on diverse mobility practices as reported by nationals of six European countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom). In total, 6000 respondents were interviewed in 2012 – that is, 1000 per country. The same questionnaire (in different languages) was used across the countries involved (see Appendix I). In addition, qualitative material coming from EUMEAN interviews is used to provide more in-depth insight into experiences of mobility practices. The interviews explored in details, among others, experiences of physical and virtual mobility (see Appendix II).

In order to examine the patterns of mobility practices among the EU citizens we resorted to latent class analysis (LCA). Using Mplus 6.12 (Muthén and Muthén 1998-2010) we performed exploratory LCA in order to group individuals into classes with similar patterns of mobilities, using the list of indicators described below. The final model presented in this chapter consists of six classes and selected on the basis of the model fit measures. The six-class model had the lowest BIC statistics compared to other models containing smaller or bigger number of classes. Furthermore, the six-class model provided a more readily interpretable framework for empirical data, compared to other models.

We used a range of indicators referring to physical long term and short term mobility, movements of objects, and non-physical mobility practices. We also included one indicator

not referring directly to practices (familiarity with other EU countries) but that captures imaginative mobility (and is found to be significantly discriminant and insightful in interpreting results). Where indicated, mobility practices were referred to the EU space.

#### The indicators used are the following:

- Migration experiences: 'Have you ever lived in another EU country for three or more consecutive months before you turned 18?'; 'Have you lived in another EU country for three or more consecutive months since you turned 18?'
- Participation in EU-funded programmes: 'Have you ever (e.g. as student or during your professional career) participated in an international exchange program that has been funded or co-funded by the European Union?'
- Tourism experiences in childhood: 'Please think about all your journeys abroad before you turned 18 (e.g. with your parents, other relatives, school or alone). How many countries did you visit before you turned 18?'
- Recent tourism experiences: 'Please think of trips abroad (within the EU) which included at least one overnight stay. How many of these trips have you had in the past 24 months?'
- Communication with family/friends abroad talking via phone/computer and via mail/email: 'Please think about the last 12 months: How frequently did you talk to family members, inlaws and friends abroad by phone or using your computer?'; 'How frequently did you communicate with family/friends abroad by mail or e-mail?'
- Communication with family/friends abroad via web-based social networks: 'And how frequently did you communicate with family/friends abroad via social networks? (e.g. Facebook, Hi5, Google+ etc.)?'
- International money transfers: 'Do you ever send money abroad for reasons other than purchasing goods or services?'; 'In the last 12 months, have you received money from someone who is living in another country?'
- Shopping abroad: 'Thinking about the last 12 months, have you purchased any goods or services from sellers or providers who were located abroad (within the EU)? That is, for example, via websites, mail, phone, etc.?'
- Following TV in foreign language: 'The following question is about TV content (e.g. movies, sitcoms, news broadcasts etc.) in other languages than [official CoR language] << and your native language>>: How often do you watch TV content which is in another language and has not been dubbed, either directly on TV or via the Internet?'
- Familiarity with other EU countries: 'Apart from [CoR], are there one or more other EU countries that you are very familiar with that is, that you know well enough to feel comfortable in?'

After running LCA models we exported the assigned probabilities of class membership and run cross-tabulations between most likely latent class membership and a set of individual characteristics (gender, age, education, ISEI, country of residence).

In the second step, in a very preliminary attempt, we drew excerpts from EUEMAN interviews in order to illustrate the types of mobile classes which emerged from the LCA. Individual experiences contextualise diverse forms of mobility in European settings, unveil

meanings associated with different mobilities, and shed light on the intersections between different practices, as well as illustrating barriers to movement.

#### Descriptive statistics: measures of cross-border practices in six European countries

An overview of mobility practices in six European countries is presented in Table 2. Over one in two Danes, Brits, Italians, Romanians, Spaniards and Germans interviewed declares familiarity with other countries, talking to family and friends abroad by phone/computer/mail or email, trips to other EU countries in the last 24 months and watching to content in another language. Germans and Brits seemed to be most familiar with other EU countries' contexts (66 and 64 per cent respectively). Clearly, for the Danes and Germans, and to less extent Brits, crossing nation states borders for short trips of leisure, work and travel has continued to be a part of everyday life since they were children. It is Danes who outnumber any other group with regards to short term physical mobility: over seven in ten of them visited another EU country in the previous two years. Setting off for a holiday abroad is less common among Italians and Spaniards (standing below 43 per cent) and Romanians (36 per cent).

Between-country differences become starker when foreign trips in childhood are considered. Almost eight in ten Danes visited another country before turning 18, compared to one in ten Romanians whose international travels were restricted by closed borders until the end of the Communist regime. Percentage of Romanians who travelled abroad in childhood was also just around a third of the share of Italians or Spaniards.

Romanians more often cross borders in other ways that make them remarkably well networked internationally. The number of Romanians who were in touch with significant others abroad via phone and email was twice the number of those who travelled abroad within the EU in the last two years (72 and 36 per cent respectively). They also often interact with other people abroad via web-based social networks.

When it comes to impersonal virtual cross-border practices, watching tv content in another language is most popular in Denmark (87 per cent), least so in the United Kingdom (36 per cent), but also Italy (38 per cent) and Spain (37 per cent) (at least occasionally). Danes most often purchase from sellers located abroad, but it is Romanians who transfer money internationally most often.

Not surprisingly, physical mobility of long permanence is the least common among cross-border practices examined here. Undertaking migration carries perhaps most risks and costs compared to other forms of mobility, so it is declared least often, along with participation in international exchange programmes funded by the EU. Here Romanian residents, although newcomers to the EU, are most likely to have migration experience, but also to have taken part in EU funded programmes.

Descriptive analysis of cross-border practices reveals the scale of different physical and virtual mobility forms among European population and a marked heterogeneity at the country level. Once knowing the numbers involved, we sought to disentangle patterns, if any, behind the ways in which Europeans cross national borders. Thus, as anticipated, we set out to examine configurations of cross-border activities with exploratory LCA techniques.

Table 2 Cross-border practices by country (%)

	Denmark	Germany	Italy	Romania	Spain	United Kingdom	Total
Familiar with other EU countries	59.3	65.8	40.7	47.9	48.2	63.8	54.3
Communicates by phone/computer/mail/e-mail with family, friends	43.0	43.3	47.5	71.7	55.0	59.2	53.3
Visited EU countries in the last 24 months	74.4	60.1	41.6	35.5	42.7	54.6	51.5
Watches tv in another language	86.9	49.2	38.0	57.6	37.2	35.9	50.9
Travelled abroad before turned 18	77.1	69.1	37.3	12.4	33.9	61.0	48.4
Communicates via web-based social networks with family, friends	24.6	17.1	25.6	40.6	29.8	27.0	27.5
Purchased from sellers or providers who were located in another EU country	34.4	18.8	12.2	10.6	13.7	11.9	17.0
Sent or received money from abroad	17.0	12.5	14.7	25.3	13.6	16.4	16.6
Lived in another EU country for three or more months	13.4	10.3	9.8	16.5	12.0	14.3	12.7
Ever participated in an international exchange program funded or co-funded by the EU	3.8	4.0	4.6	8.1	6.8	2.9	5.0

Source: EUCROSS, N= 5784

#### Patterns of cross-border practices, latent class analysis results

Our exploratory LCA distinguished six clusters (see Table 3). These clusters of respondents differ in the combination of ways in which they undertake – or not – physical and virtual cross-border practices. In the first place this classification invites to think about mobilities in non-dichotomous terms, as we distinguish six groups ranging from most mobile transnationals to least mobile locals. Classes in-between the two extremes of such a continuum provide an interesting insight into the intersection of different mobilities.

Locals form the most numerous latent class, accounting for just over 30 per cent of the EUCROSS sample. They relatively rarely cross national borders, both physically and virtually, standing well below the average for overall population. We will focus in more detail on some of the determinants of their relative immobility in the qualitative part of analysis. For the moment it is important to note here that immobile locals are a minority, albeit a sizeable one. Most Europeans do in fact display diverse patterns of cross-border mobility.

On the other end of the mobility continuum there is small but consistent group of transnationals. What is distinctive about this cluster of respondents is that they score above average on all indicators of physical and virtual cross-border practices. They are highly physically mobile both long and short term. They have higher probabilities of having had some migration experience, taken part in EU funded programmes and they are also likely to have travelled abroad recently. Furthermore, transnationals move in the virtual world when they maintain connections with family and friends located abroad via phone and computer assisted modes of communication. Compared to other groups, they also relatively often make use of online shopping and money transfers across the borders. Finally, they are competent movers who claim they are familiar with other countries than the one they come from and who follow to content in original language. Being transnational remains quite rare, as only six per cent of the EUCROSS sample belongs to this group.

Between the two extreme cases represented by locals and transnationals, our classification points to a rich constellation of physical and virtual mobilities. *Virtual transnationals* may seem quite similar to locals in the way they seldom physically travel or have lived abroad. Compared to the sample average they also rarely engage in impersonal virtual cross-border practices, that is transfer money or make purchases internationally. Unlike locals, however, they are remarkably well connected internationally through family and friendship networks. They rely heavily on phones and Internet to connect with these networks. They may lead local everyday lives in spatial terms, but cyberspace makes them well connected to others who are spread around the world. Virtual transnationals constitute around eight per cent of the EUCROSS sample.

Visitors' use of communication technologies in order to keep in touch with friends and family abroad is not too different from that of virtual transnationals. However, it is perhaps 'the compulsion of proximity', to meet face-to-face (and qualitative material will allow shedding more light on that issue) people abroad that makes visitors travel to other European countries in larger numbers. Their travel experiences are therefore not tourist-like, but rather well informed and culturally embedded. Their relative propensity for international travel coincides with visitors' being familiar with other countries. Visitors make up slightly over 11 per cent of the EUCROSS sample.

Also *tourists* do engage in short term physical cross-border practices considerably, but they rarely stay in touch with people who are settled in other countries. Their journeys are not sustained by personal ties in the places they move to. This does not hinder some cultural returns to travelling: like other physically mobile groups, and in contrast to virtual transnationals, they hold higher probabilities of sharing a feeling of familiarity with other countries. They also relatively often follow to content in another language.

The last cluster is formed by *returnees*. They have a relatively high propensity to having migrated in the past (although not as high as transnationals), and thus relatively often declare familiarity with other countries, keep in touch with family and friends abroad and send/receive money internationally. They use internet to sustain personal cross-border relations, but not to engage in instrumental and kind of more up-to-date activities, like international e-shopping (they are the least involved among the six clusters). In spite of their past migration experience, over the last two years only half of them crossed national borders, which is less than transnational, visitors and tourists, although more than the virtual transnationals and locals.

Table 3 Latent classes of cross-border practices (probabilities)

	TRANS-	VIRTUAL TRANS-					
	NATIONALS	NATIONALS	VISITORS	TOURISTS	RETURNEES	LOCALS	All
Lived in another EU country for three or more months	0.495	0.021	0.064	0.121	0.228	0.045	0.127
Ever participated in an international exchange program funded	055	0.022	0.00	0.111	0.220	0.0.0	0.227
or co-funded by the EU	0.218	0.026	0.060	0.050	0.044	0.014	0.050
Travelled abroad before turned 18	0.752	0.162	0.759	0.747	0.344	0.237	0.484
Visited EU countries in the last 24 months	0.912	0.154	0.733	0.804	0.501	0.184	0.515
Communicates by phone/computer/mail/e-mail with family, friends	0.980	0.965	0.970	0.300	0.986	0.148	0.533
Communicates via web-based social networks with family, friends	0.641	0.622	1.000	0.000	0.429	0.009	0.275
Sent or received money from abroad	0.390	0.227	0.167	0.146	0.298	0.048	0.166
Purchased goods or services from sellers or providers who were located in another EU country	0.504	0.065	0.337	0.267	0.020	0.033	0.170
Watches tv in another language	0.897	0.431	0.774	0.660	0.438	0.233	0.509
Familiar with other EU countries	0.995	0.000	0.608	0.667	1.000	0.247	0.543
Sample proportions	0.061	0.082	0.112	0.274	0.162	0.308	

Source: EUCROSS, N= 5784

What is the social profile of these six types of Europeans in the EUCROSS sample? The following cross-tabulations break down latent class membership by social categories.

Transnationals and tourists more often tend to be male while women are overrepresented among virtual transnationals and locals. Other groups tend to have a relative gender balance (Table 4).

Table 4 Cross-tabulation of latent classes by gender (%)

		VIRTUAL					
	TRANSNAT	TRANSNAT					
	IONALS	IONALS	VISITORS	TOURISTS	RETURNEES	LOCALS	All
Female	40.5	58.6	50.4	46.8	51.4	56.3	51.5
Male	59.5	41.4	49.6	53.2	48.6	43.7	48.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: EUCROSS, N= 5784

Table 5 Cross-tabulation of latent classes by age groups (%)

	TRANSNAT	VIRTUAL TRANSNAT					
	IONALS	IONALS	VISITORS	TOURISTS	RETURNEES	LOCALS	All
18-30	18.5	25.1	27.6	14.3	10.2	7.5	14.2
31-45	37.9	32.8	40.2	28.6	25.1	23.0	28.5
46-55	17.1	20.1	20.4	23.5	21.1	21.3	21.4
56+	26.5	22.1	11.8	33.7	43.6	48.2	35.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: EUCROSS, N= 5727

Perhaps due to their new technologies literacy, the majority of visitors and virtual transnationals tends to belong to younger age cohorts than the other groups (68 and 58 per cent respectively aged 46 and below). Equally, the majority of transnationals is aged 46 and below. On the contrary, locals and returnees are more likely to belong to older cohorts. Being a tourist does not seem to be related to age, as membership to this groups spreads along the whole age spectrum (Table 5).

Table 6 Cross-tabulation of latent classes by educational attainment (%)

		VIRTUAL					
	TRANSNAT	TRANSNAT					
	IONALS	IONALS	VISITORS	TOURISTS	RETURNEES	LOCALS	All
Less than tertiary	27.0	71.3	49.8	51.8	65.0	79.0	62
educated							.1
Tertiary educated	73.0	28.7	50.2	48.2	35.0	21.0	37
							.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	10
							0.
							0

Source: EUCROSS, N= 5728

Cross-border practices are highly differentiated depending on the education level. Almost three in four transnationals hold a university degree. Visitors and tourists are also more likely to be university educated than the overall sample. Mobilities are predicated on prior capabilities, which range from financial resources to language skills, which in turn hinge on education.




Figure 1 Cross-tabulation of latent classes by self-reported socioeconomic status

Source: EUCROSS, N= 4673

Transnationals, and to lesser extent tourists and visitors, are not only better educated on average, but also more likely to be found in the upper social strata, as captured by selfreported socioeconomic status (Figure 1).3 The proportion of people declaring to 'live comfortably' on their income decline is dramatically different among transnationals and virtual transnationals (72 per cent and 41 per cent), showing that the latter are possibly 'constrained' into the cyberspace by a lack of financial resources. The gap is in fact modest between transnationals and visitors, but widens when comparing transnationals to other more sedentary categories. Mobilities are both expensive and status-enhancing – unfortunately we are not in a position to disentangle whether they are more of a cause than an effect.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Very similar results were found using ISEI, a more objective measurement based on occupations (Standard International Socio-Economic Index: Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman 1992).

Table 7 Cross-tabulation of latent classes by countries of residence (%)

		VIRTUAL					
	TRANSNAT	TRANSNAT					
	IONALS	IONALS	VISITORS	TOURISTS	RETURNEES	LOCALS	All
Denmark	25.8	3.2	24.3	31.1	5.0	9.4	16.8
Germany	15.0	2.5	15.6	25.4	11.2	15.9	16.5
Italy	9.9	21.3	14.5	11.8	13.8	22.6	16.4
Romania	17.0	44.5	12.6	4.5	28.0	16.3	16.9
Spain	16.4	18.8	13.6	10.4	20.0	21.7	16.9
UK	15.9	9.7	19.4	16.8	22.1	14.0	16.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: EUCROSS, N= 5784

Finally, among transnationals and visitors Danes outnumber other nationalities. The majority of tourists also come from Denmark and Germany. Locals are in fact over-represented among Italians and Spaniards. Returnees most often come from Romania and the UK. Over four in ten virtual transnationals are Romanian citizens (Table 7). The different national composition of latent classes reflects also the heterogeneity observed on different cross-border practices indicators examined above (listed in Table 2).

#### Intersecting itineraries of mobility: qualitative profiles of mobile clusters

While LCA sheds light on more general patterns of mobilities and sorts European citizens into empirical classes, it is only qualitative material that can illustrate how this mobility is performed and experienced subjectively in everyday life. From the 60 semi-structured interviews collected in the six EUCROSS countries (EUMEAN survey) we picked stories that exemplify how individuals move in real and virtual space, portraying some of the clusters distinguished in the quantitative analysis. Clearly these are illustrative materials, with no claim of representativeness. Further more systematic work shall try to elucidate the connection between the social characteristics of the interviewees and the meanings they impute to mobility experiences.

#### 1. Local – a gendered account of immobility

Against the broad narrative of a movement-based society, mobilities are clearly not equally accessible to everyone. Paola<sup>4</sup> lives in a small town close to Milan. She is married and has two sons. She is employed in the front office of a corporation. Her work largely involves contact with local customers and administration duties. She obtained a degree in foreign languages, for which she also studied abroad. Paola is well aware of the relative ease of travelling within Europe:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This and all other names used in the text are pseudonyms. Some respondents' details (in this and in the following examples) were modified for anonymisation purposes.

...you can move freely, there is no longer the border. So this thing is certainly positive ... Now it's easy to compare, you go to a restaurant in Italy and you spend 20 euros, you go to Austria ... in the summer of 1989, we still had the lira and they still had the Austrian schilling. So the question of currency is not exactly a minor thing, is it?

Yet, even in the institutional borderless context that she describes, where free movement and single currency facilitate mobility, Paola's account highlights family circumstances and social roles that hamper personal "motility":

I decided to study languages and ... that I would travel as much as possible. In other words, I discovered I had this vocation for traveling, for other countries and for trying to understand them more. Then of course I did none of these things because... Yeah, well, I did study languages, I got my degree, but then... my family, a little, a few other things ... now there are other problems, like one of my parents not feeling well or...

Her trips abroad as a student enabled her to make new connections, but she recalls how keeping in touch by sending postcards in late 1980s and early 1990s was different and much more difficult than Facebook communication available now (and commonly used by her sons, but not by her).

When asked if she felt isolated living in a small town, she explained the value of automobility on the one hand, and the virtual connection with the wider world on the other:

Well, maybe not isolated, no, because luckily in my family we all drive and so we can move about by car and then there is the Internet so that if you need, you can be in touch with the whole world. That is a very good thing, but there one does run the risk of being isolated, yes.

However, de facto her life unfolds almost entirely within the community where she and her family live.

#### 2. Returnee – negotiating real and virtual journeys

Valentina is in her 60s and lives in a small town in Southern Italy. She is a return migrant from France, where she used to work as teacher of Italian language. Her first trip abroad took place when she was in her 20s. With her husband they went by car to France where they were to settle. It was an emotional trip, a kind of 'migration fever' driven by hopes and dreams mixed with fears for the future:

... there was the enthusiasm, the enthusiasm you have at that age when you want to do something positive ...though in terms of feelings, you know, a tinge of sadness, because when you leave your mom it's forever...

The first journey from Italy to France was just one of many trips back and forth that followed. Characteristic of this type of mobile individuals is that their cross-border

relations develop along a binational axis. Material cultures use to be important dimension of this two way traffic (see Burrell 2008). In particular recurrent food gifts keep the family united across borders. Similarly, food brought back to France carries tastes and smells of the 'other home':

Once I went by train, my dad loved cheese, so I had bought him some Camembert, and by the time we arrived the people in the train couldn't stand it anymore. I was bringing it to my dad. At night, with the heating on, they said 'Lady, what on earth do you have in these suitcases!?' ... Then I would bring over bread ... for my father ... So many things. Then, from Italy, I came with the spaghetti, all these spaghetti loose inside the car, canned tomatoes, sausages, wine, a little of everything.

During the current economic crisis Valentina's husband lost his job. Their financial situation deteriorated and they were not able to travel any more, even if the 'compulsion of proximity' (Boden and Molotch 1994) remained strong, as her daughter and sister still live back in France. Real co-presence with the family is important to her, to the extent that the airport has become 'her second home' when the family members travel to visit her in Italy. In between the visits she stays in touch using virtual technologies. Significance of new communication tools is stressed by Valentina when she talks about friends and former students she left behind:

Yes... Yes, I miss them [friends and former students], I wanted to see them, so I got Facebook. I was totally incapable of doing anything, but I learned it ... I found all my classmates, all my students, they're all there. In the morning, I almost do the roll call.

#### 3. Tourist - meeting difference

Axel is a management consultant in his 40s who lives in Berlin with his wife and children. Throughout his life, he visited many European and non-European countries either as a tourist or because of work. He started to travel alone at the age of 17, touring Southern France with other teenagers on a Volkswagen van. But holidays abroad were already a family routine for him:

I had been in almost every European country before uh I went on this journey to France. So it was really nothing for me in the sense of 'wow, I'm abroad'. But more like 'Nice to be here, to have fun'. [...] It is true that we did sightseeing in a few cities and we <went> through some... uhm, we visited little towns and stuff, but that wasn't the main goal. The main goal was really the beach, to swim and to relax.

His curiosity for other countries revolves mostly around consumption — what can be bought in local shops and supermarkets. He recounts that shopping was already a main focus of his travels with his parents:

I mean already as a child I liked to go shopping and I looked at where do the things come from that people, that you can eat, that you can buy. And that was

just what I also did in the other countries. I always turned every product I had on the back and looked at it. Where is that actually from and what do they actually have here? What's actually the difference to our supermarkets? Yes, and mostly you can't enter the houses of private persons, so you had to do that else way and uh, the most obvious things are supermarkets and do-it-yourself stores. I mean that is, that way you really get to know the differences.

He has memorable souvenirs of a travel to Japan and China with his girlfriend (now his wife) and expresses a desire to go back there and to Canada:

Asians, I'm interested in them, they excite me, I find that fascinating, I got an affinity for that. [...] I definitely want to go to Japan one more time and I definitely want to go to Vancouver in Canada also. Those two places...are my two favorite. [...] Vancouver because that city, as far as I know uh, is very multicultural. Uh, also characterized by the Asian culture, which I simply like and on the one hand the Pacific, on the other hand the Rocky Mountains in the background. I can go swimming and skiing, in two hours I can get everything. That's great. Yeah, I mean people are relaxed there. Exactly what fits me.

His interest for Asia leads him to follow Asian news via internet and tv, albeit not systematically. He also likes Asian sport events, sometime watching them on satellite channels, which he finds 'relaxing':

I mean for example something like what happened in Fukushima or something like that. It's always very exciting to see what different newspapers write and at some point I noticed, when I was in Thailand, there I bought a Thai newspaper, it was in English. Bangkok Times or something like that, and in it I read something about the FDP <Freie Demokratische Partei, a German political party> in Germany.

In Berlin, he is a member of a Japan-German friendship association, but that does not seem to yield larger social networks of contacts abroad. Ultimately, he sees this association mostly as a cultural club and possible tourist gateway:

They host a summer festival. They host some events, lectures. They also organize journeys, guided ones, through Japan, during which they really uh, yes try to show you the country from a totally different perspective. [...] also groups of pupils come here, who are in, I would say, grammar school, like about that age. Uhm, so that they speak at least a little English uhm, because most don't really speak Japanese, that has to be mentioned. Japanese is a pretty difficult language to learn.

#### 4. Visitor – looking for the personal touch

Graciela is 60 years old and lives in Madrid with her husband. She worked in a bank, but she has taken early retirement. She did not have the opportunity to travel when she was younger because she could not afford it. Her first journey abroad was to Marocco, with her husband and eight years old son. She selected Morocco on purpose, for a vague and somewhat naive Orientalist fascination. She also recalls that her mother used to tell her as a child that she sat down 'Morocco-style' (in fact, kind of yoga position):

In Marrakech I was talking to people, I went into the shops, I sat down to drink tea with them in the square, at night I sat down to have tomato soup, literally, just like one of them. [...] I have a very clear idea and I did then too and still do now that when you go to visit another country you shouldn't go as a tourist but rather mould yourself into what they are and so in that way you won't have any problems anywhere with any type of culture or any behavior or any religion or anything at all, because really you have to value the people as individuals, not for their ideals or their religion or their traditions or anything, just as a person and I think that the person, we're all good people.

She now travels quite regularly, exploring different countries. Her enthusiasm and involvement try to go beyond the 'tourist gaze':

A kid, yes, yes, a kid on the street, he came with us, he was talking to me and he said he would introduce his family to us, his dad and his mum was making some crocheted hats for my son to try on and he tried it on, the father was, by the way, I have some wooden pipes from them, they'd make a hole inside, then carve them and then they'd put a piece in the pipe for a stone to press the tobacco, it's a carved stone well, so anyway, I was sitting there with them like normal I sat there, I sat with them that was it and I'm telling you, at no point did anyone try anything with me, so well, it was a trip which was not only cultural but also very important, that feeling...

Even though she lacks the skills and opportunities for deeper connections, she makes an effort to establish personal relations with the people she meets in her holidays abroad:

We write emails to each other from time to time and we send emails and that and it's good, good, then in Peru I also have acquaintances.

#### 5. Virtual transnational – following the dear ones as time passes by

Laura is in her late 20ties and she lives in central Romania. She works in a betting agency. Her only trip outside of Romania was with her boyfriend and a group of friends to celebrate a New Year's Eve in Bulgaria. It was a positive experience, which she described in detail during the interview. When asked about travelling abroad, she claims it is important to visit your own country first before seeing other countries. However, she also explains how money and coordinating time off work with her boyfriend constrain opportunities for travelling abroad.

Laura also talks about family living in Greece with whom she stays in touch on a daily basis. It matters to her that virtual movement do not require financial resources, in

contrast to physical mobility. Asked about how difficult it is to maintain friendships across borders Laura claims without any hesitation that:

It's easy ... It's very easy ... There's the internet, there are phones. ... They [family] come to Romania every year, we meet every year.

She elaborates further on the importance of internet for staying in touch:

It's much easier to talk over the internet than over the phone. The telephone costs, the internet is cheaper. You can see photos online. You can see time passing them by, you can see, I don't know, that a cousin's wife in Greece just gave birth. I had the opportunity to see pictures of the little one that I wouldn't have seen until they came back to the country. The internet is important for me.

#### 6. Transnational – the privilege of being everywhere

Hans is 57 years old and lives in Northern Denmark, in a house with his wife and son. He is jobless at the moment, but has been a self-employed graphic designer with his own company. Later in his life, he worked for an export company which took him to several foreign countries:

It was more or less a coincidence that I later on changed direction and found a sales job, where I were to sell a Danish product, and consequently I got to travel around Europe. I was supposed to sell this product all over Europe. I had to get out there [in Europe], and I met a bunch of people... every single country in Europe.

Hans' story exemplifies some normalization of practices of EU-wide cross-border mobility, of physical travel for reasons of work and leisure, shopping internationally on a private basis using new technologies, but also keeping in touch with significant others across the borders and appreciating contacts with people from other cultural backgrounds. In particular, Hans is a musician and music fan, and travels with his family to go to music festivals abroad. As a member of Rotary Club, he enrolled one of his sons into an international student exchange program promoted by the club:

As a nuclear family with two kids, our way of travelling was very much a 'standard' kind of way. It's always been extraordinary going away with the kids. We've also taken the kids to Samsø Festival, because I'm very much into music. Besides from that, it's been quite ordinary. I've been the owner of a printing house for years, and that's where I got the idea of being a member of the Rotary Club [an international society of businessmen]. Some people consider it a lodge, but it's nothing like that. It's a humanitarian organization, and there's nothing secret about it. We don't wear top hats and white gloves, you know. There are some good people there, and being with certain personalities, you might end up learning something, right. [...] It was an exchange of different people, which I found very interesting. Exchange students. Our son chose to go to New York for a year, and we had a guy from Mexico, Gustavo, living with us.

Hans uses Skype routinely to keep in touch with other musicians Europe-wide – people who sometime host him and that he hosts in Denmark as well:

Last week we also went to Scotland. I have a lot of friends there. [...] We meet up in Skype and have one of those group conversations but unfortunately we can't practice music together this way... We are trying to collect enough money to make a new album... It's a bit unusual that Hans [himself] from Denmark, Pete from Sweden, and Henry from Glasgow, and we're able to chat like that.

His view of globalization is quite articulate. On the one hand he acknowledges the importance and the usefulness of wide and frequent social contacts, as well as the ease of shopping goods that would otherwise be rare to find, but on the other he is concerned about the possible loss of local traditions. This became evident to him when recently travelling across Italy:

I believe we need to be open-minded. I mean, we can't be great at everything we do, but we need to keep our eyes open to be able to learn. I might sound very old school now, but I think that the fact that the world has become smaller qua digitization has something to do with it, but has its downsides as well. It's great that we are able to look up anything on the internet, but when you go abroad they have the same stores everywhere, unfortunately.

#### Conclusion

In this paper we have argued that mobilities — in their plural and multidimensional manifestations — shape the everyday lives of Europeans on a much larger scale than has been recognised so far. Our interest lies particularly in cross-border mobilities, as these erode the 'container' nature of nation-state societies. Expanding on previous research on international migration within the EU, we contend that the process of European integration goes hand in hand with globalization and leads to enhanced relations among individuals that obliterate national boundaries.

While we cannot track the evolution of such cross-border activities over time, which may be a crucial test of the presumed growing interpenetration of European societies, we can however document the current spread and forms of these individual mobility patterns. To this purpose, in the paper we outlined – on the basis of LCA analysis – a typology of mobilities as experienced by European citizens sampled in the EUCROSS survey.

Our evidence shows that there are two polar social types: transnationals, scoring high on all forms of mobility, and locals, who stay aloof from all of them. Our estimate, on the basis of the weighted random six-country sample of the EUCROSS project, shows that these two extremes together account for slightly more than one third of EU citizens. The remaining two thirds, however, are not distributed along a simple continuum of gradients of mobility behaviours, but rather tend to assemble diverse combinations of mobilities that emphasize varying aspects of cross-border opportunities. While preliminary analysis indicates that country- and individual-level factors structure to some extent these 'mobility styles', further statistical analysis should seek to shed light on the relative

weight and interaction of macro and micro determinants of mobilities. Assuming that mobility is for the winners and immobility for the losers of Europeanization/globalization largely overlooks that the large majority of people are in a middle position – neither very mobile nor very immobile. The picture of mobilities in Europe is nuanced and reveals that social actors can carve a variety of strategies to adjust their individual lives to the debordering of European societies (see Andreotti el al. 2013).

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### **Cultural boundaries in Europe**<sup>5</sup>

#### Introduction

The EUCROSS project represents a valuable opportunity to understand more in depth how Europeans differentiate each other in terms of cultural tastes and practices and how the latter relate to mobility practices and different forms of sub- or supra-national identities.

Over the last few years, cultural sociology, specialized in the study of cultural consumption, has taken a descriptive turn: it has been argued that there is a need to grasp further the mechanisms that order people's cultural resources, or what Bourdieu (1979) has called 'cultural capital'. Indeed people's tastes or activities depend on the amount and the types of cultural resources people can draw on to appreciate different cultural genres. These resources are important to be unraveled as they give rise to symbolic boundaries, meaning that people use them not only to differentiate themselves one from another but also to socially distinguish themselves one from another. Indeed Bourdieu put forward the opposition between highbrow and popular culture. The first requires a 'highbrow disposition', meaning a capacity to decipher complex cultural genres and including a specific set of knowledge and expertise. The second is much more immediate and accessible to everyone by referring to people's ordinary life. Then it doesn't necessitate particular skills to be appreciated. Highbrow culture, being more exclusive and distinctive, is arguably more socially valued.

However, different scholars have now claimed that, although Bourdieu's theory is still very relevant to understand the mechanisms that tie culture and social divisions together, his cultural classification needs to be updated (Hanquinet, Roose, & Savage 2014; Prior 2005). Savage and his colleagues insisted on the necessity for scientists to reflect upon the pre-established categories they use and to assess their validity to describe cultural mechanisms at play in our societies: 'In order for research on cultural capital to progress, it is necessary to develop a richer descriptive understanding of the clustering of cultural taste, knowledge and participation in its own terms, rather than the reduction of particular, narrowly defined, cultural states to various socio-economic determinants' (2005: 12).

This has proven even more important as new forms of cultural distinction have emerged in the literature, such as the opposition between omnivores and univores. Indeed, since the later 1990s, Bourdieu's perspective has in turn been constantly disputed by a new perspective, led by Peterson and Simkus (2012; also see Peterson & Kern 1996; Peterson 2005). According to this, the upper classes — labeled as 'omnivores' — appreciate prestigious art forms but are also increasingly attracted by popular culture. Nowadays, the notion of omnivorousness suffers from a lack of clarity, having become pervaded with many different meanings. It can, for instance, be interpreted as a sign of a progressive decline of sociocultural hierarchies (e.g. Michaud 1997), although empirical studies tend to suggest that it has to be conceived as a new form of sociocultural distinction (Bryson 1996; Coulangeon & Lemel 2007). The elites would assert their status by showing cultural

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Laurie Hanquinet.

tolerance through omnivorous tastes. However qualitative studies have shown that there are indeed ways of being 'open to diversity' to paraphrase Ollivier (Ollivier 2008; Bellavance 2008). This definition is dangerously close to that of Hannerz (1990). Could omnivorousness be a specific manifestation visible in the domain of cultural practices of a wider phenomenon such as cosmopolitanism? Mixing political, cultural and social dimensions, Fridman and Ollivier (2004) even speak of 'an ostentatious openness to diversity', showing that tolerance is a part of the character of those with a breadth of social, economic and cultural resources. Nevertheless, while their approach has the benefit of indicating that omnivorousness is more than a range of tastes but also a 'discriminating attitude' (Warde, Wright, & Gayo-Cal 2008) and returns the debate to the heart of the question of cultural capital and its effects of distinction, the rapprochement established between cosmopolitanism and omnivorousness risks making of these 'catchall' categories which progressively lose their sense. Yet it is this question of interpretation which needs to be central in order to grasp the relevance of omnivorousness. Atkinson (2011) but most of all Lizardo and Skiles (2013) are right: we need to pay attention to the genesis of tastes and preferences.

More recently, Bennett and his colleagues (2009) showed that the first cultural dimension structuring the Brits' cultural tastes and activities opposed cultural engagement versus cultural disengagement. They observe the emergence, on the one hand, of people who are likely involved in many different practices, of which legitimacy differs, and, on the other hand, of people who tend not be involved in any activities, except watching television. This could seem as supporting Peterson's omnivorousness theory; however, the omnivorous patterns appear to follow specific boundaries. For instance, Brits who like foreign cultural products tend to appreciate what is actually culturally close, preferring for instance American culture more than anything else. This highlights the fact that the making of tastes should be studied with a more global approach that accounts for geocultural structuring factors. The EUCROSS project provides data that enable researcher to study some aspects of the European cultural field, and more especially the role of tastes in music and food, and how they reflect cultural but also symbolic boundaries that cross the European social space.

#### Tastes in food and in music in Europe

Before unraveling the mechanisms behind cultural classifications, let us start by describing the main trends in terms of music and food tastes. Table 1 shows the percentages of music tastes per country. Across the six countries, the most liked music genres are pop and rock. 44% of the people investigated declared to like (very much) each of them. Hip hop and metal music are the least liked genres with respectively 59% and 79% of people who don't like them (at all). Danes are characterized by an overrepresentation of those who like pop and rock music and of those who don't like hip hop. Germans, Italians and Spaniards appreciate to a greater extent classical music, compared to, among others, Danes who tend to like it proportionally less. Germans also are more likely than other nationalities to express a preference for jazz, metal, pop and rock and of a dislike of the traditional German and European music. In comparison preferences for traditional music from the country of residence and from Europe are overrepresented among Italians, Romanians and Spaniards. These three countries also

appreciate world music to a greater extent. Spain also likes metal, pop, rock music to a greater extent than most of the other countries compared to hip hop. Britons, who are comparatively more educated, have a stronger tendency to dislike music genres, except metal and hip hop.

Although it indicates expected results such as a link between tertiary education and classical music, Table 2 shows that music tastes tend not to have a 'linear' relationship with education. In most cases we can't conclude that the more educated people are, the more they like or dislike a specific music genre. Take pop music, for instance. Those who like it best have a degree between lower and higher secondary education and the least educated tend to dislike it most. However, a few interesting findings emerge. Traditional music whether it comes from the country of residence or another European country tend be preferred by those who have the lowest educational degree. This means that it is less the origin of the music than its traditional character that matters to define its public. Also rock music tends to be preferred by those who have greater educational resources. This is surprising as rock is often defined in the literature as a genre of common cultural legitimacy (Warde & Gayo-Cal 2009). Hip hop is not particularly disliked by those who have the highest degree. As a matter of fact, the least educated tend to least appreciate it.

The patterns are quite different for the links between music tastes and age. As table 3<sup>6</sup> shows, the relationships tend to develop in a much more linear way. The older people are, the more likely they are to like traditional and classical music and to dislike metal, pop, rock, hip hop. This is in line with the literature in cultural sociology which outlines the important of age in the making of tastes (Warde & Gayo-Cal 2009; Lizardo & Skiles 2013).

As mentioned earlier in this report, Salamonska, Recchi, Rossi and Baglioni have defined six different mobility groups. In table 4 we can see that transnationals show the strongest preference for world music, followed by the returnees and in contrast with the locals who tend to most dislike it. The returnees tend to have a similar profile as the transnationals with the exception that they appreciate more traditional music from the country of origin, which could possibly be a nostalgia effect. Both groups tend to have the highest means in terms of number of music genres liked. Visitors tend to also be characterized by a highbrow orientation but to like fewer highbrow genres in comparison with transnationals and returnees. However the three groups are only significantly different from the tourists and the locals in this respect. Both tourists and locals have the lowest means and tend to be more univorous. Tourists are likely not to like traditional music but to listen to pop music. Virtual transnationals appreciate to a greater extent traditional music from the country of residence compared to rock music.

Finally in terms of supra- or sub-national identity those who consider themselves as citizens of the world tend to appreciate world music to a greater extent than those who don't (30% of citizens of the world tend to like world music compared to 19%). Similarly there is an association between an identification to the country and to the region of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Both tables 2 and 3 don't show all the genres but only those for which the relationship with the other variable is most significant.

residence and a preference for music from country of residence. However, even among those who identify themselves to these geographical areas, there is still a substantial proportion who doesn't enjoy this music style. The same observation holds for the link between European identification and an appreciation of music from another country of Europe.

Table 1 Tastes in music by country

% within country		Denmark (national sample)	Germany (national sample)	Italy (national sample)	Romania (national sample)	Spain (national sample)	United Kingdom (national sample)	Total
World	World-	42.7%	33.8%	43.8%	41.4%	33.1%	49.2%	40.6%
music	World=	33.1%	39.9%	27.9%	30.6%	36.2%	28.9%	32.8%
(n=5803)	World+	24.2%	26.4%	28.4%	28.0%	30.7%	21.9%	26.6%
Classical	Classical-	43.9%	33.1%	34.8%	39.0%	34.9%	40.5%	37.7%
music	Classical=	22.4%	23.9%	23.4%	25.3%	25.3%	23.1%	23.9%
(n=5919)	Classical+	33.7%	42.9%	41.8%	35.7%	39.8%	36.5%	38.4%
Jazz	Jazz-	48.8%	39.4%	39.1%	47.0%	48.0%	47.7%	45.0%
(n=5889)	Jazz=	24.9%	28.1%	23.4%	23.6%	23.8%	24.0%	24.6%
	Jazz+	26.3%	32.5%	37.5%	29.4%	28.2%	28.3%	30.4%
Traditional	TradCoR-	47.9%	70.1%	25.8%	23.7%	30.3%	54.5%	42.1%
from CoR	TradCoR=	24.3%	16.5%	21.0%	13.6%	23.3%	22.3%	20.2%
(n=5927)	TradCoR+	27.8%	13.4%	53.2%	62.6%	46.4%	23.2%	37.7%
Traditional	TradEU-	57.5%	60.6%	45.3%	49.9%	49.5%	70.0%	55.6%
from	TradEU=	21.1%	25.5%	26.1%	22.6%	25.2%	17.1%	22.9%
Europe (n=5731)	TradEU+	21.5%	13.9%	28.6%	27.5%	25.4%	12.9%	21.5%
Metal	Metal-	83.2%	72.1%	84.1%	80.6%	75.9%	78.3%	79.0%
music	Metal=	8.2%	13.0%	7.4%	9.3%	10.4%	9.2%	9.6%
(n=5765)	Metal+	8.7%	14.9%	8.5%	10.1%	13.6%	12.6%	11.4%
Pop	Pop-	20.1%	25.1%	38.5%	39.5%	25.7%	31.8%	30.0%
(n=5886)	Pop=	27.7%	26.6%	20.3%	26.9%	24.6%	27.8%	25.7%
	Pop+	52.2%	48.4%	41.2%	33.5%	49.7%	40.4%	44.3%
Rock	Rock-	29.1%	25.7%	32.3%	57.9%	30.5%	34.5%	34.9%
(n=5898)	Rock=	22.4%	22.7%	19.4%	17.6%	20.3%	25.4%	21.3%
	Rock+	48.5%	51.6%	48.3%	24.6%	49.1%	40.1%	43.8%
Нір Нор	НірНор-	64.4%	55.2%	60.0%	53.7%	67.6%	55.2%	59.4%
(n=5793)	НірНор=	21.1%	22.7%	18.2%	16.3%	17.0%	18.1%	18.9%
	HipHop+	14.5%	22.0%	21.8%	30.0%	15.4%	26.7%	21.7%

Note: Exact question: On a scale from one to five, where one means "Not at all" and five means "Very much", how much do you like the following kinds of music?

The results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer's V (p< 0.001), indicating a significant relationship between countries and music tastes.

Table 2 Tastes for classical music, Jazz, traditional music from country of origin and from another European country, pop, rock and hip hop by level of education

% within educational level		Lower	In-between	Higher	Tertiary	Total
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		secondary	lower and	secondary	education	
		education	higher	education		
		or less	secondary	(university		
			education	entrance		
				requirement)		
Classical music	Classical-	43.7%	46.7%	42.0%	27.3%	37.6%
(n=5747)	Classical=	22.0%	21.5%	24.2%	26.1%	24.0%
	Classical+	34.3%	31.8%	33.8%	46.6%	38.4%
Jazz	Jazz-	55.7%	49.5%	45.5%	36.7%	44.8%
(n=5825)	Jazz=	19.6%	23.8%	25.6%	27.2%	24.7%
	Jazz+	24.7%	26.7%	28.9%	36.1%	30.5%
Traditional from CoR	TradCoR-	22.8%	46.4%	41.3%	50.0%	41.8%
(n=5865)	TradCoR=	15.9%	22.7%	17.9%	23.0%	20.3%
	TradCoR+	61.2%	30.9%	40.8%	27.1%	37.9%
Traditional from Europe	TradEU-	49.5%	57.6%	54.9%	58.0%	55.5%
(n=5674)	TradEU=	21.0%	23.0%	23.2%	23.6%	22.9%
	TradEU+	29.4%	19.4%	21.9%	18.4%	21.6%
Рор	Рор-	43.1%	25.3%	28.8%	25.9%	29.9%
(n=5826)	Pop=	20.1%	26.1%	24.7%	29.3%	25.8%
	Pop+	36.8%	48.6%	46.5%	44.8%	44.3%
Rock	Rock-	48.2%	33.2%	36.6%	27.3%	34.7%
(n=5836)	Rock=	18.2%	21.3%	20.1%	23.8%	21.3%
	Rock+	33.5%	45.5%	43.4%	48.9%	43.9%
Нір Нор	НірНор-	71.8%	58.1%	49.2%	60.2%	59.3%
(n=5736)	НірНор=	13.4%	20.4%	19.7%	20.5%	18.9%
	НірНор+	14.8%	21.5%	31.2%	19.3%	21.7%

Note: The results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer's V (p< 0.001).

Table 3 Tastes for classical music, traditional music from country of origin and from another European country, metal music, pop, rock and hip hop by age band

% within age bands		34 and less	35-54	55 and more	Total
Classical music (n=5919)	Classical-	51.8%	36.9%	28.1%	37.7%
	Classical=	23.5%	27.1%	20.7%	23.9%
	Classical+	24.7%	36.0%	51.2%	38.4%
Traditional from CoR (n=5925)	TradCoR-	52.6%	47.4%	28.6%	42.1%
	TradCoR=	18.7%	20.6%	20.8%	20.2%
	TradCoR+	28.7%	32.0%	50.5%	37.7%
Traditional from Europe (n=5731)	TradEU-	63.8%	57.7%	47.0%	55.6%
	TradEU=	21.1%	22.2%	24.9%	22.9%
	TradEU+	15.1%	20.0%	28.1%	21.5%
Metal music (n=5767)	Metal-	74.2%	74.9%	87.5%	79.0%
	Metal=	11.2%	11.1%	6.5%	9.6%
	Metal+	14.6%	13.9%	6.0%	11.4%
Pop (n=5886)	Pop-	22.9%	19.2%	47.2%	30.0%
	Pop=	26.7%	26.6%	23.9%	25.7%
	Pop+	50.4%	54.3%	28.9%	44.3%
Rock (n=5897)	Rock-	31.8%	26.0%	46.8%	34.8%
	Rock=	21.3%	21.8%	20.8%	21.3%
	Rock+	47.0%	52.2%	32.4%	43.8%
Hip Hop (n=5795)	НірНор-	36.1%	57.2%	80.0%	59.4%
	HipHop=	22.2%	22.9%	12.0%	18.9%
	HipHop+	41.7%	19.9%	8.0%	21.7%

Note: The results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer's V (p< 0.001).

Table 4 Tastes music by mobility groups

%								
within		virtual						
mobility		trans-		Trans-	lasala			
groups World music	World-	nationals 37.6%	tourists 41.9%	nationals 27.2%	locals <b>45.2%</b>	visitors 38.6%	returnees 38.4%	40.6%
(n=5578)	World=	33.2%	33.8%	39.8%	31.0%	36.2%	30.6%	33.1%
, , ,	World+							
		29.2%	24.3%	33.0%	23.9%	25.2%	31.0%	26.2%
Classical music	Classical-	38.7%	37.8%	25.4%	40.4%	39.9%	34.4%	37.7%
(n=5686)	Classical=	27.1%	24.7%	26.0%	21.7%	27.8%	21.9%	24.1%
( 5555)	Classical+	34.2%	37.5%	48.6%	37.9%	32.3%	43.7%	38.3%
Jazz	Jazz-	46.6%	42.3%	33.5%	52.9%	40.7%	43.0%	45.1%
(n=5659)	Jazz=	26.0%	25.6%	25.6%	23.4%	26.5%	22.3%	24.6%
	Jazz+	27.4%	32.1%	40.8%	23.7%	32.8%	34.7%	30.3%
Traditional	TradCoR-	31.5%	54.3%	56.2%	28.5%	54.3%	35.4%	42.0%
from CoR	TradCoR=	16.7%	22.2%	22.0%	19.0%	20.8%	19.7%	20.2%
(n=5642)	TradCoR+	51.7%	23.5%	21.8%	52.5%	24.9%	44.9%	37.8%
Traditional	TradEU-	52.3%	61.4%	52.7%	53.1%	59.9%	49.4%	55.7%
from Europe	TradEU=	24.2%	21.7%	25.9%	23.1%	24.5%	21.4%	22.9%
(n=5504)	TradEU+	23.5%	16.9%	21.3%	23.8%	15.7%	29.2%	21.4%
Metal music	Metal-	82.6%	77.0%	77.0%	84.9%	66.4%	80.4%	78.8%
(n=5544)	Metal=	6.9%	11.2%	9.7%	6.6%	14.4%	9.0%	9.5%
	Metal+	10.5%	11.8%	13.4%	8.5%	19.2%	10.6%	11.6%
Рор	Pop-	30.9%	22.2%	23.4%	39.2%	20.5%	35.5%	29.8%
(n=5659)	Pop=	25.2%	29.4%	31.6%	22.5%	26.7%	22.3%	25.7%
	Pop+	44.0%	48.3%	44.9%	38.3%	52.8%	42.2%	44.5%
Rock	Rock-	47.5%	25.4%	20.9%	46.4%	20.5%	40.6%	34.8%
(n=5665)	Rock=	19.4%	22.4%	26.3%	20.7%	22.7%	18.3%	21.3%
	Rock+	33.1%	52.2%	52.8%	32.9%	56.8%	41.1%	43.9%
Нір Нор	НірНор-	52.6%	59.7%	55.1%	67.7%	45.8%	60.4%	59.4%
(n=5572)	НірНор=	17.6%	22.2%	22.6%	16.2%	22.7%	14.8%	19.1%
	НірНор+	29.7%	18.1%	22.3%	16.1%	31.5%	24.8%	21.5%

Note: The results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer's V (p< 0.001).

Let us now examine differences in food tastes. As table 5 indicates French cuisine is unevenly popular across countries and is comparatively less liked by Romanians and Brits. Spaniards and Danes appreciate it to a greater extent. Spanish cuisine is much more appreciated by Italians than by the others. Italians also like cuisine from North and Central Europe more than people of the other nationalities. Cuisine from the South of Europe is particularly appreciated by Danes and Germans. Mexican cuisine is more often mentioned by Spanish respondents. Turkish cuisine is appreciated by Romanians to a greater extent, possibly because of a shared Ottoman background. Brits particularly like Asian cuisine, probably due to their links with India. A taste for South-American and Caribbean cuisine is also overrepresented among the Brits. Interestingly almost a third of Italians don't like foreign cuisine whereas only 2% of Germans and 5% of Brits share the same opinion.

All food tastes go along with significant differences between the levels of education (except North and Central European cuisine). The least educated tend to appreciate less foreign cuisine compared to the other groups of education and the relationships are not always 'linear'. For some cuisines, the second group of education (In-between lower and higher secondary education) shows some greater appreciation. Table 6 shows the relationships between French, Italian, Asian cuisines and level of education, as they are the strongest. French cuisine is much more enjoyed by people with tertiary degree than people with fewer educational resources. Asian cuisine follows the same pattern but Italian cuisine is most appreciated by the second group of education. Table 6 also indicates that around a third of those with at maximum lower secondary education don't enjoy foreign food.

Age seems to be associated with food tastes (table 7). A preference for French cuisine is overrepresented among people aged of at least 55. On the contrary the younger generations are characterized by a taste for Asian cuisine. Italian and Mexican foods tend to be appreciated to a lesser extent by the older generations but are not most popular among the youngest. Some dislike for foreign cuisine characterizes 21% of those who are older than 54 years.

Let us have a look at the association between mobility practices and food tastes. Among the transnationals each of the foreign cuisines shown in Table 8 is most likely to be enjoyed more than in the rest of the sample. The tourists tend also to enjoy various foreign cuisines. In comparison the locals are characterised by an overrepresentation of people who don't like foreign food (27% of the locals). The virtual transnationals represent the second group to dislike foreign food but they tend enjoy Italian food. 45% of the visitors tend to appreciate Asian food. They tend to like it more than other European cuisine such as French cuisines. As previously the links between tastes and subor supra-identity is not very strong with a quite a few associations being insignificant. Tastes seem more related to mobility practices than to identity.

Table 5 Foreign food tastes by country

(n=5658 except Italian and Spanish cuisines)	DK	DE	IT	RO	SP	UK	
French cuisine	21.4%	16.8%	19.1%	9.9%	21.2%	15.3%	17.5%
Italian cuisine (n=4692)	45.0%	63.8%	NA	52.5%	47.8%	42.0%	50.1%
Spanish cuisine (including cuisine from Malta) (n=4675)	12.2%	12.2%	23.5%	7.8%	NA	10.3%	13.4%
Cuisine from North and Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, Czech, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Swiss)	7.5%	8.0%	10.3%	7.9%	6.1%	2.3%	7.0%
Cuisine from the South of Europe (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Albania)	10.5%	18.5%	6.7%	7.2%	3.5%	4.1%	8.4%
Cuisine from Baltic and Nordic countries (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Iceland, Norway)	3.5%	.7%	1.1%	.5%	.2%	.1%	1.0%
Mexican cuisine	5.3%	3.0%	5.2%	1.7%	10.9%	5.2%	5.3%
Turkish cuisine	4.2%	4.5%	2.4%	12.5%	2.1%	1.7%	4.3%
Asian cuisine	26.8%	36.8%	21.8%	12.5%	26.0%	61.6%	31.5%
Anglo-Saxon	3.2%	2.2%	1.5%	1.5%	2.1%	1.0%	1.9%
South-American and Caribbean	.7%	2.8%	4.8%	1.1%	6.4%	4.7%	3.5%
African cuisine	1.2%	2.6%	3.6%	.9%	5.2%	2.5%	2.7%
No foreign cuisine	6.8%	1.7%	29.7%	12.7%	18.6%	5.4%	12.5%

Note: Exact question: Please think about foreign cuisine, i.e., all which is originally from outside [CoR]. Which national cuisines do you like best? Multiple answers possible (up to 3 answers). The results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer's V (p< 0.001).

Table 6 Tastes for French, Italian, Asian cuisine and no taste for foreign cuisine by the level of education

(n=5596, except Italian	Lower	Lower In-between Higher secondary		Tertiary	
cuisine)	secondary	lower and higher	education (university	education	
	education or	secondary	entrance		
	less	education	requirement)		
French cuisine	12.7%	13.6%	15.4%	23.2%	17.6%
Italian cuisine (n=4635)	32.4%	54.3%	51.2%	54.9%	50.2%
Asian cuisine	23.0%	32.0%	29.8%	36.2%	31.4%
No foreign cuisine	33.1%	6.1%	12.1%	5.4%	12.5%

Note: The results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer's V (p< 0.001).

Table 7 Tastes for French, Italian, Mexican, Asian cuisine and no taste for foreign cuisine by age bands

(n=5658 except Italian cuisine)	34 and	35-54	55 and	
	less		more	
French cuisine	10.2%	17.6%	23.0%	17.5%
Italian cuisine	50.6%	55.3%	44.1%	50.2%
(n=4694)				
Mexican cuisine	6.7%	7.5%	2.0%	5.4%
Asian cuisine	38.1%	34.7%	23.0%	31.5%
No foreign cuisine	6.5%	8.9%	20.9%	12.5%

Note: The results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer's V (p< 0.001).

Table 8 Tastes for French, Italian, Spanish, South European, Asian cuisine and no taste for foreign cuisine by age bands

(n=5432		Minternal					
except Italian	T	Virtual					
and Spanish	Trans-	transnatio			_		
cuisines)	nationals	nals	Visitors	Tourists	Locals	Returnees	All
French	25.9%	10.1%	15.8%	21.3%	13.4%	19.8%	17.5%
cuisine							
Italian cuisine	56.4%	54.5%	54.3%	54.3%	39.9%	50.6%	50.1%
(n=4514)							
Spanish	16.0%	9.7%	14.4%	15.9%	10.3%	12.7%	13.3%
cuisine							
(n=4474)							
South EU	9.8%	5.7%	7.6%	12.2%	7.5%	5.0%	8.5%
Asian cuisine	43.3%	29.6%	44.7%	31.5%	24.0%	29.5%	31.4%
No foreign	1.7%	15.0%	3.8%	4.9%	26.9%	9.9%	12.4%
cuisine							

Note: The results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer's V (p< 0.001).

# **Cultural divisions in Europe**

Now that we have a clearer idea of music and food tastes, we will assess what the main cultural divisions are in Europe. In the following section, we will unravel the main oppositions in terms of tastes that differentiate Europeans one from another.

### Multiple Correspondence Analysis

In order to obtain the main dimensions structuring the European space of tastes, we will perform multiple correspondence analysis. This method, which is the same as the one used in Bourdieu's *Distinction* (1979), is much valued to provide a picture of the organization of tastes in Europe and their relationships to mobility practices, identities and social space. Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) can be conceived as the equivalent of principal component analysis for categorical data, e.g. with a finite number of categories or modalities (Le Roux & Rouanet 2004). This method is a geometric approach that conceptualizes multivariate datasets as clouds of points in an Euclidean space. The analysis is performed by investigating two clouds, the cloud of modalities and the cloud of individuals.

MCA allows an emphasis on individuals. Compared to standard Factor Analysis that mainly focuses on variables, it is possible to interpret people's distribution in the cloud according to their tastes and practices because one is not limited to the study of underlying structures. Next to the active variables (those that construct the space), MCA permits to implement supplementary variables in the constructed space that help to understand it further. MCA does not then reify variables as agents instead of individuals, which is, according to Manzo (2005), one of the main problems of quantitative empirical sociology.

As Rouanet, Ackerman and Le Roux put it (2000), Bourdieu – who first popularized this technique in the sociology of culture - stressed its relational character (on relational techniques, see also Emirbayer 1997; Mohr 1998). Hence, he strongly objected to linear models that tend to hide the system of relations behind the causal link between a dependent variable and an independent one. Although it was put aside for long partly because of a dominant postpositivism, there has been a striking revival of this geometrical technique over the last decade (e.g. Bennett et al. 2009; Prieur, Rosenlund & Skjott-Larson 2008).

Given its relational features, MCA is certainly appropriate to test a correspondence between the space of tastes and practices and social space (Wuggenig 2007). The idea that reality is relational is central to the understanding that tastes and activities cannot be understood out of the social context that gives them meaning. MCA focuses on underlying dimensions, so that the findings can be interpreted in terms of relational differentiation that does not lean too heavily on the specific items used (Abbott 1988; Atkinson 2011). This also has an indirect consequence: since the relations between tastes can evolve, the structures (or in MCA terms the axes) that socially order them can also evolve. In this sense, it is not surprising that Bennett et al. (2009) found somewhat different cultural patterning in the UK compared to Bourdieu's results. However, this does not devalue Bourdieu's approach since the latter is able to account for historical changes. The value of MCA consists in being able to uncover and to visualize the complex

relationships between the different components of cultural participation that could not be unraveled with a one-dimensional cultural index.

#### **Data and Variables**

The analysis includes 20 active variables and 50 active modalities (i.e. categories of variables). 'Active' means that they contribute to the construction of the space of tastes. Other modalities are left 'passive'; this means that they are not used in the development of the analysis<sup>7</sup>. Typical passive modalities are missing answers, refusals to answer, 'other', etc. These should not be confused with the supplementary variables/ modalities which are variables that are inserted inside the cloud of modalities once MCA has been built to better understand the distribution of modalities and individuals. Sociodemographic items are usually used as supplementary variables to understand, for instance, how age can be related to an opposition between offline and online cultural participation. The position in the clouds indicates with which cultural practices and tastes age can be associated. These supplementary variables are often used as 'structuring factors': they structure the cloud of individuals not only by the mean points of their modalities but also by sub-clouds (showing their dispersion).

Table 9 recapitulates the active variables setting up the space. The variables already mentioned in this paper are used in addition to a variable measuring whether people follow sport in the media. 5649 individuals constitute the sample. Individuals who didn't give an answer to the questions with regard to music tastes and to food tastes have been excluded. The data have been weighted. Table 10 shows the supplementary variables and their associated frequencies for the active sample used in the MCA.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> When this happens, a specific MCA is undertaken.

#### **Table 9 Active variables**

#### **Music tastes**

On a scale from one to five, where one means "Not at all" and five means "Very much", how much do you like the following kinds of music?

- World music
- Classical music
- Jazz and Blues
- Traditional and folk music from country of residence
- Traditional and folk music from other European countries
- Metal
- Pop
- Rock
- Hip-Hop and R'n'B

1 don't like

2 Indifferent

3 Like

#### **Food tastes**

Please think about foreign cuisine, i.e., all which is originally from outside [CoR]. Which national cuisines do you like best? Multiple answers possible

- French cuisine
- Italian cuisine
- Spanish cuisine (+ Malte)
- South European
- Baltic and Nordic cuisine + North and central European cuisine
- Turkish cuisine
- Anglo-Saxon cuisine (only 2% but results don't change with or without)
- South-American and Caribbean cuisine
   + African cuisine (including South-Africa)
- Asian cuisine
- Mexican cuisine

1 yes 2 no

#### Follow sports in the media

Based on the two following questions:

Do you, in general, follow sports in the media? No

Yes, at least once a week

Yes, less regularly

And do you follow sports on an international level or in another country (e.g. watching matches of the German Bundesliga or the Formula-One world championship)?

No (I don't follow sport on an international level)

Yes, at least once a week

Yes, less regularly

NOTE. The question was only asked to those who watch sports in the media

- 1 No sport Tv
- 2 No sport International but sport
- 3 Sport international and more local

Table 10 Supplementary variables for the MCA

Age bands	Gender	Education
24 and less (11.9) 25-34 (14.6) 35-44 (20.9) 45-54 (17.6) 55-64 (16.8) 65 and more (18.2)	Men (48.9) Women (51.1)	Lower secondary education or less (19.8) In-between lower and higher secondary education (17.6) Higher secondary education (24.6) Tertiary (38)
Socio-professional Status	Subjective income	Types of cross-bordering Europeans
In full time paid work [(or away temporarily) (46.6) In part time paid work [(or away temporarily) (9.7) In education [even if on vacation (8.4) Unemployed (6.9) Retired (22.9) Doing housework, looking after children or other persons (4.3) [Other (e.g. permanently sick or disabled)] (1.3)	We are living very comfortably on the money we have (13.8) We are living comfortably on the money we have (43.2) We make ends meet (29.6) We find it difficult (9.5) We find it very difficult (4.0)	Virtual transnationals (7.5) Tourists (28.3) Transnationals (6.4) Locals (28.9) Visitors (13.5) Returnees (15.4)

Note: The percentages come from the active respondents included in the MCA.

## Main cultural dimensions in the European space of tastes

The first step in a specific MCA consists in choosing the number of axes that properly define the space of cultural profiles. The modified rates<sup>8</sup> indicate that one axis is not sufficient (25%), whereas taking the five first axes brings explained variance up to 67%. We will then analyse and interpret the first five axes which reflect the main cultural dimensions in the European space of tastes. In order to do so, two tools can be useful. First, the modalities that contribute more than average to an axis should be identified: they guide us in the interpretation and the labelling of the axes. The average contribution of a modality is 100/50 or 2. Each modality having a contribution equal to or higher than 2% contributes significantly to the (formation of the) axis and gives us some information about its meaning. Second, two-dimensional figures can also be used to assess the location of these most contributing modalities and their relations with other relevant modalities. These graphs illustrate the relations between relevant modalities in a more understandable way than graphs representing more dimensions.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> These rates give a better assessment of the importance of axes (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2004, pp. 200–201).

Table 11 Eigenvalues and modified rates of the most important axes

Number	Eigenvalue	Percentage	Modified rates	Cumulated modified rates
1	0.1017	6.75	24.7%	24.7%
2	0.0983	6.52	22.4%	47.0%
3	0.0735	4.88	9.1%	56.1%
4	0.0638	4.24	5.5%	61.6%
5	0.0626	4.15	5.1%	66.6%

Axis 1: musical openness versus localness, see Figure 1

We start here by interpreting axis 1. If you have a look at the significant modalities, we see that there are 13 modalities from 7 variables that contribute more than average to the orientation of the first axis. They account for 80.6% of the variance in that axis. These modalities refer all to music tastes.


We can now have a look at Figure 1 who shows modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on axis 1 in the two-dimensional space created by this axis and axis 2<sup>9</sup>. Figure 1 includes then more modalities than the 13 most contributing modalities (which contribute to 26% of the variance on axis 1: 13/50) and shows how some food choices can be linked to music tastes on the right and on the left of the axis 1. When two modalities from different variables are close to each other, it means that people who chose one tended to choose the other. When two modalities from the same variable are located near each other, this means that respondents who selected one of the categories tend to have the same patterns of choice (as defined by the plane 1-2) than those who selected the other.

Axis 1 illustrates a tension between a taste for diverse music genres and, especially metal, rock and hip hop, on the left and a dislike of most genres with the exception of an appreciation of traditional music from country of residence on the right. It is worth noting that classical music has a very limited contribution to axis 1. Therefore axis 1 refers more to the wideness of the musical repertoire people listen to than to the highbrow nature of their tastes.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Note that we have chosen here to represent spaces created by axes which succeed one another in terms of the importance of their eigenvalue. For instance, axis 1 is represented in its relation with axis 2. However, it is possible to illustrate the interactions between axes 1 and 3, for instance.

Figure 1 Modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on axis 1



# Axis 2: Highbrow Europe-oriented profile and lowbrow orientation, see figure 2

There are 13 modalities from 7 variables that contribute more than average to the orientation of the first axis. They account for 90.7% of the variance in that axis. Most of the variables contributing more than average are related to music preferences; however, enjoying Asian (at the top) or French (on the bottom) cuisine does significantly contribute to axis 2. As previously Figure 2 shows the distribution of most relevant modalities to axis 2 but doesn't limit itself to the ones whose contribution is above average. Figure 2 shows then the same space as Figure 1 but focuses on axis 2 this time.

At the top, can be found a rejection of classical music, of traditional music both from country of residence and another European country, of world music and of jazz but a preference for Asian food. At the bottom, the opposite profile seems to emerge. A taste for traditional music from another European country turns to be very important, alongside enjoying classical and world music, traditional from CoR and Jazz. In terms of food, French and Northern, Central European and Baltic cuisines are appreciated. This could reveal an opposition between a highbrow Europe-oriented profile and a more lowbrow orientation.





Figure 2 Modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on axis 2

Axis 3: Love for highbrow European cuisine & Indifference and rejection of traditional and popular music versus Love for traditional and popular music & dislike of highbrow foreign cuisine, see figure 3

There are 15 modalities from 10 variables that contribute more than average to the orientation of the first axis. They account for 72.8% of the variance in that axis.

At the top, French cuisine seems to be accompanied by mixed feelings about a rather broad range of music tastes and a rejection of hip hop. French cuisine goes along with Italian food this time. At the bottom, this time classical music and jazz are not associated with traditional music but metal music, pop and hip hop. Italian cuisine is not enjoyed here.

Figure 3 Modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on axis 3



# Axis 4: forms of cultural proximity, see figure 4

There are 13 modalities from 9 variables that contribute more than average to the orientation of the first axis. They account for 66.7% of the variance in that axis.

At the top are located a preference for Turkish cuisine, Southern and Northern European cuisines, a rejection of classical music and the category related to following sport at an international level in the media. At the bottom can be found an appreciation of different forms of music, including metal, jazz and classical, a taste for Asian and French cuisine and no sport in the media. A look at the Figure 9 (see further below) helps us to understand further this distinction. It enables us to better understand axis 4, which seems to reflect cultural proximity coming from the past. Romania, which was part of the Ottoman Empire, is attracted to Turkish cuisine. It also enjoys other European Northern and Southern food. The UK's favourite food is Asian food, which includes Indian cuisine. This mirrors that close links tied between India and the UK. Given the other cultural variables present in this area, it could be postulated that the bottom of the axis reflects national subculture. More generally this axis could arguably be more influenced by migration patterns or background than by socio-economic variables, as we will see below.




Figure 4 Modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on axis 4

# Axis 5: European versus non-European tastes, see figure 5

There are 13 modalities from 9 variables that contribute more than average to the orientation of the first axis. They account for 77.3% of the variance in this axis.

Tastes for European vs. non-European food seem to structure the fifth axis, with at the top a preference for South-American, Mexican, Asian foods and at the bottom an appreciation of Anglo-Saxon, French, South-European, and Italian cuisines.

Sth American/ Africa

Mexican cuisine

Asian cuisine

TradEU=

Rock= • TradCoR=

No sport TV •

No Italian cuisine

TradEU
Rock+ • No Asian cuisine

Metal+ • Italian cuisine

Figure 5 Modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on axis 5

# **Exploration of the cultural space**

French cuisine

Anglo-Saxon

Let us investigate further the differences between Europeans when it comes to tastes and assess the relations between tastes and socio-demographic background. Figure 6 shows the location of the variables of gender, age, education, socio-professional status, and subjective income in the plane formed by the axes 1 and 2. The structures are exactly the same as those identified before. As a reminder, axis 1 opposes an orientation towards localness in terms of music tastes (positive coordinates) to a tendency to be more open to musical diversity (negative coord.) and axis 2 a lowbrow more cosmopolitan profile (positive coord.) to a highbrow Europe-oriented one (negative coord.).

South EU

Gender, being located near the intersection between the two axes, has almost no effect on both axes. It has actually no effect on the five first dimensions. In comparison age seems more relevant to understand the distribution of respondents in the cloud. The

strongest oppositions on axis 1 is between the categories '25-34' and '35-44' on the left and the age band '65 and more' on the right. More generally, people from 18 to 54 years-old are located closer to musical openness and people aged at least 55 to musical localness. On the second axis there is an even clearer link with age with the younger respondents situated at the top of the plane 1-2 and the older at the bottom. The greatest gap is between the youngest category and the oldest one. This means that young people tend to have a more lowbrow profile than to older people who are more inclined to have highbrow Europe-oriented tastes. Age has also a relation to axis 3 (see Figure 7). The generations above 44 years tend to have a closer affinity with a love for French cuisine and an indifferent attitude towards most music genres (except a rejection of hip hop), while the younger generations appear to enjoy more various (lowbrow) forms of music compared to highbrow European food. However the gap between them is much smaller than on axes 1 and 2.

Socio-professional status echoes some of the results associated with age. On axis 1 those in education (negative coord.) are opposed to the retired (positive coord.). However, there is also a fairly strong gap between those who have a full time job compared to the retired and also the person in charge of the housework. This shows that the positioning of individuals in the space might not only be linked to age and life cycles but also to some kind of withdrawal into the home. Axis 2 is more explicitly associated with age, by distinguishing people in education and retired. This is in line with what we have just seen about the effect of age. MCA is not designed to assess whether age and socio-professional have a distinctive impact, as it is not the aim of the technique. The variable appears barely linked to axis 3, although there doesn't seem to have an opposition between retirees and people in paid work but there is a very small one between retirees and housewives now. Subjective income turns to be more important to understand axis 3, with less well-put people closer to a large lowbrow music repertoire. Amateurs of Italian and French cuisine are wealthier (at least subjectively).

Education offers some insights about axis 1 and axis 3. The stronger opposition on both axes is between tertiary education on the left of the axis 1 and at the bottom of axis 3 and lower secondary education (or less) on the right of the axis 1 and at the top of axis 3.

To recap, in the upper quadrant on the left of Figure 6, can be found people whose musical openness is more oriented towards lowbrow genres. They tend to be young and in education, likely to obtain more cultural resources in a near future. In the lower quadrant on the right, are located educated middle-aged respondents professionally active who enjoy a more highbrow profile in their openness (visible in their preference for French cuisine). A highbrow profile drawing on more traditional and local cultural genres can be associated with older people with a lower level of education and with a smaller subjective income in the lower quadrant on the right. Musical lowbrow localness is to a lesser extent related to the socio-demographic variables investigated. Figure 7 shows that a taste for specific cuisine goes along with cultural and economic capital. Beyond the third axis, the associations with these variables become insignificant.

Figure 6 Age, Gender, Education, Socio-professional status, and Subjective income in plane 1-2 (cloud of modalities)




Figure 7 Age, Gender, Education, Socio-professional status, and Subjective income in plane 2-3 (cloud of modalities)




Figure 8 shows the distribution of the nationalities in the space 1-2. Germans are overrepresented in the upper quadrant on the left compared to other nationalities, i.e. among those who are characterized by musical openness more oriented towards lowbrow genres. Romanians and Italians are more likely to have the opposite configuration. However, the differences on the axis are quite small. The gaps are wider on the axis 2. It opposes the Britons, closer to the lowbrow orientation, to Italians who appear closer to a taste for French cuisine. Axis 3 (see figure 9) shows a small contrast between Romanians and Italians on one hand and Germans on the other. The position of Italians can be understood once we know that less than a third of Italians don't like foreign food. Also Italians and Romanians tend to appreciate traditional music. Germans' position reflects some affinity with French cuisine. Figure 9, already discussed above, also shows that the opposition between Romanians and Britons on axis 4 is stronger. Figure 10 shows that Germans and Romanians tend to be overrepresented among those who like European cuisine, compared to Britons and Italians.

Figure 8 Countries in the space 1-2 (cloud of modalities)




Figure 9 Countries in the space 3-4 (cloud of modalities)





Figure 10 Countries in the space 4-5 (cloud of modalities)



The different types of sub- or supra-national identities appear to be relatively unrelated to the question of tastes in the European space. The categories within each variable don't show significant oppositions on any of the five axes. What is somewhat more interesting are the different positions of the types of cross-bordering Europeans. Figure 11 now shows the cloud of individuals. The meaning of the axes and the relations between the categories remain the same. Only the scale has changed, as the figure doesn't illustrate the modalities in the cloud of modalities but their mean-points in the cloud of individuals. This move towards the cloud of individuals enables us to use ellipses of concentration which encircle about 86% of individuals having selected a specific modality. Figure 11 indicates that there is a noticeable deviation between the visitors and the transnationals (here on the graph) on the left and the locals on the right given the partial overlapping of the two ellipses. Not very surprisingly, the locals are closer to the pole of localness, whereas the transnationals and the visitors are more characterised by musical openness. The differences between these mobility groups become more tenuous on the other axes. As figure 12 points out, there is a very small deviation between the visitors and the returnees on axis 2 and a slightly greater one between the transnationals and the virtual transnationals on axis 3.

Figure 11 Types of cross-bordering Europeans in the space 1-2 (cloud of individuals 60% of the sample)





Figure 12 Types of cross-bordering Europeans in the space 2-3 (cloud of individuals 60% of the sample)



## **Conclusion**

This chapter offers new insights in the making of cultural tastes. Compared to standard research in cultural sociology, EUCROSS provides us with exceptional data to evaluate the role of concrete or symbolic geographic boundaries in people's tastes. Although our analysis was limited to three areas of tastes (music, food, and sport), it showed quite different patterns compared to previous similar research focusing on only one country or region (e.g. Bennett et al.). The first axis is not strictly speaking dedicated to an opposition between cultural engagement versus disengagement but rather illustrates a tension between openness and localness especially in terms of music. We can assume that those who are more open tend to be more omnivorous but omnivorousness is not standing alone here and is entangled within another distinction between global and local. Similarly if there exist highbrow mechanisms of distinction, they are more complicated than often assumed and have different implications whether one is more a food or a music lover. By distinguishing a love for music from a culinary taste, axis 3 shows that specific areas of tastes can be more salient in some cultural profiles than in others. Axes 4 and 5 are also very interesting as they underline very well the role that cultural affinity among different cultural groups can play in what one likes, showing that the socioeconomic background doesn't explain everything when it comes to cultural profiles. Axis 5 illustrates an interest for European or non-European culture (through food) but also an opposite attraction to what is close and familiar or to what is more exotic.

We have also seen that countries have to some extent different cultural profiles according to their proximity with culture within Europe or not but also according to their past interactions with other cultural groups. Mobility practices can also be related to tastes with the more mobile having more cultural resources to acquire a diversity of tastes. Our results underline again the link between education and openness, while both seem also associated with mobility practices. This tends to be in line with an idea of highly mobile cultural elites, opposed to more locally anchored and less cultural and economically rich groups.

In terms of identity the different configurations of tastes don't appear to be linked to specific forms of sub- or supra-national identity. Only specific tastes, such as those for World music or for Southern and Northern food, develop links with a sense of belonging to specific geographic areas.

In conclusion our results open new perspectives to think about cultural tastes and show the interest of large-scale research able to account for other forms of symbolic domination and distinction within the European space.

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# Patterns of social transnationalism in regional Europe<sup>10</sup>

Transnationalism is a complex web of practices and habitus connecting people from paired, cross-border social-worlds (Strauss 1993) or life-worlds (Schutz & Embree 2011). The actors are different in immigrant (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007; Schiller, Basch, & Blanc-Szanton 1992) versus social transnationalism (Mau 2012). The builders of the cross-national bridges are, in the first case, migrants in destination societies and, in the second case, residents in a certain society, with or without migration experiences, promoting connection behaviours and attitudes towards people in other societies. The transnational web is constituted by practices and networks (Dahinden 2009) having behind a bipolar habitus (Vertovec 2009) of here and there.

In Europe, what do sociocultural bridges connect in both types of transnationalism, national societies or regions? What are the specific dimensions of social transnationalism that differentiate among countries and among regions? Two basic hypotheses address these questions. The first one supports the idea that transnationalism is a cross-border multiple bridge that links not only national societies but also different regions and communities as their subunits. This is the hypothesis of 'multilevel transnationalism with overlapping bridges at cross-national and cross-regional levels' (the community level of transnationalism, however, is not considered here). The second hypothesis posits that social transnationalism (STNS) has identity, consumption and networks as its key components. Immigrants' transnationalism places the focus on a web linking two container societies. This chapter questions such a view and suggests that there are various patterns of transnationalism according to regional location in the European Union. In some, very homogeneous societies, regions could be irrelevant for the specification of social transnationalism.

The regional hypothesis is tested by Eurobarometer (EB) 73.3 data and EUROSTAT data for all the NUTS 2 regions. EUCROSS data on natives are used to refine the interpretation of the EB&EUROSTAT data.

Social transnationalism as key dependent variable is measured by personal migration experience, indirect migration experience, attachment to a foreign country and consumer behaviours involving cross-border (actual or virtual) mobility. An index of transnationalism and a typology of the phenomenon are tested for significant variations in five categories of regions (poor, developed, socially poor, socially developed and of low competitiveness), controlling for a series of demographics. The results indicate the fact that social transnationalism is significantly influenced by the development pattern of the regions even if one controls for country characteristics. Once the abstract relation between transnationalism and regional characteristics is proved, it follows a detailed description on what patterns of transnationalism are specific for what regions or categories of regions. Mapping out fields of social transnationalism connecting countries of the European Union is also part of the results section. The proxy variable for measuring such fields is given by the shares of people attached to a foreign country. The methodological idea of transnational fields is converted here into a map of the main transnational social fields in Europe.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Dumitru Sandu.

Dimensional analysis of STNS is based on more detailed data coming from the EUCROSS survey on natives in six countries (Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Denmark, and Romania). The hypothesis that is tested on the basis of these data stipulates that identities, cosmopolitan consumption, and social capital abroad are the basic dimensions of STNS.

Theoretical and practical implications of the findings will be discussed in the final part of the chapter.

# Methodology: Measuring social transnationalism (STNS)

Transnationalism as a web of networks and practices connecting paired societies across borders is a social construction by specific mechanisms related, mainly, to mobility or migration and expressions of social choices or values. Starting from this idea we constructed two indices of *mobility* (STNSmob) and *cultural* (STNScult) transnationalism. STNSmob integrates information of four items on personal migration experience abroad (for work, school, or other reasons) of returnee migrants, indirect migration experience abroad by close relatives or friends that are in other countries, regularly spending holidays or weekends in another country and intention to emigrate. STNScult measures transnationalism by three indicators of regularly following news from another country, eating food that is typical of other countries, and by high attachment to one or two other countries. An overall index of social transnationalism is computed from all the seven previously mentioned indicators (STNSmc). The three indices capture the quantitative side of social transnationalism. The qualitative variation of transnationalism is identified by a typology (STNStype) that is described some paragraphs below.

A first validation of the indices could result from their variation in intensity by macroregions of the European Union (Table 1). New Member States (NMS) have lower transnationalism indices compared to Western and Northern countries of the EU, consistently with the existing hierarchy of GDP. Southern European countries, surprisingly, even if they are having a much higher development level than NMS, are at the same level of STNS as these new member states.

Table 1 Mean values of social transnationalism (STNS) indices by macroregions of the EU

	Eastern NMS	Central- Europe NMS	South EU15	WEST EU15	NORTH EU15	Total
STNSmob	48,2	47,3	47,2	51,5	54,2	50,0
STNScult	44,5	45,2	45,1	54,5	54,5	50,0
STNSmc	45,8	45,7	45,6	53,5	54,9	50,0
GDP2010*	49,0	68,0	98,0	117,0	112,0	100,0

Data source: EB73.3. Each of the data series are standardised (as to have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 14). Eastern NMS - LT LV EE RO BG, Central Europe NMS - PL HU CZ SK SI, South EU15 IT EL ES PT, West EU15- FR BE DE AT NL, North EU15- DK SE FI UK IE. The very small countries (MT, LU, CY) are not included into analysis. \*GDP per capita as % from EU average.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> All three indices are factor scores of four (for STNSmob), three (for STNScult), and seven (for STNSmc) indicators, on the set of EB73.3 for 27 EU countries. Their KMO indices, in the order given above, are 0.668, 0.610, and respectively 0.809. For easier reading of the data, each factor score is converted to have a standard deviation of 14 and a mean of 50 (Hull score).

Transnationalism is a multidimensional phenomenon and its typological measure (that captures, partially, this multidimensionality) is likely to be better connected to regional variations than the simple index measure. This methodological hypothesis is tested on a (STNStype) that distinguishes among migration, project, values values&commuting), consumption, and comprehensive STNS (see Box 1). Migration transnationalism is rooted in direct or indirect migration experience. Persons in this category are, all of them, returnees (from work, study, or stay abroad by other reason) and, to a high degree (over 90%), persons that have close friends or relatives abroad. Migration per se, in its direct or indirect form, has a double significance, as it yields mobility experience and network capital abroad. Each of the two components is in interaction: emigration is favoured by networks abroad and favours the increase of network capital. Project transnationalism is specific to persons who intend to 'move to another country within the next ten years'. The majority of them (62%) have close friends or relatives abroad, about one fifth are former migrants and about one third are young persons that are over 15 years old but still at school. Value transnationalism is specific for people that regularly 'follow news, cultural life or sports from another country', 'eat food at home that is typical of another country', 'spend holidays/weekends in one particular country other than the residence one' and are attached to other countries. All of them intend to leave for another country in the next 10 years and about 80% are having close connections abroad but poor personal experience as immigrants. People in this category are transnationals without experience of living abroad. Close to this category is that of consumption transnationalism of people that like and consume news and food specific to other countries but do not intend to leave the residence country and do not go so frequently for weekend or holidays abroad. Comprehensive transnationalism is for those that have very high personal experience of migration and intentions to migrate and significantly over average levels of value orientations abroad, including high declared attachments to other countries.

The dominant type of transnationalism is based on consumption (about one quarter of EU population) and this segment of population is mainly located in Western Europe (Table 2). The second type is that of migration transnationalism with dominant location in Northern Europe.

Table 2 Types of STNS by EU macroregions

Types of STNS		Мас	croregion	ıs in EU (%	6)			
	Eastern NMS	Central- Europe NMS	South EU15	WEST EU15	NORTH EU15	Total	% col.	STNSmc average
value	4,0	6,4	12,2	46,0	31,3	100	3,4	72,0
comprehensive	2,2	3,4	27,2	35,8	31,4	100	3,6	86,3
project	13,6	17,2	23,7	26,7	18,7	100	4,9	54,6
migration	5,5	9,8	22,3	38,2	24,1	100	7,9	64,6
consumption	4,2	9,2	13,1	52,0	21,5	100	24,3	59,1
localistic (low STNS)	9,0	17,1	34,1	26,9	12,9	100	55,9	39,9
Total	7,4	13,7	26,6	34,8	17,5	100	100,0	50,0

Data source: EB73.3. Highlights mark significant associations between column and row values of the variables (as indicated by adjusted standardised residuals that are not in the table). Reading example: 31.4% out of the people who experience comprehensive transnationalism are living in Northern EU15 countries and there is a significant, positive association between belonging to this type and living in Northern EU15 countries. N=26602.

The typological distribution of STNS is highly regionalised. Each out of the five regions has a profile: NMS are defined by high project transnationalism, with a higher probability of this type in the extreme Eastern part of this region; Southern European countries are similar to NMS by their large share of low transnationalism people but do not record high percentages for project transnationalism; comprehensive and migration transnationalism is specific to the North of Europe and the consumption one to Western Europe.

#### Box 1. Building and validating STNS typology

Social transnationalism (STNS) is a cross-border social construction process having multiple nuclei in mobility, cultural, entrepreneurial, virtual space communication or non-state institutionalized practices. Formation and support of habitus is all the time behind such practices. The typology (STNStype) we are building and using in this context considers, by data constraints, only mobility and cultural nuclei of the process. Associated indicators as specified in the table below.

			Types of	STNS gener	ated by cluste	er analysis	
Nuclei of STNS*	Clustering criteria	migration	consumption	project	value	comprehensive	localistic
Y s	returned migrants	2,06	-0,29	-0,08	-0,11	3,18	-0,35
LIT	relatives and friends abroad	1,04	0,32	0,22	0,59	1,44	-0,43
MOBILITY experiences	intentions to live in another country in next 10 years	-0,35	-0,35	2,85	2,85	2,00	-0,35
L 9	holidays abroad	0,17	0,70	-0,38	1,07	1,32	-0,45
RAL ss	typical foreign food consumption	0,38	0,85	-0,24	1,12	1,11	-0,54
CULTURAL	follow regularly news from another country	0,48	0,79	-0,40	1,05	1,15	-0,52
CC	attached to other contries (two choices)	0,42	0,52	0,26	0,75	1,10	-0,43


Data source: EB 73.3. K means cluster analysis with standardised variables.

Figures are cluster centers averages of the classification criterion for the class.

Classes are defined function of the criteria having the highest means for the class (highlighted cells). Each variable has a 0 mean.

\*Other nuclei of STNS could not be included into analysis due to constraints of a secondary data analysis. These could refer to COMMUNICATION practices in virtual space, TRANSNATIONAL entrepreneurship or NONSTATE INSTITUTIONALISED linkages.

The specific profile of each of the six types generated by cluster analysis is indicated by the maximum values for each of the seven indicators of mobility experience and cultural practices. Migration STNS, for example, is common among people who are very rich in personal migration experience abroad (returnee migrants) cumulated with indirect migration experience by having relatives and friends abroad. Natives in this category worked abroad and are having good close connections abroad by their friends and relatives. Value transnationalism is specific to persons of high transnational habitus that is based more on indirect than direct migration experience abroad.



The validity of the cluster classification was tested by a discriminant analysis considering six predictors of STNStype - HUMAN CAPITAL, WELLOFF (see table 7), man (1 yes, 0 no), EU15 (1 yes, 0 no), regional human development index, age interval of 16-35 (1 yes, 0 no), urban residence (1 yes, 0 no).

The six STNS categories fit well into sociodemographic profiles. The comprehensive type is specific

to persons with high human capital, living in large cities and from developed regions of EU15.

			STNS	type		
	comprehen			consumpti		
	sive	migration	value	on	project	localistic
HUMAN CAPITAL index (mean)	64.0	58.1	58.0	54.8	53.4	45.1
Wellbeing index(WELLOFF) (mean)	52.0	52.5	53.7	54.7	50.2	47.2
youth 16-35 years old, %	46.2	25.5	58.5	29.8	64.9	27.1
men (%)	53.6	53.0	55.4	51.2	54.3	45.1
live in large cities (%)	44.9	33.8	35.6	24.5	30.6	23.2
residents in NMS (%)	5.9	15.8	10.8	13.7	31.2	26.3
regional development index (mean)	61.2	55.9	57.7	55.4	49.8	49.6

Data source: EB73.3.

58.2% of cross-validated grouped cases are correctly classified by discriminant analysis. The proportional chance criteria (Cprob) for assessing model fit in discriminant analysis is 0.383. The model is technically validated by the standard rule of having the share of correctly classified cases larger than Cprob\*1.25. Multinomial regression in table 5 is also a criterion validation for the typology.

In fact, what directly validates the transnational typology is the fact that there are several territorial nuclei of transnational similarity among neighboring or high proximity countries: Bulgaria-Romania-Poland, Latvia-Lithuania for project transnationalism; Denmark-UK for comprehensive transnationalism; Belgium-Netherlands and Germany-Austria for consumption transnationalism. Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal are Southern countries with large shares of localistic or non-transnationalist populations. Spain, in this series, seems to be a very special case of heterogeneity, having, at the same time, a large share of localistic population but also a large segment of population of comprehensive transnationalism. Subnational analysis by NUTS2 regions could contribute to better understand such situations. <sup>12</sup>

A focus on the components of STNS, with more detailed data (from EUCROSS survey on natives) passes from two to three components. Instead of the simple distinction between value and mobility transnationalism, one can differentiate between consumption, identity and network transnationalism (Dahinden 2009). A factor analysis on a set of nine indicators from a sample of six countries (Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Denmark, and Romania) identifies three latent variables as components of STNS. Consumption transnationalism is measured mainly by purchases from abroad, frequency of short trips abroad, following foreign media for sports or films, space competency<sup>13</sup> (number of foreign countries the subject is familiar with), preferences for foreign cuisine (as proxy for eating foreign cuisine). Identity transnationalism is measured by European identification and by national identification. Network capital abroad and receiving money from abroad are the two indicators for network social transnationalism (Table A 2). This dimension analysis is an

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The findings in this paragraph are results from a table crossing transnationalism types with 24 countries of EU with the tool of adjusted standardized residuals, EB73.3 data. Technical details of the analysis are not presented into the text.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Many thanks to Ettore Recchi for suggesting the measure of spatial competence using familiarity with the country (EUCROSS sample).

exploratory one<sup>14</sup> but consistent with the criteria involved in the typology derived from Eurobarometer data.

The fields of social transnationalism connecting countries in the European Union are identified by the use of aggregated data on 'the foreign countries people are mostly attached to'. A set of six countries in Europe are acting as major attachment or attraction poles for populations in the EU. These are France, Spain, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, and Austria. The way fields of transnational attachment interconnect among them gives an image of the European structure of social transnationalism. The use of other countries attachments as a measure the ways transnational social fields are structured is in line with the methodological idea that transnational social fields are constituted not only by ways of being but also by ways of belonging (Levitt & Schiller 2004). Being attached to another country is, in fact, a way of belonging to another sociocultural space.

## Measuring development at NUTS 2 level

NUTS2 regions are the subnational units that could have, by their development level and type, a significant impact on STNS. Their level of development is measured here by a regional human development index (RHDI), like in the standard human development index of UNDP (UNDP 2013), by aggregating the values of GDP per capita (as percentage from the mean of EU, 2007), life expectancy at birth (2007) and share of population with tertiary education (2010).

The typology of NUTS 2 results from crossing their specific values on GDP per capita with life expectancy at birth as relevant indicators for economic and, respectively, social development.<sup>15</sup> Poor regions have low values on both indicators and comprehensive development ones are at opposite point with high values on the same indicators. Similarly, middle developed regions are defined by middle values on social and economic dimensions. What mostly define the qualitative aspects of the typology are the other two types of economically developed regions and socially developed ones. A region is considered in one or another of the two categorises function of the dominant values on the two scales.

Poor regions are specific to East and Central-East parts of EU and economically developed regions to the countries from West and North Europe (Table 3). The regions that are more socially than economically developed are especially located in Southern Europe. Comprehensive development regions of high GDP and life expectancy do not have a specific location in EU.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> A country by country factor analysis indicates a different structure of the factors especially for Denmark (four factors) and for Italy (network capital and purchasing behaviours in the same factor). It is not clear if these special cases are real or sampling effects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> The two variables were previously recorded as to having three classes of equal shares. The classes with fewer cases have been collapsed to their neighbours by the procedure of reduction in an attribute space (Barton 1955).

Table 3 Population of EU macroregions by development level of NUTS2

		European ma		Total	Average		
Type of NUTS 2 regions by development profile	East	Central East	South	West	North	EU (%)	value of RHDI
poor	93.8	91.5	1.6	1.7	0.0	20.4	30.2
socially developed	0.0	0.0	51.2	29.9	17.5	27.1	53.8
middle developed	0.0	1.4	9.3	18.1	30.7	14.4	55.9
economically developed	6.2	7.1	3.5	34.1	22.7	18.5	58.7
comprehensive development	0.0	0.0	34.3	16.1	29.1	19.7	65.1
Total EU	100	100	100	100	100	100	52.4
Average value of RHDI	23.1	35.5	53.9	59.6	61.2	52.4	

Data source: EUROSTAT. N=215 sub-state regions, majority of them NUTS2. The adopted level for regional computations is consistent with the type of the regions that are reported in EB 73.3 (NUTS1 for Germany and for the UK). The paired of row-column values that are significantly associated are marked in the shadow cells (adjusted standardised residuals for p=0.001). Reading example: 51.2% out of the total population in the Southern countries of the EU lives in socially developed regions; the average development level for the regions in these countries is of 53.8.

### **Data analysis**

## Living transnationally by European regions and countries

The type of development of regions brings about higher probabilities for specific types of social transnationalism (STNS). Four out of the five types of transnationalism are highly associated with living in economically developed regions (Table 4) that are specific to North and West Europe. The regions with less diversity of STNS are the more socially than economically developed, located in the South of Europe. A lack of transnationalism is dominant in these regions. Very close to their profile is that of the poor regions from the Eastern and Central-Eastern Europe. It is here that one notices the prevalence of project transnationalism: people are linked to other countries or regions by their intentions to live abroad in the next ten years. Middle developed regions favour only two types of transnationalism that are based on consumption or on cross-border commuting and consumption. Comprehensive transnationalism — in the areas of consumption, value, migration, and intentions of mobility — is specific for the regions that are both socially and economically developed (i.e., in the category of comprehensive development).

Table 4 Types of social transnationalism by types of regions in EU

	Regional human developopment typology (%)							
STNS typology	poor	middle developed	socially developed	economically developed	comprehensive development	Total		
value	1.7	4.9	2.6	4.4	4.1	3.4		
comprehensive	1.0	2.7	2.3	4.2	8.5	3.7		
project	7.2	4.4	4.9	3.2	4.9	5.0		
migration	5.8	7.7	7.4	9.7	9.5	7.9		
consumption	15.6	32.6	20.1	34.1	23.0	24.1		
localistic (low STNS)	68.7	47.7	62.7	44.5	50.0	55.9		
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Data source: EB 73.3. Highlighted cells mark significant associations between column and row values.

The territorial distribution of STNS becomes clearer if one goes down from macroregions to countries (Figure 1). Comprehensive transnationalism is the key mark of the sociocultural profile for the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Ireland. Belgium-Netherlands and Germany-Austria have a more consumption profile of STNS. As one can see from the dendrograme in Figure 1, the two clusters of countries are having similar transnational profiles. Slovenia, even if not very similar, is closer to the transnational profile of Austria and Germany.

It is only Finland, out of the Nordic countries that is not in the previous grouping of comprehensive-consumption transnationalism. This country is closer to Greece and Spain, having in common with them a profile dominated by migration transnationalism. The majority of the people in these countries are rich in direct migration experience as returnees and/or indirect experience by having relatives or friends living abroad.

A third grouping is formed by countries of project transnationalism, with larger shares of people intending to go abroad. The purest examples of this category are Latvia and Lithuania. A sub-group for this type is formed by Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. Here one finds a significant segment of people practicing a project transnationalism but also large shares of people that do not adhere to any kind of transnationalism. Portugal and Italy are closer to the group of the three Eastern countries not by project transnationalism but mainly by their large shares of locality-oriented people.

The transnational profile of Southern countries is closer to the profile of the majority of former socialist countries (except Baltic countries) than to EU15 countries from the West or North of the continent. Southern European countries are having in common the presence of large segments of population of low transnationalism. Nonetheless, the two largest Southern European countries, Italy and Spain, are very different by their transnational profile. Italy is defined mainly by its huge share of low transnationalism (non-TNS), which characterizes about 80% of the total population. Spain has a large share of non-TNS people (64%) but it also has significant shares of persons in the categories of comprehensive (8%), consumption (13%), and migration (9%) transnationalism.

The highest concentration for each of the five types of STNS are for:

- Its consumption form in Netherlands (56%), Malta (48%), Luxembourg (46%), and Belgium (44%);
- The comprehensive type in Luxembourg (21%), Ireland (10%), Spain (8%), and the UK (7%);
- Value and commuting form in Luxembourg (8%), Malta (8%), Denmark (7%), and Netherlands (7%);
- Migration based STNS in Cyprus Republic (19%), Sweden (17%), Luxembourg (17%), Ireland (15%), and Netherlands (12%);
- Project transnationalism in Latvia (25%), Lithuania (19%), and Estonia (10%).

Low STNS with a dominant localistic orientation of the population has the largest shares in Italy (80%), Bulgaria (77%), Poland (74%), Greece (73%), and Romania (70%).




Figure 1. Similarity among countries on types of social transnationalism

Data source EB73.3.Dendrograme from cluster analysis – furthest neighbour, Pearson correlation measurement of similarity. Input data are adjusted standardised residuals in a table crossing typology of STNS with 24 countries of EU. Residuals are standardized before clustering. Labels in the left hand rectangles indicate the specific profiles of transnationalism for the interviewed people in the reference countries. Denmark, United Kingdom, Belgium, and Netherlands are forming a core of similarity by their high degree of value transnationalism.

## Multilevel roots of social transnationalism

In this section, I would focus first of all on the predictors that are the most discriminant ones for the typology of Social transnationalism (STNS): human capital at personal and regional levels and GDP per capita at regional and national levels. The second part of the section will analyse the causal profile of each STNS type in order to clarify the *because reasons* (Schutz & Embree, 2011) of adopting different versions of transnationalism.

Qualitative social transnationalism (Table 2) is mainly dependent on personal and regional human capital (Table 5): all the five types of STNS are higher for people speaking at least a

foreign language and using internet. Four out of the five types of STNS are having a higher probability of existence in regions of large share of tertiary educated people. High human capital, at personal and regional level is especially effective to favour comprehensive, values, and migration transnationalism.

Table 5 Predictors of the types of social transnationalism in European Union

		T	ype of socia	l transnat	ionalism (r	eference o	category - lo	ow STNS)		
	migration		consumption		project		values		comprehensive	
	coef.	р	coef.	р	coef.	р	coef.	р	coef.	р
age	0.006	0.066	0.003	0.138	-0.046	0.000	-0.030	0.000	-0.019	0.000
man*	0.332	0.000	0.194	0.000	0.388	0.000	0.349	0.004	0.227	0.077
higher education*	0.531	0.002	0.712	0.000	0.343	0.108	0.422	0.177	1.347	0.000
still at school*	-0.776	0.007	0.330	0.044	0.627	0.009	0.653	0.038	0.231	0.498
secondary education*	0.110	0.472	0.423	0.000	0.022	0.891	0.498	0.088	0.617	0.005
speaks fluently a foreign										
language*	2.165	0.000	1.124	0.000	0.652	0.000	1.572	0.000	3.077	0.000
use internet*	0.210	0.068	0.538	0.000	0.536	0.000	1.194	0.000	-0.061	0.776
subjective social class (1										
low4 higher)	-0.084	0.067	-0.070	0.032	-0.044	0.375	-0.092	0.171	-0.199	0.003
had difficulties to paying the										
bills (1 no3 most of the										
time)	-0.101	0.246	-0.199	0.001	0.362	0.000	0.201	0.067	0.336	0.004
urban residence*	0.262	0.011	-0.061	0.550	0.043	0.732	0.300	0.073	0.385	0.051
population density in the										
region (In)	0.137	0.004	0.159	0.003	0.037	0.570	0.174	0.022	0.308	0.013
GDP per capital in the region										
(In)	-0.723	0.039	-0.369	0.282	-0.398	0.245	-1.056	0.024	-0.373	0.524
life expectancy in the region										
(In)	-0.091	0.976	-9.915	0.001	-3.433	0.302	-5.243	0.198	2.830	0.556
tertiarry educated people in										
the region (In)	0.904	0.000	0.417	0.085	0.816	0.000	1.309	0.000	1.231	0.004
GDP per capita in the country										
(% from EU average)	0.016	0.000	0.029	0.000	0.006	0.216	0.034	0.000	0.026	0.000
Constante	-0.834	0.945	40.301	0.001	13.752	0.309	21.236	0.201	-21.428	0.259
Pseudo R2	0.155									
N	23491.000									

Data source: EB 73.3. Multinomial logistic regression in STATA, with cluster option to correct for non-independence of observations within the same region (86 clusters as given by NUTS2 or NUTS 1 for the UK and Germany), to generate robust standard errors.

Education per se plays differently for various kinds of transnationalism: higher education is specific to people oriented towards comprehensive, migration, and consumption transnationalism; secondary education is specific only for consumption transnationalism; young people of over 15 years old that are still students are mainly oriented towards consumption, values, and project transnationalism (table 5).

NUTS 2 or NUTS 1 regions affect transnationalism significantly and independently of the country or personal status effects. It is not only the high educational profile of the region that favours STNS but also its population density. NUTS 2 regions with a high number of persons per square km are more likely to host people that are in the category of comprehensive category of social transnationalism. This relation is not surprising if one

notices that territorial density is a significant predictor of regional human development<sup>16</sup>. The finding is in line with the general view that the higher the density at national or at territorial level, the higher the probability to reach high scores for development of reference territorial units (WB 2009).

High GDP per capita at national level favours four out of five types of STNS (the exception is project transnationalism). The relation is valid also for quantitative transnationalism measured on an interval scale (as a factor score STNSmob. STNScult, and STNSmc) (Table A 1): the higher the value of GDP per capita at the national level, the higher the index values for transnationalism. There is no such linear relation between regional GDP and STNS in its qualitative expressions. The empirical analysis suggests that the gap between a high national and a low regional GDP is favourable for migration and for values transnationalism. Regional frustration on level of living could be increased by living in areas that are relatively poor compared to the national average, and consequently, could stimulate migration and values linkages of transnational type.

Project transnationalism is specific for young people (average age of approximately 30 years old), large part of them still at school (over 30%) and having difficulties in paying their bills (44%). On the other hand they are having the resources for relocation by fluently speaking a foreign language, by the use of internet, and by living in areas of highly educated people. They are the least rooted type in the economic or social profile or the region (no significant connection with density, GDP or life expectancy indicators of their regional residence). One could say that they are transnational by their life-cycle, frustration, and high abilities to connect with people from other places. In terms of intensity, this is the social type with the lowest transnational orientation (excepting non-STNS category). Their mobility component of transnationalism (STNSmob) is more intense than the value one (STNScult). Project transnationals are dissatisfied with their everyday life in the local and national settings, live in rather poor or low density areas and are having the human resources to go and work abroad. The highest concentration of project type of transnationalism is in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

Consumption transnationalism is specific to the secondary educated population, living in rural or rather low density areas, having low social capital abroad and no intention to leave the country. They are having the poorest personal experience of working or living abroad compared to any other STNS type. The largest share of the type is in Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.

Migration type of transnationalism groups people of high personal or indirect (by relatives and friends) migration experience abroad. They are the oldest (48 years old, on the average) among the five categories of transnationalism, highly educated, speaking fluently a foreign

macroregions of EU. All the coefficients in the OLS regression are significant at p=0.001 level, except for the coefficient for NUTSadmin, significant at p=0.10 level.

RHDI=19.6+ InDENSITY\*2.61+5.24\*NUTSadmin-9.07\*EAST+15.8\*SOUTH+21.7\*WEST+26.7\*NORTH, R2=0.74, 199 NUTS 2 in the sample, robust standard error by cluster option function of the country, where RHDI – regional human development index, InDENSITY – inhabitants per square kilometre in the NUTS2 region, NUTSadmin – dummy for NUTS2 having administrative status and the other predictors being dummies for

language and living in urban or high density areas. The highest concentration of people with high migration experience abroad is in Luxembourg, Cyprus Republic, Sweden, and Ireland.

Value transnationalism is specific to people of low experience abroad, rather young (33 years old, on average), frequent users of internet (about 90%), and high consumers of material and cultural goods from abroad. The highest concentration for value transnationalism is in Netherlands, the UK, Belgium, France, Sweden, and Denmark (with percentages of around 6 to 7% for each of these countries).

Comprehenisve transnationalism is for highest human capital people (by education, foreign languages) living in highly dense, urban areas. Its key component is migration experience. The largest shares for people in this category are, again, in the North, with the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Sweden (with percentages around 6% to 10%). Luxembourg, in the category of very small countries, has the largest share of comprehensive transnational people (22%).

The fact that STNS types are highly rooted in social life is supported also by the fact that subjective classes are closely associated to transnational types: comprehensive, value, and migration transnationals feel attached to upper class; consumption type is overrepresented in the categories of upper middle and upper classes; low transnational people are mostly in the lower class; people in project transnationalism type are not significantly associated with a certain subjective class category.<sup>17</sup>

Table 6 'Which country other than (our country) do you feel the most attached to? Firstly?' (%)

Attracting countries	Attachement expressed by people from						
(first choice)	NMS	EU15	EU				
France	5.5	11.4	10.3				
Spain	5.8	11.3	10.3				
Italy	10.0	9.2	9.3				
Germany	13.6	5.9	7.4				
United Kingdom	8.8	5.9	6.5				
Austria	5.8	5.4	5.5				
United States	4.5	7.0	6.6				
Other EU15	12.9	15.6	15.1				
Other NMS	20.2	4.8	7.7				
Other unspecified	13.1	23.3	21.4				
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0				
N	2562	11007	13569				

Data source: EB 73.3. Reading example: 13.6% out of the persons interviewed in NMS consider Germany as the country they are most attached to; 49% out of the total interviewed people did not expressed any attachment choice.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Adjusted standardised residuals are the basis for assessing the relations in the paragraph. Subjective class in Eurobarometer survey is measured on a ten points scale. Recoding to get five values considered lower class for scores 1 to 4, middle for 5, upper middle for 6 and upper for 7 to 10.

## Transnational social fields of Europe

Social transnationalism is not only a matter of profiles for persons, regions or countries of residence as discussed in the previous subchapters. Its determining factors are also specified by poles of attraction or connection. This is what we can capture if one adopts the reference frame of social fields that are structured across borders. The particular form of transnational habitus (Guarnizo 1997) that will be considered here is attachment to a foreign country.

The poles of attraction in social transnationalism are in a different hierarchy for population in EU15 compared to New Member States (NMS). France and Spain are the countries of maximum attraction for people from EU15 (

Table 6). NMS people are mostly attached to Germany, Italy, and the UK. United States is the fourth pole of attraction for EU15 residents. Austria is as important as France and Spain for structuring social transnationalism in NMS.

The European structure of social transnationalism is better specified by considering the attachments among all the EU countries (Figure 2). Four main fields of inter-countries attachments are easily identified in this space. The cores of the fields are France, Germany, the UK, and Sweden.




Figure 2. Intra-European fields of social attachment

Data source Eurobarometer 73.3. Reading example: the highest attraction to France is declared by people from Belgium and Luxembourg (over 21% out of the total interviewees, of over 15 years old, from each of these countries); medium level of attraction to the same country is in the case of people from Netherlands (a share in the interval of 11%-20%). The main country of attraction for Polish residents is Germany and the second is the UK. The main poles of attraction in EU are marked by bold letters in writing the country name. The most important streams of attachment were considered in the diagram only to the degree they are statistically significant to 1% in an analysis of adjusted standardised residuals.

France is at the heart of a cluster of South transnational fields connecting people from Italy, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Malta, and Romania. Latin languages and proximity function as an important glue in this structuring. Germany and Austria are the central place of attachment for the majority of NMS. Two other small fields are formed around the UK as a pole attracting Ireland and Lithuania, and Sweden as central place for people from Denmark and Finland. Linkages among the four fields are given by secondary preferences: Poles for the UK, Romanians for Germany, Dutch for France, and Danish for Germany.

An identification of the favouring factors to choose a certain attraction field could contribute to an understanding to its dynamics (Table A4). Personal migration experience abroad of returnees is, as expected, an important factor contributing to a high attachment to a foreign country. This is mainly the case of people attached to Germany and the UK<sup>18</sup>. At the opposite side is the case for people attached to Austria and Sweden as foreign countries. These are the only two out of the eight attraction poles where attachment is not significantly conditioned by a previous direct or indirect migration experience abroad. It is not clear why attachment choices are not a outcome of migration experience for these two poles. One possible explanation for the Austrian pole is that here there is a high probability of having immigrants from the neighbouring former communist countries. Austria is the only EU15 country having as direct neighbours four NMS (Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Czech Republic). Short trips across border and easy physical and virtual mobility could be factors involved in the building of the transnational field that are more efficient than migration per se.

Network capital provided by friends or relatives abroad directly contributes to building social transnationalism by favouring attachments to other countries. Identification with some countries like Germany, France, or USA is favoured more by having relatives than by having friends in the attracting country. For identification to Italy and the UK, friendship counts more than relatives. It is difficult to formulate a general hypothesis for this pattern variation. Each identification pattern seems to be having specific roots for each country. The strengths of the relatives abroad in bringing identification could emerge for Germany in relation with the history of the spread of German people as minorities in Central and Eastern Europe.

Attachment to a foreign country is structured, mainly, in a four dimensional space of migration experience, human capital, material capital and age (Table 7).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> It is for these attraction poles that the partial regression coefficients are maximum in table A4.

Table 7 Foreign country attachments in a four dimensional space

	partial 1	regressior	n coefficie	nts for co	ntryies of	attraction	(reference	e 'no attac	hment')
predictors of attachement	Austria	Germany	France	Italy	Spain	Sweden	UK	USA	other
STNSmob	0.047***	0.069***	0.062***	0.056***	0.053***	0.042***	0.056***	0.065***	0.077***
HUMAN CAPITAL	-0,008	0.025***	0.032***	0.02***	0.008	0.048***	0.059***	0.02***	0.025***
WELLOFF	0.018***	0.009**	0.015***	0,005	0,006	0.014	0.012**	0.018***	-0,006
AGE 16 to 35 (1 yes, 0									
no)	-0.365**	-0,018	-0.257*	-0,188	0.261*	-0.614***	0.522***	0.425***	0,088
MAN (1 yes, 0 no)	0,086	0.2*	-0,066	-0,133	0,056	0,074	0,052	0.269*	0.145**
URBAN residence (1									
yes, 0 no)	-0,049	-0,061	-0,134	0,103	-0,082	-0,233	0,285	0.34**	-0,012
	•	Pseudo		Sign	ificance le	vels for c	oefficients	in multino	omial
Data source: EB 73	3.3	R2=- N=25751 regression: *** p=0.001, ** p=0.01, *p=0.05.							

WELLOFF factor score for goods in the hosehold, subjective social class and having difficulties to pay bills last year; HUMAN CAPIAL - fator score for higher education, speaking fluently o foreign language and using internet. STNSmig - factor score of different forms of migration experience, as described in methodological section.

Migration experience (direct, or indirect, by relatives and friends abroad, and by intention to leave the country as given by STNSmob) plays much more than each of its components in moulding attraction to a foreign country. It is only in Sweden and UK fields that migration experience is less important than human and material capital in influencing attraction to a foreign country. The finding allows for the interpretation that the probability to be attached to a foreign country is higher if the person is at the same time returned migrant, has relatives or friends that emigrated abroad and has decided to migrate again. Human capital (measured by an index of higher education, use of internet, and fluently speaking a foreign language) is the second favouring factor in generating a habitus (Bourdieu, 1984) of foreign country attachment.

The models accounting for transnational identities are different between EU15 and New Member States (NSM). Migration experience (or capital) keeps a more important role than human and material capital in building identification with a foreign country in NMS compared to the process in EU15. Identification with a foreign country for residents in EU15 has a more complex determination with the involvement of material and human capital together with migration experience as conditioning factors. Identification with most developed countries (Germany, France, Sweden, UK and USA) for people from EU15 is favoured by migration, human and material capitals. Their identification with Italy and Spain is limited to the positive influence of migration and human capital.

For people from NMS, identification with a foreign country involves migration experience for all the nine migration fields. Human capital in the same category of countries of residence is an identification factor only with respect to five transnational fields (France, Sweden, UK, USA and unspecified other country). Austria is the only target country for identification for people from NMS where high material capital has a significant, positive impact.

#### **Space competence in STNS**

The familiarity with different foreign countries is a basic indicator for the STNS profile of the country. Unfortunately we do not have its values at regional level to explore its relevance

with Eurobarometer data as we had in the previous section. The information is available for the EUCROSS survey on natives in six European countries. Denmark, Germany and the UK are much richer in space competence as given by the percent of people that declare being familiar with at least two foreign countries. Tertiary educated people from Spain, Italy, and Romania are having a similar very low score on the space competence index (Table 8). As expected, the foreign country familiarity index is higher for people with high human capital (speaking foreign languages and having higher education), higher migration experience abroad (directly, at personal level, or indirectly, by friends and relatives abroad), and better material situation in the household (results of a logistic regression not shown in the text).

Table 8 Degree of social transnationalism for tertiary educated people in six European Union countries, by seven indicators (%)

	Denmark	Germany	UK	Spain	Romania	Italy
familiar with at least 2 foreign countries	65	53	42	33	32	31
high european identity	41	46	13	44	45	48
received money from abroad in the last year	4	2	9	3	20	6
purchased from abroad in the last year	51	36	48	35	25	27
at least one trip abroad in the last year	87	83	78	68	57	66
at least once in a month follows foreign media	79	65	55	72	78	56
likes foreign cuisine	44	55	44	57	35	33

Data source: EUCROSS survey on natives, national samples. Weighted data by four age categories, gender and primary education by taking reference values from Eurobarometer 78. Reading example: 65% out of the Danish interviewed people are familiar with at least two foreign countries. Table reports only tertiary educated people to make the country effects more visible on the main segment of interviewed people (38% out the total EUCROSS sample are tertiary educated).

A clearer profile of social transnationalism results from reading the values of the factor scores from the analysis in Table A 2 by each country of the sample: consumption score is maximum for Denmark and minimum for Romania; European identification score is maximum for Spain and minimum for UK; network capital abroad has its maximum for Romania and minimum for Germany.

The EUCROSS data prove, more than the Eurobarometer, that social transnationalism, by its various indicators, is highly dependent of the lifeworlds as circumscribed by status variables (age, gender, education, subjective class etc.) (Table A 3).

#### **Conclusions**

In accordance with the basic expectation of the chapter, social transnationalism (STNS) in Europe proved to be a multilevel, multidimensional, and field-dependent phenomenon. Countries do not enter in transnational networks as containers but as spaces that are structured by their regional and cross-border field configurations. Transnational behaviours of people in the regions are a direct function of the combination between their human, social, and material capital, and age structure. Higher mobility transnationalism is associated with living in areas of higher territorial densities and higher regional development in poor economic conditions. The territorial inconsistency between economic poverty and higher human capital foster emigration from the regions, irrespective of the level of development

of the country. Value compared to mobility STNS is to a lesser degree influenced by regional characteristics (Table A1, Table A5). Human capital and regional effects are more important for mobility than for cultural transnationalism (Table A5). Wellbeing is positively related to cultural transnationalism and negatively to mobility one (Table A5).

STNS phenomena are selective in socio-demographic space: there is a higher probability for young men in large urban areas from developed regions and countries to adopt the patterns of transnational social worlds (Table A5).

STNS is highly differentiated in the EU not only by degree but also by its types or qualitative variations (Table A6): comprehensive transnationalism is specific to Nordic countries; consumption type of transnationalism is typical for Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Belgium; project transnationalism is located mainly in New Member States; migration transnationalism is specific for Finland, Greece, and Spain (Figure 1). Localism or low STNS is specific for Southern Europe and NMS (Table 2).

STNS is highly structured in the EU not only by its dimensions and types but also by the fact that there is a rich causal structure that is specific for each type of transnationalism. Causal analysis using entirely different data sets (Eurobarometer and EUCROSS) and with different measurements brings forth the idea that human capital factors (higher education , speaking foreign languages and using internet) significantly contribute to an increase in social transnationalism habitus and in the multiplication of its expression practices. More education and higher abilities to speak foreign languages bring higher values for spatial competence, European identification, cosmopolitan purchasing, consumption of foreign culture and foods, more frequent shorts trips abroad (Table A 3).

Direct and indirect (by linkages with friends and relatives) migration experience abroad is also fundamental to favouring social transnationalism. Some facets of transnationalism are under the impact of personal experience abroad (space competence, receiving remittances and tourism abroad) and some other are not impacted by such experiences (consuming material and cultural goods from abroad, eating foreign food or identifying with Europe).

European identification seems to be more under the influence of human capital than an effect of direct or indirect migration experience abroad (Table A3). The finding is in line with results of an analysis of social transnationalism for Romania (Eurobarometer data). It was noted for this country case that transnational identification with one's own and other country is favoured by direct and indirect migration experiences but not by identification with Europe (Sandu 2014). It is likely that migration experience abroad has a mediating impact on European identification through increasing space competence, use of foreign languages, and transnational identification. All these chain or mediated relations between migration abroad and European identification need further research and analysis. European identification is, according to EUCROSS data, also a social stratification phenomenon: a higher position on the subjective scale of wellbeing brings an increased probability of European identification.

Even if limited, childhood socialization of living in a foreign country contributes to higher STNS by increasing space competence and the propensity of buying goods from abroad.

Social remittances (Levitt & Schiller 2004) as values, identities, networks, and practices proved to be not only exchanges between migrants and origin societies. They are circulating in an environment including whole societies with their structuring at national and regional level. The social transnationalism perspective could contribute to a better understanding of social remittances and territorial development. Going down from national to regional spaces to capture the real structure of social transnationalism could help for a more regionalised approach in territorial development.

The social fields of European transnationalism are structured in around four centres of attraction: France-Spain-Italy, Germany-Austria, United Kingdom, and Sweden (Figure 2). The majority of New Member States are gravitating around the German-Austrian pole of attraction. Some Eastern countries are socially attracted by two different centres. This is the case of Romanians valuing first of all the Southern-Latin attraction poles (Italy-Spain-France) and, secondly the German-Austrian centre. Polish people are mainly attracted by Germany and secondly by the UK. The configuration of cross-border social fields in Europe are first of all determined by migration experiences and secondly by human capital resources (Table 7).

Migration experience resulted from personal, friends, and relatives abroad influences is by far the most important factor in increasing the probability to enter the majority of transnational social fields in Europe. Its impact is higher for New Member States citizens compared to citizens of the EU15, for whom social transnationalism is more often an outcome of human capital.

# **Appendix**

Table A 1.Predictors of STNS as continuous variable

	STNSmob		STNScult		STNSmc	
	Coef.	P>t	Coef.	P>t	Coef.	P>t
age	-0.046	0.001	-0.013	0.193	-0.031	0.005
man*	0.970	0.000	1.252	0.000	1.222	0.000
higher education*	2.474	0.000	4.082	0.000	3.702	0.000
still at school*	-0.514	0.489	1.452	0.044	0.440	0.527
secondary education*	0.482	0.212	2.404	0.000	1.643	0.000
speaks fluently a foreign language*	10.795	0.000	8.688	0.000	11.156	0.000
use internet*	1.202	0.020	2.379	0.000	2.035	0.000
subjective social class (1 low4						
higher)	-0.230	0.171	-0.600	0.001	-0.439	0.010
had difficulties to paying the bills (1						
no3 most of the time)	0.359	0.229	-0.503	0.057	-0.120	0.670
urban residence*	1.429	0.019	0.645	0.249	1.174	0.051
population density in the region (In)	1.074	0.004	0.924	0.003	1.155	0.001
GDP per capital in the region (In)	-2.709	0.052	-2.816	0.129	-3.066	0.058
life expectancy in the region (In)	-4.898	0.719	-32.397	0.064	-22.045	0.136
tertiarry educated people in the						
region (In)	4.946	0.000	3.812	0.002	4.891	0.000
GDP per capita in the country (%						
from EU average)	0.050	0.009	0.154	0.000	0.117	0.000
Constante	68.554	0.195	183.153	0.010	139.099	0.019
R2	0.241		0.259		0.316	

Data source: EB 73.3. OLS regression with cluster option to correct for non-independence of observations within the same region ( 86 clusters as given by NUTS2 or NUTS 1 for UK and Germany), to generate robust standard errors.

Table A 2.The three dimensions of STNS

	STNS dimension	ons (rotated co	mponent matrix)	Communalities after factor
indicators of STNS	consumption	identity	network	extraction
at least one trip abroad in the last year	.712	016	051	0.51
no of foreign countries that are familiar	.583	.065	.048	0.347
purchased from abroad in the last year	.575	058	.085	0.341
likes foreign cuisine	.511	.115	006	0.275
at least once in a month follows foreign media	.404	.109	.270	0.248
mainly european indentification	.019	.786	.007	0.275
mainly natioinal identification	091	777	033	0.613
received money from abroad in the last year	107	053	.794	0.645
network capital abroad (no of foreign countrie where he /she has friends or	.205	.074	.693	0.528
% variance explained by the factor	18.4	14	13.3	
Data source: EUCROSS survey on na	tives, 2013. KMO	=.65, PCA, VAF	RIMAX, N=6016. W	eighted data.

Table A 3. Predictors for specific indicators of STNS

Predictors				Depend	dent varia	bles that	are signi	ficant fo	r social t	ransnatio	nalism			
	high eu ider	ropean	familiar least 2 coun	•	received from ab	road in	purchase abroad last	in the	at least		month	once in a follows n media	likes fo	
	В	Sig.	В	Sig.	В	Sig.	В	Sig.	В	Sig.	В	Sig.	В	Sig.
lived abroad before 18 years old*	.011	.934	.718	.000	.392	.063	.275	.036	.091	.558	031	.817	151	.225
lived abroad after 18 years old*	.063	.434	.808	.000	.724	.000	.099	.250	.466	.000	.016	.858	.127	.105
has relatives or friends abroad*	.046	.481	.628	.000	.973	.000	.403	.000	.414	.000	.380	.000	.317	.000
well off (5 points scale)*	.140	.000	.186	.000	176	.003	.178	.000	.553	.000	.028	.420	.057	.087
primary education*	.094	.329	272	.015	.169	.378	708	.000	849	.000	021	.827	276	.005
knows a foreign language*	.133	.000	.374	.000	.040	.495	.360	.000	.432	.000	.355	.000	.169	.000
age	.019	.000	.020	.000	009	.017	024	.000	010	.000	005	.022	.005	.007
male*	147	.014	.399	.000	.103	.357	.621	.000	.326	.000	.840	.000	030	.614
Germany*	.122	.208	471	.000	008	.976	420	.000	222	.070	755	.000	.776	.000
UK*	-1.370	.000	546	.000	.624	.009	.336	.004	.029	.826	911	.000	.431	.000
Italy*	.317	.002	-1.318	.000	.219	.382	738	.000	692	.000	865	.000	339	.002
Spain*	.520	.000	-1.286	.000	.005	.986	631	.000	-1.001	.000	055	.653	.628	.000
Romania*	.504	.000	-1.258	.000	1.933	.000	-1.542	.000	-1.640	.000	145	.238	339	.002
Constant	-1.454	.000	-1.193	.000	-3.067	.000	.409	.059	.475	.027	1.604	.000	695	.000
R square Nagelquerke	0.114		0.252		0.19		0.219		0.311		0.155		0.081	

Data source: EUCROSS survey on natives in six European countries (Germany, UK, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Romania). N=5072. Logistic regressions.

<sup>\*</sup> Dummy variables. Reference category for the country of residence – Denmark. Weighted data.

Table A 4. Predictors of attachment to the main poles of European migration fields

	cat	tegorie	es of de	pende	nt varia	able: a	ttractin	g coun	try for a	attachr	ment op	otion (	referen	ce cate	egory -	no atta	achmen	t)
predictors for	Aus	tria	Gern	nany	Fran	nce	Ita	ly	Spa	ain	Swe	den	U	K	US	SA	Oth	ner
attachment country	coef.	sig.	coef.	sig.	coef.	sig.	coef.	sig.	coef.	sig.	coef.	sig.	coef.	sig.	coef.	sig.	coef.	sig.
former migrant*	0.230	0.221	0.971	0.000	0.550	0.000	0.609	0.000	0.427	0.002	0.324	0.082	0.836	0.000	0.691	0.000	1.030	0.000
relatives abroad*	0.287	0.163	0.645	0.000	0.581	0.000	0.325	0.013	0.304	0.013	0.355	0.062	0.247	0.088	0.564	0.000	0.678	0.000
friends abroad*	0.103	0.586	0.379	0.001	0.441	0.000	0.654	0.000	0.317	0.008	0.270	0.178	0.386	0.002	0.487	0.003	0.695	0.000
higher education*	-0.232	0.266	0.041	0.794	0.310	0.029	0.301	0.009	0.212	0.120	0.634	0.008	0.280	0.043	-0.052	0.761	0.244	0.005
secondary educ&	-0.060	0.658	-0.072	0.545	0.055	0.658	0.069	0.495	0.242	0.035	-0.159	0.615	-0.209	0.122	-0.186	0.226	0.237	0.001
internet user*	-0.366	0.016	0.048	0.715	0.394	0.006	0.123	0.365	0.022	0.867	0.204	0.422	0.972	0.000	0.405	0.016	0.068	0.369
fluent in a foreign lang.*	0.419	0.089	0.888	0.000	0.844	0.000	0.450	0.001	0.221	0.074	1.102	0.000	1.291	0.000	0.556	0.000	0.880	0.000
clasa4subjective soc.class	0.057	0.414	0.147	0.002	0.151	0.003	-0.061	0.254	-0.052	0.340	0.103	0.336	-0.043	0.432	0.145	0.007	-0.082	0.022
index of goods in hhd	0.188	0.000	0.137	0.000	0.092	0.025	0.151	0.000	0.224	0.000	0.093	0.225	0.232	0.000	0.177	0.000	0.106	0.000
age 16-35 years old*	-0.366	0.023	0.014	0.899	-0.270	0.042	-0.199	0.117	0.217	0.076	-0.575	0.004	0.373	0.002	0.339	0.003	0.135	0.070
man*	0.112	0.349	0.210	0.043	-0.049	0.579	-0.145	0.164	0.051	0.622	0.107	0.571	0.030	0.796	0.268	0.026	0.143	0.012
urban*	0.001	0.996	-0.041	0.783	-0.120	0.374	0.112	0.376	-0.012	0.936	-0.232	0.296	0.286	0.049	0.379	0.007	-0.005	0.958
East EU*	1.091	0.011	0.972	0.001	-0.470	0.122	1.034	0.004	0.465	0.062	0.927	0.031	-0.011	0.954	-0.290	0.225	0.324	0.143
Central-East EU*	2.327	0.000	1.344	0.000	-1.072	0.000	0.501	0.117	-0.393	0.172	1.027	0.015	0.241	0.203	-0.318	0.286	0.771	0.000
West EU*	2.988	0.000	0.573	0.016	-0.027	0.896	1.239	0.000	1.066	0.000	1.445	0.000	-0.243	0.142	-0.110	0.623	0.952	0.000
North EU*	0.322	0.453	0.556	0.017	-0.277	0.223	0.012	0.967	0.878	0.000	1.943	0.000	-0.545	0.212	0.650	0.003	0.771	0.000
Constant	-5.599	0.000	-4.873	0.000	-3.578	0.000	-3.897	0.000	-3.988	0.000	-6.347	0.000	-5.099	0.000	-4.876	0.000	-2.803	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.100		Multin	omial	logistri	regre	ssion, r	obust	standar	d erro	rs, clust	eropt	ion fun	ction c	of NUTS	2 resid	lence re	gion,
N	25751		weight	ed dat	a by w2	22 varia	able in	EB73.3	data se	t. * du	ımmy v	ariable	. Shado	w for	p<0.05.			

Table A 5.Multilevel models for quantitative STNS as dependent variables

	STN	Smob	STN	Scult	STN	ISmc
	Coef.	P>z	Coef.	P>z	Coef.	P>z
HUMAN CAPITAL	4.540	0.000	3.954	0.000	4.842	0.000
Wellbeing index	-0.390	0.000	0.223	0.014	-0.057	0.510
youth of age 16-35	1.413	0.000	0.135	0.438	0.771	0.000
man (1 yes, 0 no)	0.607	0.000	1.154	0.000	0.945	0.000
urban (1 yes, 0 no)	0.875	0.000	0.858	0.000	0.960	0.000
RHDI	0.073	0.007	0.046	0.115	0.071	0.010
GDP per capita ,country	0.040	0.007	0.072	0.000	0.066	0.000
_cons	41.738	0.000	39.970	0.000	39.325	0.000

Data source: EB 73.3. Mixed-effects (multilevel) models with random intercepts at levels two and tree, in STATA 13. Grouping variables – country (27) and NUTS2 or NUTS1 (201).N=25426.

Table A6. Basic dimensions and types of social transnationalism

Transna	tional exp	eriences		Type	es of social	l transnat	tionalism (	STNS)	
			MIGRA	71-	CONSUM				nonSTNS
Dime	ensions	Specific forms	TION	PROJECT	PTION	VALUES	HENSIVE	TYPES	(localistic)
	ŢΠ.	as returned migrant							
	MOBILITY	by relatives abroad							
	Σ	by friends abroad							
		short trips/tourism							
	MPT	cultural							
	2 =	consumption							
S	CONSUMPI	consumption of							
PRACTICES		material goods							
ACT	COMMUNICATI ON*	personal							
PR/	<u> </u>	communities							
	J.	non-state							
	Σ	institutions							
		practices							
	ENTREPRE NEURSHIP	content							
		intensity							
for	IDENTI	community, region							
oositions 1 ces)	VALUES	for all forms of practices							
HABITUS (dispositions for practices)	PROJECTS	for migration, entrepreneurship, life							
Ή	COMP ETENC ES*	for all forms of practices							

\*Dimensions not covered by the data set used in empirical testing of the typology. Highlight for main items giving the profile of the type.Distinction between 'ways of doing' and 'ways of belonging' ((Wimmer & Schiller, 2002) is, in fact, the polarity between practices and habitus that is used in the dimensional analysis for typology

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## Supra-national identification among movers and stayers in Europe<sup>19</sup>

#### Introduction

The analysis of national and supra-national identification of native populations constitutes an important research agenda. This is not the least the case since the concerns and interests of citizens, or their disinterest in certain topics and concepts, are legitimate factors in the decision making of democratic entities. In this sense, questions of identification are relevant for the positioning of countries towards each other and, in particular, for their cooperation in the framework of supra-national entities, such as the European Union, or even on a global scale. Contrary to opinions often expressed by different national actors in public debates most studies have come to the conclusion that there is no incompatibility between national and European identifications but that they are complementary instead (Bruter 2005; Citrin and Sides 2004; Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Duchesne and Frognier 2008; 2002).

As hypothesised in Deutsch's transactionalist theory, transnational relations of national populations, such as frequent foreign travel, knowledge of foreign languages and foreign friends have been demonstrated to increase identification with larger regional entities (Deutsch et al. 1957). However, transnational interactions are highly stratified across society and the younger and highly educated are much more frequently involved in these interactions than the elderly and the less educated (Kuhn 2011). As a consequence, the level of identification with Europe does not necessarily rise in tandem with an increase in these interactions. Instead, the stratification with regard to interactions could be reflected by stratification with regard to identification.

Using quantitative data gathered in 2012 and 2013 as part of the EUCROSS study, this chapter examines the identification with geographical entities (city, region, country, Europe, and the world) of nationals of Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom as well as Romanian and Turkish<sup>20</sup> migrants to these countries. However, the focus here is on the identification with Europe and cosmopolitan attitudes. By doing so we are investigating the conscious self-identification of individuals. On the contrary it is not our aim to inquire the existence of a "European identity". In drawing this distinction we follow Brubaker and Cooper (2000) who argue that "identity", due to its nature as a social construct, is not suitable as analytical category.

According to Mau and collaborators, transnationalism can be understood as involvement in cross-border interactions and mobility (Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann 2008). Kuhn (2011) subdivides transnationalism into three dimensions: transnational background, transnational practices and transnational human capital. Transnational background includes migration experiences, transnational practices involves the interaction with non-national actors and sojourns abroad and transnational human capital includes foreign

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Steffen Pötzschke and Michael Braun.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Throughout the chapter we employ terms like 'Danes', 'Italians', 'Turkish (migrants)', 'Turks', 'Romanians' etc. to refer to individuals who are citizens of the respective countries. This means that we refer with these terms to nationality in a legal sense and not to ethnicity.

language proficiency and general education. It is particularly the first (transnational background) and also the third (transnational human capital) of these dimensions, in which migrants are different from the "stayer" part of a population.

The study of migrants introduces important additional aspects compared to the study of general populations. The mere fact of having migrated distinguishes the former already per definition from (internationally) immobile "stayer" populations. Their experiences should therefore be immediately conducive to transnational attitudes. Depending on the age at migration they have also been socialised in one or more countries and many of them are fluent in more than one language. In addition, migrants can relate not only to one country and to supra-national entities, but to two different countries in a much more encompassing sense than members of national populations with transnational contacts.

Studies of migration and integration have focussed mostly on the relationship of the migrants to both their country of origin (CoO) and country of residence (CoR) (Brubaker 1989). While many pioneering studies on "transnational social spaces" (Pries 2008) were conducted by researchers of this field, they usually did not take the migrants' stance with regard to more encompassing entities, such as the European Union, into consideration. However, it should be noted that the majority of early transnationalism studies focused mainly on migration between the Americas (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc 1995; Guarnizo 1998; Smith 1998; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Portes 1999) where entities comparable to the European Union with regard to its degree of institutionalisation, influence on national affairs and presence in the public space are currently not existent.

Migration research usually distinguishes four domains of migrants' integration into a country of residence: cultural, structural, social and identificational (Esser 1980; Heckmann and Schnapper 2003). Cultural integration includes country of residence language proficiency, structural integration deals with citizenship rights, and the placement of migrants in the system of social stratification and social integration involves ethnic intermarriage and having friends from the country of residence. Finally, identificational integration consists in a strong feeling of belongingness or at least the acceptance of the values of a social system. Analyses in this tradition have focused on whether migrants have achieved (or are likely to achieve in the nearer future) full integration into their country of residence or whether they tend to segment, i.e. remaining primordially oriented to their country of origin or their co-nationals living in the country of residence. The main thrust of this chapter, however, will not be integration into the country of residence but European integration. Furthermore, it is confined to the aspect of identificational integration, and we will therefore not discuss the other domains. Even though we are not solely concentrating on migrant respondents the mentioned distinctions are very helpful since identification and integration processes of non-movers are influenced by the very same factors.

Regarding our migrant samples, we assume that the barriers to integration which Romanian movers have to face should be lower than those for Turkish citizens. This is not only due to the different formal rights accorded to both groups but also to (perceived) cultural, linguistic or historical ties between Romania and several countries of residence (namely Spain, Italy and Germany). Furthermore, the gap between intra-European migrants and those who originate from outside of the EU created in public discussion and

mass media seems to increase within the European Union as a whole. Alongside of only small remnants of the older guest worker migration and the following family reunification, intra-European migration constitutes to a high degree a "new" kind of migration, consisting of a novel mix of migrants coming for work or family reasons on the one hand and those coming to improve their education and quality of life on the other (Braun and Arsene 2009; Braun and Glöckner-Rist 2012). As Braun and Müller (2012) point out the awareness of integration deficits in many EU countries is largely confined to migrants from countries outside of the EU. Only for these groups language proficiency is made obligatory as an entry requirement in some EU countries. Furthermore, the political preference for migrants to assume the citizenship of the country of residence is also confined to these groups. A higher pressure to integrate might also lead to more discrimination, in particular because the opportunities to fully integrate are often not given. As McLaren (2001) found out, it is in particular the elites which differentiate between internal and external migrants in the EU and less the general population (though also the latter differ in their opinions depending on the migrant group).

However, it could also well be that the advantages common to EU-25<sup>21</sup> citizens have not yet been generalised to Romanian nationals, for at least two reasons: First, Romania has become a member of the EU only very recently and Romanian workers had, at the time of the survey, not yet been granted free access to the labour market of all member countries. Hence, Romanian citizens of working age were excluded from one of the most important direct advantages of European unification.<sup>22</sup> Second, since the time directly preceding the EU enlargement of 2004, there have been periodic and often populist discussions regarding feared mass migration of citizens from the new EU member states and presumed negative effects of their arrival on the labour market positioning of EU-15 nationals. These discussions were renewed before Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union in 2007 and were intensified by the outbreak of the global financial crisis in the same year. In accordance with this, recent studies showed that Romanian migrants are routinely depicted negatively in the mass media of EU-15 countries (Light and Young 2009; Uccellini 2012). Finally, Romanians might often be confused with Roma (Moroşanu and Fox 2013). While, as argued above, in direct comparison with Turkish migrants Romanian movers should encounter less obstacles to integrate into CoR societies, these just mentioned additional aspects might cause the latter to face discrimination by the nationals of the different countries of residence, or at least produce a feeling of being discriminated.

Equally, It is to be expected that the respondents of the different national samples identify to varying degrees with Europe. However, differences in identification seem not to be directly related to the length of the membership period of a given member state. Fuchs (2011) found for instance that the attachment to Europe in some states which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> In accordance with established conventions in studies of the European Union we apply the following definitions: 'EU-15' refers to all member states of the European Union before the enlargement of 2004, 'EU-10' refers to those EU member states which joined the Union in 2004, 'EU-25' refers to all member states of the European Union before the enlargement of 2007.

Restrictions regarding the access to the labour market were in place in four of the five surveyed countries of residence of Romanian migrants during the field period, the only exception being Denmark. See: European Commission 2011.

joined the EU in 2004 was above the EU-25 average (e.g., in the Czech Republic and Poland) while it was below average in others (e.g., in Cyprus and Lithuania). Based on a somewhat more elaborate indicator and focusing on political identity Scheuer and Schmitt (2007) also came to the conclusion that there is not necessarily a direct or linear relation between length of a countries EU membership and its population's identification with Europe. Hence, the stayer population in Romania could differ in either direction from the respondents in the other five member states.

The results of Braun and Müller (2012) on the basis of the PIONEUR (Recchi and Favell 2009) data on migrants from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom to the other four countries are most relevant for our purpose both as a sample of comparison and for generating hypotheses; therefore we will base several of our hypotheses on their main results. These intra-EU-15 migrants include a particularly large proportion of highlyskilled labour, study and "quality-of-life" migration, which are becoming increasingly important both quantitatively and qualitatively (King 2002). They are what Favell (2008) refers to as "free movers", who make highly individualised moves, independent of chain migration and not (primarily) motivated by economic or political reasons. The EU-15 migrants profit most from the dramatically increased freedom of movement across national borders which is facilitated both by the conferral of rights and advances in transportation (Recchi 2008). Indeed, these intra-European migrants can be considered a group to which European integration provides particularly large gains. Thus, it can be expected that their identification with the European Union is stronger in comparison to the native ("stayer") populations and this is what actually has been found to be the case. In contrast to EU-15 migrants, both migrant groups analysed here are, to different degrees, in disadvantaged positions. Regarding Romanians as "recent" EU citizens this means that they had - at the time of the survey - not yet been accorded all the same rights as the mobile individuals from longer established EU member states. Nevertheless, even with slightly limited membership rights, migrants from Romania were in a very privileged situation compared to those from Turkey.

#### **Hypotheses**

In this chapter, we are pursuing a set of related research questions. The first two refer to the comparison of stayers and movers:

- (1) Do migrants show indeed stronger supra-national identifications than stayers?
- (2) Do the variables measuring transnational background and behaviour work in a similar way for movers and stayers? Or is migration experience so dominant that additional transnational background and behaviour has a much lower importance for migrants?

The second set of main research questions relates to the difference between Romanian and Turkish migrant groups:

- (3) Do Romanian migrants indeed show a much higher identificational integration than Turkish migrants?
- (4) Is this difference related to the EU citizen rights accorded to the different groups?
- (5) Do the variables measuring transnational background and behaviour work in a similar way for both migrant groups?

Finally, we are interested in any differences in the level and the determination of identifications by transnational background and behaviour of the stayer populations.

From the literature on European identification among stayers (Citrin and Sides 2004; Dubé and Magni-Berton 2009), one can conclude that higher *educational qualifications* should lead to a stronger identification with the European Union. Braun and Müller (2012) also found strong educational effects for intra-EU migrants, in particular for having a university degree.

We postulate that the worse the *subjective economic situation* was at the age of 14, the stronger should European identification be at the time of the interview. The subjective economic situation at the age of 14 is likely to serve as a comparison standard against which the current situation is evaluated. With respect to national populations Fligstein (2009b) shows that the subjective economic situation at the time of the interview, however, has a positive effect on the identification with Europe. We expect to find the same effect both for stayers and movers.

When looking at the literature the effect of *gender* is not really clear. Among researchers who have used Eurobarometer data (from different waves) there seems to be consensus that, among stayers, women have a lower identification with the European Union than men (Citrin and Sides 2004; Fligstein 2009b; Risse 2010). With respect to research relying on other data, the results are not that homogenous. There are both examples which observe the same trend as the aforementioned research (Schmidt, Tenscher, and Weber 2003) and such which, on the contrary, find a more pro-European stance of women (Jamieson and European Commission 2005; Quintelier, Verhaegen, and Hooghe 2014). The data on intra-European movers gathered and analysed as part of the PIONEUR project showed the same tendency as Eurobarometer data, i.e. men identified more with Europe than women did (Braun and Müller 2012). We refrain from formulating any hypothesis regarding the direction of a possible effect, since the processes behind these different results are not entirely clear.

Because older people have generally been socialised in much more nationalised contexts and their experiences with globalisation are biographically more recent, identification with supra-national entities should be lower for them than for younger people, and this is what was found on the basis of Eurobarometer data (Citrin and Sides 2004). However, for intra-European migrants a weak effect could be found in the opposite direction, in the sense that the identification of older migrants with the European Union is higher than that of younger migrants (Braun and Müller 2012).

For migrants only, the *age at migration* should be relevant. Migration at younger ages should increase identification with the European Union, as the opening to new horizons took place in the formative years. A longer *duration of the stay* is expected to increase identification with the European Union, but possibly not above the level reached by the stayer population of the country of residence. These effects can be conceived as mainly mediated by opportunities in that a longer stay increases the exposure of migrants to new environments. Unfortunately, these theoretical propositions cannot be tested together given the database we use.

While Braun and Müller (2012) postulated identification differences depending on the *migration motives*, they did not find any. So we will also refrain from formulating a hypothesis in this regard.

With respect to the stayer population in European countries Fligstein (2009a) argued, based on Eurobarometer data, that *travels to other EU countries* would strengthen the identification with the European Union. However, having migrated is the major distinction of migrants from the national populations in the receiving countries. Nevertheless, both compared to the national populations and in comparison of the different migrant groups among each other, there are other aspects of physical mobility to take into account. Here it is useful to differentiate between experiences in other EU countries and non-EU countries. The latter should clearly be less relevant for European identification but could nevertheless have an effect by leading to a greater open-mindedness and cosmopolitan orientation in general.

Braun and Müller (2012) did not find any effect of a *previous sojourn in the country of residence* for intra-European migrants. However, the European Union is largely responsible for the opportunities migrants have to move freely between European countries. This benefit is particularly visible for migrants who have experienced multiple moves. Therefore, the aforementioned authors argued that a *previous sojourn in a third EU country* should strengthen identification with the European Union. This was actually what they found. Regarding current stayer populations available research which explicitly considers the effect of previous *prolonged* stays abroad on the identification towards Europe or other entities is mainly limited to student mobility (Fuss, García Albacete, and Rodriguez Monter 2004; Sigalas 2010; Kuhn 2012). Nevertheless we expect that sojourns in another EU country should strengthen European identification of national sample respondents, too. Sojourns in non-EU countries might show a weaker effect as they indeed could rather strengthen a more general cosmopolitanism instead.

Earlier studies found that participation in exchange programmes (e.g., Erasmus) do not have a significant impact on the identification of stayers with Europe. Kuhn (2012) argued that this is mainly due to the fact, that persons who are taking part in such programmes usually already have a very positive stance towards Europe to start with. Since nationals of all surveyed countries as well as Turkish citizens can participate in EU funded exchange programmes the influence of such experiences will also be tested. However, in accordance with the above mentioned argument we do not expect that the participation in Erasmus or other EU exchange programmes does significantly influence the identification of the migrants analysed here either.

Having a partner from a third EU country should be particularly beneficial for European identification, though Braun and Müller (2012) did not find a corresponding effect. However, their explanation for this is telling and warrants the inclusion of the variable here: In the bivariate case, they did find an effect of a partner from a third country on identification with the European Union, which vanished however upon inclusion of characteristics of the friendship network in the multivariate regression. This means that the effect of the ethnic origin of the partner is mediated by the friendship network. However, this does not exclude that the former might be still relevant in a different sample and, more generally, in the case of non-migrant respondents. Mau (2010) argues

that binational marriages and civil unions foster the transationalisation of the individuals' daily lives as they potentially become part of social circles in more than one country. In this sense being in a relationship with a foreign EU citizen might also strengthen the identification with Europe as the legal framework created by the European Union facilitates the formation of such relations. Freedom of mobility and granting of social rights and benefits to EU citizens are only two aspects which might be mentioned in this regard. Furthermore, Europe might be conceived as a common cultural heritage and background by such couples. Having a partner from a third country could on the contrary be more conducive to a general cosmopolitan stance.

Friends originating from other EU countries and friends living in other EU countries should be most effective in strengthening European identification, for both movers and stayers. This is also what Braun and Müller (2012) have found in their study of intra-European migrants.

At least in theory, for migrants, transnational ties to the country of origin could prevent a complete reorientation towards the country of residence. If this holds, frequent *contacts* with family members and friends in the country of origin should have positive effects on country of origin identification and also on identification with the European Union, while they should not be conducive to country of residence identification. However and contrary to the expectations of Braun and Müller (2012), the impact of frequent contacts with family members and friends in the country of origin on identification with the European Union did not turn out to be significant. This is not too surprising, as the compatibility of simultaneous identifications with different geographical entities has been demonstrated in the literature.

Analysing data of the citizens of EU member states Gerhards (2012) has shown that there is a positive correlation between the *knowledge of languages* and the attachment to Europe. We would expect to see similar results, since language knowledge facilitates access to foreign country media and allows respondents furthermore to interact more closely with citizens of other EU countries. In the latter assumption we are following Fligstein (2009a) who considers direct contact with Europeans abroad a main driving force of European identification. With respect to migrants, Braun and Müller (2012) showed a similar effect of the proficiency in the CoR language.

The use of *foreign-language TV* should work in a similar way as the knowledge of additional languages. In addition, it is to be expected that it widens the horizon beyond the country of origin and the country of residence.

For migrants, Braun and Müller (2012) expected that experiences of discrimination in the country of residence should not only negatively affect identification with the country of residence but by means of generalization also the identification with the European Union. However, they could not find such an effect. Nevertheless, we postulate that with the Romanian and Turkish migrant samples we have here (which are both, though to different degrees, more outsiders to the EU than the migrant groups in the PIONEUR study), this might be different.

#### **Data and Methods**

The analyses presented in the following are based on the EUCROSS survey. Detailed information on the methodology of the survey, its implementation and on the characteristics of the different samples can be found in the methodological chapter of this report (Appendix A). For our analysis we use the quantitative data on all national, as well as Romanian and Turkish migrant samples in the six surveyed countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom).

#### The dependent variables

The chapter presents two related sets of regressions. The first ones (Tables 4-6) concentrate on identification with Europe. In general, identification with different geographic entities was measured by the question: "On a scale from one to five, where one means 'strongly disagree' and five means 'strongly agree', please tell me how much you agree with the following statements? (a) I feel as a citizen of the town where I live, b) I feel as a citizen of the region where I live, (c) I feel [CoR national], (d) migrants only: I feel [CoO national], (e) I feel European, (f) I feel as a citizen of the world". All variables are reverse-coded. However, the orientation towards the remaining entities will only be used to put European identification into perspective and not in their own right. We treat European identification as a quantitative variable but have checked whether dichotomising the dependent variable leads to markedly different results, which was not the case.

The second set of regressions (Tables 7-8) uses the difference between identification with Europe and a more general cosmopolitan stance as independent variable. To this end a variable was created by subtracting the numeric value of the answer given to sub-item (f) above (I feel as a citizen of the world) from sub-item (e) (I feel European). This variable therefore could theoretically take values from -5 to 5, where positive values mean that the identification with Europe is higher than the identification as a citizen of the world.

### The independent variables

Education is entered as three dummy variables for intermediary and upper secondary as well as university education (with those having a lower secondary education or less constituting the baseline).

The subjective economic situation at the age of 14 and at the time of the interview were measured by the questions: "Which of the following descriptions comes closest to your feelings about how well off the household you were living in was when you were 14 years old?" and "Which of the following descriptions comes closest to how you feel about how well off your household is today?". The response categories were: "We are/were living very comfortably on the money we have/had", "we are/were living comfortably on the money we have/had", "we make/made ends meet", "we find/found it difficult" and "we find/found it very difficult".

Gender is a dummy variable with men as the baseline category, i.e. the effects presented pertain to women.

Age and, for migrants, duration of the stay in the CoR are included as quantitative variables. (As age at the time of migration is a linear combination of age and the duration of the stay in the country of residence, it is not possible to include all three variables at the same time in a regression.)

The migration motives of Romanian and Turkish respondents who are not living in their country of origin were measured by an open question. Three dummy variables are used for education, quality-of-life and family/love motives. The baseline is constituted by work motives.

Information on previous sojourns of three months or more in countries other than the country of origin and the country of residence were collected by the use of two items. The first one asked for stays realised before the age of 18 and the second one for those realised later in life. Since the respondents were asked to specify the country in which they stayed a differentiation following geographical criteria is possible. The answers to both mentioned items were combined and are entered as dummy variables for previous sojourn in another EU country and in any other country (i.e., which does not belong to the European Union). No previous stays of at least three months serves as the baseline.

The participation in exchange programmes is measured by the dichotomous item: "Have you ever (e.g. as student or during your professional career) participated in an international exchange program that has been funded or co-funded by the European Union?".

A number of variables are introduced for the measurement of recent mobility. Trips to other countries within the last 24 months that included at least one overnight stay are entered as two dummy variables for stays in another EU country and stays in any other country. For migrants these dummies do not include the respective CoO, as they are meant to measure the mobility between the CoR and third countries. As in the case of the above mentioned previous sojourns, these variables are dichotomous and indicate only whether or not the respondents visited the respective group of countries within the specified time frame. No stays in another country than the CoR or CoO serve as baseline. Furthermore, the total number of these trips and, for the migrant samples, the number of visits to the country of origin are included in the analysis by means of two separate quantitative variables, asking how many of these trips the responds made in the last 24 months.

The origin of the partner is entered as dummy variables for partner from the country of residence, partner from another EU country and partner form a third non-EU country. Those who do not have a partner or whose partner is from the CoO (migrant samples only) serve as the baseline.

For the migrant samples we include measurements of integration into different social circles in the country of residence. Therefore, the existence of family members, in-laws and friends in the country of residence who come from the country of origin, the country of residence and a third country were measured by the items, "Please think about all family members, in-laws and friends you have who live in [CoR]. I would like to know: How many are originally from [CoO]? And how many are from [CoR]? And how many are

originally from other countries?" Answer categories were "none", "a few" and "several". These variables are treated as quantitative variables, although they were measured on an ordinal scale only.

The measurement of contacts abroad followed the same principles. Respective dummies are included in the regressions of nationals and migrants alike.

Besides the existence of a transnational network the data also allow an assessment of the frequency in which different forms of communication are used. To this end three items were included asking how often the respondents communicated during the last 12 months with friends and family abroad via phone or a software such as Skype, via mail or e-mail and via social networking sites (e.g., Facebook). The offered answer categories are "every day", "at least once a week", "at least once a month", "less often" and "never". These categories are reverse-coded.

Knowledge in a third language (other than the CoR and CoO language) is included as a dichotomous item with no additional language proficiencies as reference.

In order to allow for the measurement of foreign media consumption the following item was included: "The following question is about TV content (e.g. movies, sitcoms, news broadcasts, etc.) in other languages than [official CoR language] [and your native language]: How often do you watch TV content which is in another language and has not been dubbed, either directly on TV or via the Internet?". The response categories were "every day", "at least once a week", "at least once a month", "less often" and "never". This question is reverse-coded.

For migrants only, discrimination experience was measured by the question "Have you ever felt discriminated against in [CoR] because you were born in another country?" Response categories were "no, never", "yes, sometimes" and "yes, frequently". This variable is treated as a quantitative variable, although it was measured on an ordinal scale only.

#### Analytical procedure

The results section begins with some preliminary analyses. First, descriptive information is provided on the distribution of the samples with regard to age, age at migration, duration of sojourn in the country of residence, gender and migration motives in the different subsamples. Obviously, some of these information apply to EUCROSS migrant samples only.

Second, the means for the identifications with the different geographical entities are presented.

This is, third, followed by a series of regressions of European identification on potential explanatory variables. In a first model, we include the different national populations or the migrant groups, respectively. Then we add core demographic variables, e.g., education, the perception of the own economic situation in childhood and at present, gender, and the variables measuring transnational behaviour, such as trips to other countries and friendship relationships.

Finally, similar regressions including country respectively migrant group dummies are presented using the difference between identification with Europe and self-description as citizen of the world as dependent variable.

#### **Results**

Descriptive information on the samples

Table 1 presents descriptive information on age, age at migration, duration of the sojourn and the gender composition of the different populations.

Table 1 Age, age at migration, duration of the sojourn and gender

	Age	Age at migration	Duration of sojourn in CoR	% female
Danes	49.1			50.0
Germans	49.9			51.2
Italians	50.1			57.6
Romanians	42.1			44.0
Spanish	48.7			52.7
British	56.0			52.9
Turks in				
Denmark	41.2	20.8	20.4	47.2
Germany	46.2	19.1	27.1	56.1
Italy	33.9	24.9	9.0	43.8
Romania	40.7	29.0	11.7	31.2
United Kingdom	38.5	26.1	12.4	43.0
Romanians in				
Denmark	33.4	26.3	7.1	41.0
Germany	48.8	33.4	15.5	56.8
Italy	42.2	29.3	12.9	59.8
Spain	36.8	28.5	8.2	58.7
United Kingdom	33.6	28.5	5.1	48.6

Source: EUCROSS (2013). Nationals: N=5951; Turks: N=1235; Romanians: N=1225

The mean age of national samples varies between 42 years in Romania and 56 in the United Kingdom. However, respondents in the four countries in between are much closer together as they show a mean age between approximately 49 and 50 years. The gender distribution amongst nationals is absolutely balanced in Denmark, where half of the sample is of either sex. All other samples, but the Romanian one, contain slightly more women than men. In Romania it is the other way around.

All migrant groups are on average younger than the respective national populations of their countries of residence. However, the difference is very small for both Turks and Romanians in Germany. The average age of the migrants differs very much by both migrant group and country of residence.

Turks were typically younger than Romanians when they moved to their countries of residence, with the exception of the Turks in Romania which are in this respect more similar to the Romanian migrants than to the Turkish samples in other countries. With the only exception of Italy, Turks have spent already a considerably longer period in their countries of residence than Romanians.

The Turkish sample in Romania is also noticeable with respect to the gender distribution as it is composed of considerable more men than women. Otherwise the gender distribution amongst migrants is relatively balanced while, at the same time, displaying higher variance than amongst the national samples.

Table 2 presents information on the migration motives of the different migrant groups.

**Table 2 Migration motives** 

	Work	Education	Quality of life	Family/love
Turks in				
Denmark	27.2	0.8	6.0	69.6
Germany	20.6	2.8	2.8	72.6
Italy	45.6	25.2	7.2	25.2
Romania	67.6	4.4	4.4	21.2
United Kingdom	28.2	33.9	19.8	32.3
Romanians in				
Denmark	49.6	25.6	17.6	14.0
Germany	32.0	2.8	14.8	53.6
Italy	63.2	1.6	10.0	32.0
Spain	70.8	1.2	11.2	21.6
United Kingdom	54.8	24.2	29.4	15.3

Source: EUCROSS (2013). Turks: N=1250; Romanians: N=1248

As far as the migration motives are concerned, very marked differences can be observed between the different groups. The Romanian samples in four of five surveyed countries show clear similarities as these participants migrated mainly for work reasons. Only for those Romanians who went to Germany family instead of work was the main reason to migrate.

The data of Turkish migrants gives a more diverse picture. On the one hand, Turkish migrants in Denmark and Germany, for instance, stated "family/love" as the main migration motive. Hence these are exactly those two samples who also show the lowest average age of migration and the longest duration of their stay. However, the fact that these respondents stated family reasons for their migration does not entirely come as a

surprise. For instance, in Germany three quarters of the interviewed Turkish nationals immigrated since the mid-1970s. This means that the majority of this sample arrived after the Federal Republic ceased its labour recruitment policy in 1973. Following this political decision, migration from Turkey did not end but its character changed, as many Turkish workers decided not to return to their country of origin for the time being. Instead family reunifications became a much more important migration pattern since those Turks already living in Germany started to invite their families to join them in a considerably higher number than before (Herbert 2003; Kastoryano 1996).

On the other hand, "work" was cited as main migration motive by Turkish respondents in Italy and Romania. Especially with respect to the latter a comparison to migration years and historical dates brings interesting insights. 72.4 per cent of our Turkish sample migrated to Romania between 1995 (the year in which Romania officially applied for EU membership) and 2007 (the year in which it joined the EU). Thus, this migration could, at least partially, have been motivated by the prospect of the future EU membership of this country. This is all the more plausible as in none of the other samples a majority migrated in this particular time period.

Table 3 Local, regional, country of origin, country of residence and European identification and cosmopolitan attitudes

	City	Region	CoO	CoR	Europe	World
Danes	4.4	4.4		4.8	3.9	3.4
Germans	4.0	3.9		4.3	4.0	3.4
Italians	3.9	3.8		4.3	3.9	3.9
Romanians	4.2	4.2		4.6	3.8	4.0
Spanish	4.2	4.1		4.2	4.1	4.3
British	3.9	3.9	-	4.4	3.0	3.4
Turks in						
Denmark	3.4	3.3	4.5	1.7	2.7	4.1
Germany	3.4	3.3	4.7	1.3	2.9	3.8
Italy	3.1	3.0	4.4	2.0	3.0	4.0
Romania	4.8	4.7	4.8	1.0	4.7	4.9
United Kingdom	3.4	3.2	4.3	2.8	3.0	4.1
Romanians in						
Denmark	3.4	3.5	4.3	2.2	4.5	4.5
Germany	3.7	3.7	4.3	2.9	4.3	4.3
Italy	3.8	3.7	4.5	2.4	4.5	4.3
Spain	3.7	3.7	4.7	2.2	4.4	4.4
United Kingdom	3.4	3.3	4.3	2.4	4.1	4.0

Source: EUCROSS (2013). Nationals: N=5856; Turks: N=1209; Romanians: N=1200

Identification with different geographical entities

Table 3 presents the group averages for local, regional, country of origin, country of residence and European identification as well as more general cosmopolitan attitudes.

Danes show clearly the strongest identifications with both their city and their region. On the bottom, we find the Italians and the British. With the exception of Romanians in Italy and Turks in Romania, the migrant populations show lower local and regional identifications than the corresponding national populations. Romanians score slightly higher than the Turks in some countries, only.

With regard to country of origin identification the migrant groups do not differ very much from each other and from the national populations' orientation towards the countries they live in.

Identification with the country of residence is again highest for the Danes, followed by the Romanians. With the exception of Spain, it is higher than local and regional identifications. Unsurprisingly, identification with the country of residence is much lower for the migrants than for the national populations. Romanian migrants identify more with their country of residence than Turkish migrants do, with the only exception of the United Kingdom where it is the other way around.

An interesting picture emerges for identification with the EU: With the exception of the United Kingdom, where identification with the EU is rather weak, all other stayer populations are on a comparable level. However, European identification among stayers is in most cases markedly below that of country of residence identification, in particular in Denmark and Romania. Romanian migrants score higher than the stayer populations and dramatically higher than the Turks, with the only exception of Turkish EUCROSS respondents in Romania who identify more with Europe than any other group. It is also noteworthy that identification with the EU is, by a wide margin, higher than identification with the country of residence for all migrant groups.

A general cosmopolitan attitude is slightly higher than EU identification in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, while the contrary is true in Italy, Romania and Spain. The difference between the Romanian and Turkish migrants is rather small and most pronounced in Germany. Especially high cosmopolitanism is found among the Turks in Romania. The members of this group are indeed exceptional in their high local and regional as well as supra-national identifications, combined with a complete lack of identification with Romania as a country. When comparing European identification and cosmopolitanism among migrants, it becomes obvious that for the Turks cosmopolitanism is much higher than identification with Europe, while for the Romanians there is virtually no difference between the two.

## Multivariate analysis of European identification

Table 4 shows two regression models for EU identification for the national populations. Model 1 includes only the country dummies (Denmark is used as a baseline) and model 2 adds the demographic and behavioural variables.

Table 4: Regression models for European identification for the national samples (unstandardised regression coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2
Germans (baseline: Danes)	0.069	0.165**
Italians	0.009	0.201**
Romanians	-0.145**	0.082
Spaniards	0.213***	0.387***
British	-0.982***	-0.911***
Education (baseline: lower secondary education or		
less)		
Intermediary secondary		0.012
Higher secondary		0.015
University		0.030
Economic household situation (age 14)		-0.010
Economic household situation (currently)		0.095***
Female		0.116***
Age		0.008***
Physical mobility		
Previous sojourn in an EU country		-0.024
Previous sojourn in a non-EU country		0.102
Recent trip/s to other EU country/-ies		0.072
Recent trip/s to non-EU country/-ies		-0.083
Number of recent trips abroad		0.027
Participation in an EU exchange programme		0.118
Partner(baseline: no partner or partner from CoR)		
Partner from another EU country		0.178
Partner from non-EU country		-0.102
Social contacts abroad - Number of family members,		
in-laws and friends originally		
from CoR		-0.018
from third country		0.058
Frequency of communication abroad via		
Telephone or computer (Skype etc.)		0.031
Mail or e-mail		0.033
Social networking sites		-0.022
Knowledge of foreign language/s		0.157**
Consumption of TV content in a foreign language		0.037**
Constant	3.936***	2.664***
N	5,979	5,698
Adj. R²	0.090	0.116

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Without any controls for transnational behaviour and the demographic variables (Model 1), the Danes, Germans, and Italians are on the same level of European identification. The Spaniards are on a slightly higher and the Romanians on a slightly lower level than the former, while the British identify markedly less with Europe. This picture changes to some extent but not dramatically, once the controls are introduced: Germans and Italians show now slightly more European identification than the Danes, the Romanians are on the same level, and the Spaniards identify clearly more with Europe than the Danes. The British remain the group which identifies least with Europe.

Only a few of the demographic variables and forms of transnational behaviour have a significant effect: The better the current economic situation of the household, the more European respondents feel. Women identify more with Europe than men. The same holds true for older compared to younger people, contrary to our expectation regarding the stayer population and to earlier Eurobarometer based analysis. The knowledge of foreign languages and the consumption of TV content in a foreign language also contribute to European identification amongst the nationals.

While the country dummies alone explain 9 per cent of the variance in European identification, together with the demographic variables and transnational behaviour, nearly 12 per cent can be explained. Further analysis (tables not presented) show for the entire sample of nationals, i.e. for all countries taken together, the demographic variables and transnational behaviour alone explain some 2 per cent of the variance but the differences between the single countries are considerable. While in the United Kingdom nearly 10 per cent and in Italy nearly 8 per cent of the variance of European identification can be explained by the variables considered, it is only 4 per cent in Germany and between 1.3 and 2.4 per cent in Romania, Spain and Denmark.

Similar results as for European identification can be obtained for cosmopolitanism, as far as the effects of the current economic situation of the household, gender, and age are concerned. However, with regard to transnational behaviour, entirely different variables are relevant: Longer sojourns outside of the European Union, number of trips abroad in the last 24 months, having a non-EU partner, and contacts to foreign countries (Table not presented). We can conclude that identification with the EU is not just a variant of a general cosmopolitan attitude but determined by different variables, at least in part. We will therefore analyse which variables have an influence on whether respondents identify more with Europe than with the entire world. But before embarking on that, we will turn to the European identification of the Romanian and Turkish migrants.

Table 5 shows the two regression models for EU identification for the migrants. Model 1 includes only the dummies for the migrant groups (the Turks in Denmark are used as a baseline) and model 2 adds the demographic and behavioural variables. While these models resemble those in Table 4, it should be noted that, for migrants, additional variables are included.

Table 5 Regression models for European identification for the migrant groups (unstandardised regression coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2
	0.240*	0.445444
Turks in Germany (baseline: Turks in Denmark)	0.249*	0.415***
Turks in Italy	0.344**	0.237
Turks in Romania	2.007***	1.932***
Turks in United Kingdom	0.303**	0.275*
Romanians in Denmark	1.802***	1.634***
Romanians in Germany	1.709***	1.466***
Romanians in Italy	1.834***	1.660***
Romanians in Spain	1.730***	1.686***
Romanians in United Kingdom	1.449***	1.382***
Education (baseline: lower secondary education or less)		
Intermediary secondary		0.084
Higher secondary		0.119
University		0.135
Economic household situation (age 14)		-0.062*
Economic household situation (currently)		0.060
Female		0.107
Age		0.007*
Duration of stay in CoR		-0.000
Migration motives (baseline: work)		
Education		0.096
Quality of life		0.051
Family/love		0.020
Physical mobility		
Previous sojourn in a EU country		0.020
Previous sojourn in a non-EU country		-0.215
Recent trip/s to other EU country/-ies		-0.027
Recent trip/s to non-EU country/-ies		0.047
Number of recent trips abroad (except CoO)		0.039
Number of recent trips to CoO		0.031
Participation in a EU exchange programme		0.087
Partner(baseline: no partner or partner from CoO)		0.007
from CoR		-0.089
from another EU country		0.184
from non-EU country		0.134
•		0.132
Social contacts in CoR - Number of family members, in-laws		
and friends originally		0.044
from CoO		-0.041
from CoR		0.167***
from third countries		-0.034

	Model 1	Model 2
Social contacts abroad. Number of family members in		
Social contacts abroad - Number of family members, in-		
laws and friends originally		0.002
from CoO and living there		0.002
from CoO living neither there nor in CoR		-0.060
from third country living in any country but CoR		0.044
Frequency of communication abroad via		
Telephone or computer (Skype etc.)		-0.041
Mail or e-mail		0.011
Social networking sites		0.054*
Knowledge of additional language/s		0.283***
Consumption of TV content in a third language		0.025
Discrimination experience		-0.118**
Constant	2.656***	1.965***
N	2,474	2,227
Adj. R²	0.274	0.301

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

In the case of the migrant samples, group dummies explain 27.4 per cent of the variance in European identification. The Romanians in all countries of residence resemble each other and are located on a much higher level of European identification than the Turks. The latter are also very similar in all the countries of residence, with the notable exception of the Turks in Romania who are on the same level as the Romanian migrants. Adding the demographic and behavioural variables increases explained variance to 30.0 per cent. However, all the migrant-group dummies (with the exception of Turkish migrants in Italy) remain significant. In fact, 14.7 per cent of the variance is due to the migrant groups as such, not mediated through the demographic and behavioural variables. As the Turks in Romania also contribute to the differences on the migrantgroup level, we also performed analyses using just a more general migrant-group dummy, distinguishing Turkish from Romanian migrants. Virtually the same results come out of this analysis (7.6 per cent of the variance is explained by the distinction between Turks and Romanians as such). That is, Turkish and Romanian migrants differ from each other over and above what can be expected by their different demographic background and their transnational behaviour. This result is in support of our assumption that the different formal legal status of Romanian and Turkish migrants strongly influences their differences in European identification.

As far as the transnational background and behaviour variables are concerned, very few of them have a significant effect. As hypothesised, those migrants who stated that they spent their youth in economically difficult conditions show more European identification than those who did not. However, since this was measured by a retrospective assessment which probably most respondents gave in direct comparison to their current situation, it basically means that the identification with Europe is higher for those respondents who subjectively judge that they achieved a substantial improvement of their economic

situation since their late childhood. It seems safe to assume that they attribute this improvement to a large extent to the realisation of their migratory project and the opportunities it provided them with. This could also indicate that the differences in attitudes towards the European Union are connected to a growing gap between winners and losers of globalisation which is attested by Kriesi et al. (2006). Recent findings based on Eurobarometer data confirmed that such an effect is indeed visible regarding the EU-population as a whole (Teney, Lacewell, and De Wilde 2014). However, a thorough test of this hypothesis would have gone beyond the scope of this article and is not possible with the present data. Therefore, it has to be reserved for future research.

Older migrants are also more attached to Europe than the younger ones. Trips to other countries within the last two years do not have a significant impact on the orientation towards Europe. However, the lack of such an effect has to be evaluated keeping in mind that all analysed samples have the major mobility experience, namely the migration to another country, in common. Therefore, short-term mobility has a smaller impact on individual self-conception than for non-migrants. Among the variables characterising the friendship network, only the number of friends from the country of residence who live in the country of residence have a significant positive effect. The same applies to the frequency of contacts via social networking sites with family members, relatives and friends abroad during the last year. However, neither the existence of broader transnational networks (within the EU or beyond), nor regular contact to friends and family abroad via telephone, mail or e-mail have significant effects in this direction. As expected, additional languages have a positive effect. Finally, experiences of discrimination have a negative effect on European identification.

As we did above with regard to nationals, for the migrant groups a short assessment should be given, on what changes when taking cosmopolitanism as the dependent variable instead of European identification (table not presented). In addition to higher secondary education, the current economic situation of the household has a positive effect (but there is no effect of the economic situation at age 14). Moreover, the frequency of communication abroad via social networking sites has a positive effect (but not communication by telephone or Skype). Finally, knowledge of additional languages has a positive effect, as it had for European identification.

Also for the migrants, we can thus conclude that identification with the EU is not just a variant of a general cosmopolitan attitude but determined by mostly different variables.

Table 6 Separate regression models for European identification of Turkish and Romanian

migrants (unstandardised regression coefficients)

mgrants (unstandardised regression coemicients)	Romanian migrants	Turkish migrants
Education (baseline: lower secondary education or less)		
Intermediary secondary	0.099	0.115
·	0.099	-0.018
Higher secondary		
University	0.103	0.004
Economic household situation (age 14)	0.003	-0.171***
Economic household situation (currently)	-0.007	0.164**
Female	0.004	0.254**
Age	0.007	0.014*
Duration of stay in CoR	-0.009	-0.006
Migration motives (baseline: work)		
Education	-0.061	-0.060
Quality of life	-0.077	0.017
Family/ love	-0.041	-0.211*
Physical mobility		
Previous sojourn in a EU country	0.144	-0.102
Previous sojourn in a non-EU country	-0.332*	-0.174
Recent trip/s to other EU country/-ies	0.102	-0.411**
Recent trip/s to non-EU country/-ies	0.049	0.242
Number of recent trips abroad (except CoO)	0.008	0.072
Number of recent trips to CoO	-0.004	0.094*
Participation in a EU exchange programme	0.111	0.078
Partner (baseline: no partner or partner from CoO)		
from CoR	0.058	-0.084
from another EU country	-0.147	0.364
from non-EU country	-0.030	0.151
Social contacts in CoR - Number of family members, in-laws		0.131
and friends originally		
from CoO	-0.005	-0.009
from CoR	0.130**	0.286***
from third countries	-0.046	-0.183*
Social contacts abroad - Number of family members, in-	-0.040	-0.165
•		
laws and friends originally	0.001	0 421***
from CoO and living there	-0.081	0.431***
from CoO living neither there nor in CoR	-0.030	-0.315***
from third country living in any country but CoR	0.027	-0.046
Frequency of communication abroad via	0.515	
Telephone or computer (Skype etc.)	-0.016	-0.201***
Mail or e-mail	-0.000	0.042
Social networking sites	0.042	0.082*
Knowledge of additional language/s	0.181	0.449***
Consumption of TV content in a third language	-0.006	0.131***

	Romanian migrants	Turkish migrants
Discrimination experience	-0.162***	-0.148*
Constant	4.096***	1.804***
N	1,110	1,117
Adj. R²	0.020	0.167

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

When looking separately at the regressions for Romanian and Turkish migrants (Table 6), a striking result appears: Romanian attitudes are only to a very small degree accounted by demographical and behavioural variables; only 2 per cent of the variance can be explained. That means that Romanian migrants show high identification with Europe, largely independent of their transnational background and their transnational behaviour. For Turks this is the opposite: With nearly 17 per cent of explained variance, the independent variables taken together have an impact more than eight times as big.

In the Romanian samples, having lived in a country outside of the European Union for more than three months has a small negative effect. Social integration in the country of residence, measured here by the number of family members, relatives and friends who are natives, has a strong positive impact on European identification. Interestingly, it seems that for this effect to occur, a higher number of close contacts with people whom the respondents do not consider migrants but of CoR origin is needed, on the contrary having a CoR partner alone does not have a significant effect. Finally, discrimination experiences have a negative effect.

For Turks, however, a much longer list of variables is relevant: Unfavourable economic conditions in the youth of the migrant and favourable conditions at present increase European identification. Women and older migrants have a stronger attachment. Especially the former is noteworthy as it means that, not only contrary to Eurobarometer results on stayer populations but also in contrast to the findings regarding movers from EU-15 countries, in the case of Turkish migrants it is actually women who are more likely to identify with Europe. Moreover, as for the latter, our results are contrary to Eurobarometer results on stayer populations but in line with the results regarding movers from EU-15 countries. A higher number or trips to the country of origin in the last 24 months has a positive impact. The same holds true for family members, relatives and friends who are originally from Turkey and also live there. In the light of the above discussed influence of the assessment of the migration project as an economic success this could indicate that returning to the country of origin and encountering family members there causes respondents to judge their current situation favourable and to attribute positive developments and aspects, at least partially, to opportunities provided by the European Union. Family members, relatives and friends from the country of residence who live in the country of residence have a positive but those from other countries (presumably largely non-Europeans) have a negative impact. The same applies to family reasons as migration motive. This points to a similar positive impact of social integration as in the case of Romanian migrants. The frequency of contacts on the telephone with family members, relatives and friends abroad during the last year decreases European identification, but when these contacts are via social networks they have a positive impact. This might mean that it is less the contact with these people as such which has an effect but the medium used. Unsurprisingly, additional language knowledge has a positive effect on European identification as has the consumption of foreign-language TV. Finally, discrimination experiences have a negative effect.

Summarising the results on European identification, we can conclude that the demographic and behavioural variables work in a markedly different way in the different populations under investigation. They play a considerable role in explaining European identification of the Turkish migrants and the British and Italian nationals but are virtually unimportant for the Romanian migrants as well as for the Romanian and Spanish nationals.

# Multivariate analysis of the difference between European identification and cosmopolitanism

In the following we will use the difference between European identification and cosmopolitanism as the dependent variable. Higher values mean that the identification with Europe is stronger than the identification as citizen of the world.

When controlling for the demographic and behavioural variables, compared to Danes and Germans, for all the other populations the balance between cosmopolitanism and European identification is more in favour of the former. Besides the country dummies, age is highly significant (in a positive direction). This means the higher the age of the respondent, the more European identification is boosted versus a general cosmopolitanism.

The fact that both partner origin variables are very significant, too, underlines the importance of such cross-cultural contacts on a very private and close level. The effects are in the expected direction: having a partner from another EU country is positively related to a more European identification whereas respondents whose partner comes from a third country tend to be more inclined towards a more universal cosmopolitan stance. Interestingly social contacts to people abroad show only significance when they consist of co-nationals and in this case they are favouring rather a cosmopolitan than a European identification. However, this might well be related to the question whether these contacts themselves live within the confines of the European Union or not, which is a fact that was not controlled for in this model. Other aspects related to a comparatively stronger identification with Europe are frequent communication abroad by telephone and foreign language knowledge. Finally, recent trips abroad show only significance when they were directed to non-EU countries and are unsurprisingly positively related to a more cosmopolitan than European stance. Country dummies, demographic and behavioural variables account for 9 per cent of the variance.

Table 7 Regression model for the difference between European identification and cosmopolitanism for the national samples (unstandardised regression coefficients)

	Nationals
Germans (baseline: Danes)	0.040
Italians	-0.488***
Romanians	-0.748***
Spaniards	-0.748
British	-1.025***
Education (baseline: lower secondary education or less)	-1.023
Intermediary secondary	-0.069
•	0.003
Higher secondary	0.003
University  Franchis household situation (ago 14)	
Economic household situation (age 14)	0.002
Economic household situation (currently)	0.046*
Female	-0.008
Age	0.005***
Physical mobility	0.005
Previous sojourn in a EU country	-0.005
Previous sojourn in an non-EU country	-0.066
Recent trip/s to other EU country/-ies	0.088
Recent trip/s to non-EU country/-ies	-0.118*
Number of recent trips abroad	-0.026
Participation in a EU exchange programme	0.043
Partner(baseline: no partner or partner from CoR)	0.200**
Partner from another EU country	0.380**
Partner from non-EU country	-0.310**
Social contacts abroad - Number of family members, in-laws and friend	ls
originally	
Social contacts abroad - from CoR	-0.103**
from third country	-0.038
Frequency of communication abroad via	
Telephone or computer (Skype etc.)	0.056*
Mail or e-mail	0.014
Social networking sites	-0.034
Knowledge of foreign language/s	0.129*
Consumption of TV content in a foreign language	0.010
Constant	0.082
N	5,629
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.093

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

If we leave the country dummies aside, the demographic and behavioural variables alone explain 3.3 per cent of the variance for all countries taken together. However, individual samples differ considerably: While for Germany, nearly 5 per cent and in Italy nearly 4 per

cent of the variance can be explained, these variables explain virtually nothing in Denmark and Romania. Spain and the United Kingdom are in-between (Tables not presented).

The following table presents the corresponding results for the Romanian and Turkish migrants. Please consider that additional variables are included again for the migrants.

Table 8 Regression models for the difference between European identification and cosmopolitanism for the migrant groups (unstandardised regression coefficients)

	Romanian migrants	Turkish migrants
Country of residence		
Baseline	Romanians in Denmark	Turks in Denmark
Germany	0.039	0.507**
Italy	0.245	0.294
Romania		1.136***
Spain	0.121	
United Kingdom	0.167	0.252
Education (baseline: lower secondary education or less)		
Intermediary secondary	-0.309	-0.035
Higher secondary	-0.224	-0.144
University	-0.109	0.080
Economic household situation (age 14)	-0.013	-0.080
Economic household situation (currently)	-0.070	0.004
Female	-0.050	0.329**
Age	0.008	0.005
Duration of stay in CoR	-0.011	0.016*
Migration motives (baseline: work)		
Education	0.228	0.138
Quality of life	-0.013	-0.302
Family/love	0.049	-0.171
Physical mobility		
Previous sojourn in a EU country	0.032	-0.109
Previous sojourn in an non-EU country	-0.231	-0.102
Recent trip/s to other EU country/-ies	-0.025	-0.249
Recent trip/s to non-EU country/-ies	-0.034	-0.155
Number of recent trips abroad (except CoO)	0.032	0.143*
Number of recent trips to CoO	-0.008	0.050
Participation in a EU exchange programme	0.131	0.125

	Romanian	Turkish
Partner (baseline: no partner or partner from CoO)	migrants	migrants
from CoR	0.066	-0.038
from another EU country	-0.419	0.094
from non-EU country	0.025	0.788
Social contacts in CoR - Number of family members, in-laws		
and friends originally		
from CoO	-0.001	-0.076
from CoR	0.104	0.119
from third countries	0.049	-0.157
Social contacts abroad - Number of family members, in-		
laws and friends originally		
from CoO and living there	-0.030	0.006
from CoO living neither there nor in CoR	-0.095	-0.066
from third country living in any country but CoR	-0.058	0.173
Frequency of communication abroad via		
Telephone or computer (Skype etc.)	0.001	-0.016
Mail or e-mail	-0.043	-0.027
Social networking sites	-0.027	0.084*
Knowledge of additional language/s	-0.096	0.169
Consumption of TV content in a third language	-0.010	0.046
Discrimination experience	-0.129*	-0.107
Constant	0.525	-2.011***
	0.020	011
N	1,098	1,112
Adj. R²	0.014	0.091

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

For Romanian migrants, even if the dummies for the respective countries of residence are included, only slightly more than 1 per cent of the variance can be explained. The only significant effect is discrimination experience. The more discrimination is felt, the weaker European identification becomes relative to a general cosmopolitanism.

For the Turks, this is different. All variables together explain 9 per cent of the variance. Our model shows that female Turkish migrants incline towards European identification rather than cosmopolitanism. Likewise, the length of the stay in the CoR, the number of recent trips abroad and the frequency of using social networking sites all strengthen EU versus cosmopolitan orientation. In contrast to the Romanians, discrimination experience has no effect for the Turkish migrants.

If we use the demographic and behavioural variables alone, the explained variance for all Romanian migrant groups taken together is 1.3 per cent. We find again differences between the respective countries of residence: With more than 4 per cent most is

explained for the Romanian migrants in Germany and the United Kingdom but virtually nothing in Denmark (Tables not presented).

For all Turkish migrant groups taken together, if we again use demographic and behavioural variables alone, the explained variance is 6.7 per cent. Differences between the single countries of residence are even more pronounced for the Turks than for the Romanian migrants. While 10 per cent of the variance for the Turks in Romania, 8 per cent for the Turks in Italy and 2 per cent for the Turks in Denmark is accounted for, virtually nothing can be explained in Germany and the United Kingdom (Tables not presented).

#### **Conclusions**

Of the EUCROSS respondents in the national samples the British identify least with Europe and the Spanish most. All the other national groups are closer to the Spanish than to the British, while the differences among them are not very pronounced. Variables that explain European identification of the national populations are gender, age, the current economic situation of the household, the knowledge of foreign languages and the consumption of TV content in a foreign language. However, the demographic variables and transnational behaviour explain overall only 2 per cent of the variance and the differences between the single countries are considerable (from nearly 10 per cent in the United Kingdom to slightly more than 1 per cent in Romania).

Romanian migrants show a much higher European identification than Turkish migrants, even under control of the demographic and behavioural variables. This dissimilarity can largely be explained by their different legal status, as it remains even after control for demographical and behavioural variables. It is interesting that the latter variables explain very little in the Romanian case, while for the Turks transnational background and behaviour go a long way in explaining their European identification. Variables found to be relevant include language knowledge, media consumption, personal networks and communication with people in other countries.

Demographic and behavioural variables work in a markedly different way in the different populations under investigation. They play a considerable role in explaining European identification of the Turkish migrants and the British and Italian nationals but are virtually unimportant for the Romanian migrants as well as for the Romanian and Spanish nationals. While the level of European identification of the Romanian migrants is so high that there is only little room for the working of transnational background, behaviour and experiences, this explanation hardly can be applied to the other populations. It is also noteworthy that there is no principal divide between nationals on the one hand and migrants on the other in the explanatory power of transnational background, behaviour and experiences. It could have been expected that these variables have a stronger effect for nationals than for migrants, as for the latter they might be less relevant compared to their migration experience as such.

We also analysed the balance between European identification and cosmopolitanism, that is, whether respondents identify more with Europe than with the entire world. When controlling for the demographical and behavioural variables, compared to Danes and

Germans, for all the other populations the balance between cosmopolitanism and European identification is, at times markedly, more in favour of the former. European identification is boosted versus a general cosmopolitanism by a better current economic situation of the household, a higher age of the respondent, having a partner from another EU country, having frequent communication abroad by telephone and knowing foreign languages. On the other hand, cosmopolitanism becomes stronger than European identification if the respondent has recently made trips to non-EU countries, has a partner from a non-EU country and has CoR contacts abroad. While the demographic and behavioural variables explain some 3 per cent of the variance for all countries taken together, individual samples again differ considerably (from nearly 5 per cent in Germany to virtually nothing in Denmark and Romania).

For Romanian migrants only slightly more than 1 per cent of the variance can be explained, the only significant effect being discrimination experience. For the Turkish migrants, nearly 7 per cent of the variance is accounted for, with marked differences between the single countries of residence. Women tend more to European identification than to cosmopolitanism, and the length of stay in the CoR, the number of recent trips abroad and the frequency of using social networking sites strengthen EU versus cosmopolitan orientation.

Overall, European identification is not just a variant of a general supra-national attitude but is determined by different variables, at least in part.

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## Transnational solidarity and cross-border practices in Europe<sup>23</sup>

This chapter focuses on the factors that promote the support for European social solidarity among European citizens – a key dimension of the sense of belonging to Europe as operationalized in the EUCROSS project. Given the context of the recent economic crisis, transnational social solidarity is understood as support for Eurobonds and other mechanisms that have been presented by national and EU political actors as solutions to the economic difficulties some of the EU countries faced during the 2008-2013 period. Drawing on theoretical and empirical perspectives on national social solidarity, the chapter deduces a set of explanations that can be applicable to understanding solidarity EU context.

While there is extensive research on both theoretical and empirical underpinnings of social solidarity in the context of national states, there is a shortage of studies in what regards social solidarity in a transnational polity such as the EU (but see Ross and Borgmann-Prebil 2010). Normative reflections on the future of the EU warn that there is a European crisis of solidarity. This crisis is generated mainly by the ambiguity of the concept of European 'peoplehood' and feelings of loss of national identity and economic insecurity (Borgmann-Prebil and Ross 2010; Delanty 2008). Based on the EUCROSS survey data with nationals of the six countries selected, the main findings of this chapter show that identification with Europe and transnational friendships are significant predictors of European solidarity. With the exception of returnees, when compared to locals, the other patterns of cross-border mobility presented in Chapter 1 have no role in explaining the endorsement of transnational forms of solidarity.

## National and transnational solidarity

Social solidarity entails networks of relationships that presuppose dependency, reciprocity and responsibility among the members of a group or a political community. Regarded either as the essential characteristic of societies by Durkheim (Evans 1977; von Oorschot and Komter 1998) or as a special type of social relationship by Weber (Stjerno 2005), in essence, social solidarity refers to group loyalty and sharing of resources in a political community. Historically, national governments are the repository of the institutions of solidarity in a society. Their role is to define the networks of mutual support and to delimitate the groups among which economic and social hazards are distributed (de Deken et al 2006: 142). Consequently, social solidarity has a component of 'top-down' enforcement of obligations and responsibilities and a horizontal dimension through which individual members legitimize these rules (Parsons 1967). Without individual approval, formal rules of social solidarity face the danger of 'free-riding' and non-compliance. But what motivates individual members of a political community to support relationships of responsibility, interdependence and reciprocity among each other?

In the context of national societies, 'categorical identities' such as 'nation' or 'community' sustain social solidarity among the members of a political community (Calhoun 2002). However, these categorical identities do not rise in a vacuum. Social interactions and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Irina Ciornei.

exchanges with other group members are likely to bring awareness of the existence of other similar individuals with shared interests and destiny. Following this argumentative line, the subsequent analysis explores the extent to which identification with Europe and cross-border interactions foster a conception of transnational solidarity among individuals.

## **Hypotheses**

Shared identity and European solidarity

National identity posits individuals as 'equivalent to each other' and justifies both the bottom-up and top-down enforcement of solidarity on the basis of the sharing of a common identity/similarity. In this situation, the individual shares a set of cultural elements with the other members of the group/political community and this common identification and recognition is what constitutes the basis for solidarity among members. It is no surprise that following this line of reasoning the connection between identity and solidarity has been mainly negative in the context of the European polity. Since identification with Europe is weak and non-salient, the argument goes, few solidarity ties can arise between still nationally rooted European citizens (Delanty 2008). As a solution to this malaise, theorists such as Ross (2010) call for a reconceptualization of transnational solidarity that bypasses the essentialist, nationally bounded conceptions of solidarity. Habermas (1996) and Calhoun (2002) situate the possibility of European solidarity through engagement in a Europe-wide public sphere in which citizens become aware of the perspectives of all others.

Yet, not all is lost when associating identification and solidarity in a transnational setting. The few empirical studies that make a connection between solidarity at the transnational level and European identification do show a positive correlation between the two concepts. Mau (2005) demonstrates that individuals who also embrace a European form of identification, as opposed to those who identify exclusively with their national community are also more prone to support redistributive policies at the European level. Since European identification is a significant predictor for European solidarity understood as transnational redistributive arrangements, it is relevant to test if identification with Europe also drives financial solidarity in the context of economic crisis. The first hypothesis proposed is that

H1. Individuals who display a stronger degree of identification with Europe are more likely to support financial solidarity arrangements at the EU level.

Still, the connection between (European) identity and solidarity cannot be properly understood without taking into account the role of social interactions. Social interactions among individuals create feelings of identity which, in turn, spill-over into solidarity among group members (Stjerno 2005). As Recchi (2012) argues, involvement in space-situated associative relations make possible the consciousness of we-ness, of a shared identity which then spills over in support for social solidarity.

Related to this, a separate line of inquiry does not consider identity as an intermediary category between social interaction and solidarity. Through interaction with others, previously strangers, the individual becomes sensitive to their concrete 'pain' and 'needs'

and expands her repertoire of solidarity (Rorty 1989). In this situation, interaction among individuals has a direct positive effect on the formation of solidarity ties. Drawing on previous research that shows a positive association between social interactions, cross-border mobility and European identification (Recchi and Favell 2009; Kuhn 2011), this chapter investigates the implications of intra-EU mobility for the endorsement of a transnational conception of social solidarity. It is expected that

H2. Individuals with a larger array of cross-border practices and connections are more prone to support a European conception of social solidarity.

More specifically, transnational friendships and cross-border mobility practices, such as travelling or residing in other EU countries, are factors that can enable the formation of the 'we-ness'. This, in turn may spill-over into a conception of solidarity at the transnational level. The analysis tests if these practices have a direct impact on solidarity or if they actually contribute to the embracement of a supranational identity which in turn has a positive effect on solidarity at the level of the EU. Two derived hypotheses are the following:

H2a. A larger community of European friends increases individual support for transnational forms of solidarity. Since transnational friendships are relevant not only in terms of numbers, but also in terms of diversity of nationalities, it is expected that both large numbers and nationally diverse friendships to have a positive impact on transnational solidarity.

H2b. A larger degree of cross-border practices is positively associated with the support for a supranational conception of solidarity. Following the analysis in Chapter 1 it is expected that more enduring patterns of cross-border interactions such as transnationals, visitors and returnees to be positively related to the endorsement of transnational forms of solidarity.

## Operationalisation

The following analysis is based on the survey samples with national respondents in the six countries selected. Question 3.15 of the EUCROSS survey is relevant for constructing the dependent variable:

'The EU member states are currently pooling national state funds to help EU countries having difficulties in paying their debts. On a scale from one to five, where one means "strongly disagree" and five means "strongly agree": Please tell me how much you agree with this measure?'.

Given that the variable is measured on a 1-5 scale, the analysis is based on a set of ordinal logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered per country of residence. In order to better understand the meaning of solidarity, the chapter also uses excerpts from the EUMEAN interviews. The answers have been coded with the Atlas.ti7 software and refer to the following question of the qualitative survey:

"Do you think members states showed solidarity during the economic crisis?"

Regarding the independent variables, the survey offers a rich conceptualization of concepts such as European identity (H1), cross-border mobility and social interaction (H2). In relation to European identity, I test separately various measurements such as:

- a. On a scale from one to five, where one means "strongly disagree" and five means "strongly agree", please tell me how much you agree with the following statements? "I feel European."
- b. Do you consider yourself as being...CoR only/CoR and European/European and CoR/Only European/None of the above.
- c. If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been dissolved, would you be sorry about it, indifferent or relieved? , where those who responded "sorry" received a one and the rest zero.

In the analysis I use the second measurement, as it is what gives a better fit of the model.

The community of transnational friendships is measured both as numbers and diversity. I therefore test the significance of two variables. One refers to how many foreign born friends who live in another EU country the respondent has (none, some, a lot). The second one is related to the number of countries of residence of these friends (none, one, at least two). As the first measurement is not significant, the regression analyses shown below use the second measurement.

Cross-border interactions are operationalized following the methodology described in Chapter 1. The analysis tests the role of the six patterns of cross-border mobilities in the support for a European form of social solidarity: transnationals, virtual transnationals, visitors, tourists, returnees and locals.

The analysis controls for respondent's level of education, age, gender, occupation (operationalized on a four point nominal scale such as managers, professionals, skilled workers and unskilled workers) and ideological positioning on the left-right scale. It is expected that higher levels of education and occupational status to be positively correlated with support for European solidarity. As well, a placement on the right on the ideological scale is connected to support for anti-immigration and anti-EU parties in several EU countries (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). Placement on the right has, in consequence, a negative impact on attitudes regarding solidarity at the EU level.

## **European solidarity in the EUCROSS and EUMEAN surveys**

The distribution of respondents' preferences regarding European solidarity is influenced by their national context. As table 1 shows, on the overall, roughly 50 per cent endorse institutional arrangements for financial risk sharing. However, Danish and German respondents tend to adopt a neutral (3) position while almost two thirds of Spaniards and Italians declare to agree and strongly agree. Romanians place themselves nearer Southern European opinions, while only a minority of British respondents agree with transnational financial redistribution. Although clear differences between countries can be observed, the relationship between the context of residence and preferences on transnational solidarity is weak (Cramer's V<20). This suggests that besides nationality,

other factors play a more important role in explaining the diversity of opinions of EUCROSS respondents.

Table 1 Percentages of answers on a 1-5 scale, where 1 is strong disagreement and 5 is total agreement with financial redistribution at the EU level

	(1) strongly disagree	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) strongly agree	(8) [Don't know]	(9) [Answer refused]	Total
Germany	16.1	16.6	33.3	17	14.1	1.8	1.2	100
Denmark	10.3	12.5	31.7	24.4	15.8	5.1	0.3	100
UK	17.7	10.5	30.4	19.9	16.4	4.5	0.7	100
Italy	5.7	3.9	18.3	18.6	50.9	2.2	0.4	100
Romania	12.6	11.2	20.1	11.1	40.1	4.8	0.1	100
Spain	4.5	3.1	15.1	23.4	49.7	3.5	0.7	100
Total	11.1	9.6	24.8	19.1	31.1	3.7	0.6	100

Pearson chi2(30) = 997.7703 Pr = 0.000 Cramer's V = 0.1821

In what regards the meanings attached to European solidarity, the respondents have distinct understandings. The interviews from the qualitative EUMEAN survey are illustrative of the diversity of opinions. As an overall observation, German and Italian respondents tend to interpret solidarity as an individual act, while Spanish and Romanian interviewees speak more often about solidarity among nation-states. It is worth noting, though, that regardless of the meaning, the majority of respondents agree on the fact that neither citizens nor governments showed enough solidarity during the economic crisis.

One understanding of solidarity endorsed by respondents refers to solidarity among individuals. An act of solidarity is perceived as the direct financial help to troubled individuals from other countries. But, in most of the cases the interviewees refuse to engage in such practices.

"Well, I can only say that for me. I mean I am not really solidary, because if I was solidary, I would have to grab some Greek or something like that, who is retiring and has no money and I would have to transfer some money to his bank account, so that he would be able to make ends meet. That would be actual solidarity, as an individual. I don't do that, you know. I'm not planning on it either. So in this sense I'm not solidary at that point, but I understand the people, that they complain." (DE3, man, 46 years old)

A second interpretation refers to solidarity among governments/states. For example, some interviewees propose to increase intra-EU labour mobility to help out fellow union-members in need.

"Perhaps there should be, for example, still more signals from the other countries, in which things are working out, such as Germany and Poland, which economically are faring well, to the outside that they are ready to accept workers. That is to accept them voluntarily." (DE7, woman, 34 years old)

Solidarity among EU governments also have negative connotation among the EUMEAN respondents. Most of the Spanish, Italian and migrant interviewees think that it has been only a façade, a political measure that does not refer to real solidarity but obscure hidden motives.

"Come on!! Everybody turned their backs on everybody inside the European Union. They gave money; they've done certain things to help certain states, yes! I agree, but they didn't help because they wanted those countries to survive or go through the crisis. They helped because they were afraid for themselves, their chairs, their countries. There is no cohesion strong enough inside the European Union that would create a strong European feeling." (RO44, man, 42 years old)

"Q: In general, would you say that the States and the people of the European countries have shown solidarity as expected in the face of this crisis?

I think it is very easy to be in solidarity when things are good. But when things are complicated, it affects you, and you shut off into your own world, I think." (ES6, woman, 40 years old)

British and German respondents have more moderate opinions regarding the allegedly secret motives behind manifestations of financial solidarity among member states. These respondents are of the opinion that solidarity at the supranational level only became more manifest only after the national governments took the necessary measures.

"Q: And how do you feel about that, for instance, Britain and countries helping the other countries who are perhaps in deeper crisis in Europe?

A: That's fine so long as that country is doing as much as it can do initially to help themselves. So long they are doing the max to help themselves, so long as they are not expecting us to give them, you know, millions of pounds and yet they're letting their own people pay a very low rate of tax, or whatever it might be, I don't know how it works. So long as they are helping themselves to the max then I don't mind." (UK9, woman, 56 years old)

## European solidarity, identity and cross-border practices

This section discusses the relation between transnational solidarity, identification, and cross-border practices. As already anticipated in the theoretical section, 'national identities' are the cement of social solidarity in the context of modern nation states. Can identification with Europe play a similar role, in spite of its weak and non-salient character? The significance tests indicate that there is a very weak but significant correlation between attitudes towards European solidarity and identification with Europe (table 2). Individuals who claim to have some sort of European identity are more likely to agree with common policies of financial risk sharing. The respondents who feel strongly European are the group with the lowest proportion among those against transnational financial redistribution policies, albeit they are also the most numerous among the 'neutrals'.

Table 2 Preferences of European solidarity and identification with Europe (results in percentages)

Solidarity	Only national	National and European	European and National	Strongly European
1	18.97	8.64	6.88	7.45
2	12.28	9.22	9.40	5.88
3	26.49	25.33	24.50	32.16
4	16.26	22.03	22.15	14.51
5	26.00	34.78	37.08	40.00
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson chi2(12)=2044615 Pr=0.000 Cramér's V= 0.1089

Tables 3 and 4 show a similar perspective in what concerns transnational friendships. The larger the number of foreign friends, the greater the probability of supporting European solidarity. The difference between the various groups of transnational friendships is even more visible when we take into account the range of European nationalities that constitute them. Thus, the larger the number of countries these friends live in, the greater the support for transnational solidarity. This finding corroborates previous arguments related to the role of 'human interaction' as a basis of social solidarity.

Table 3 Preferences of European solidarity and number of friends in other EU countries (results in percentages)

Solidarity	A lot	Some	None	
1	13.00	8.74	12.03	
2	7.33	6.88	10.61	
3	21.33	27.33	24.97	
4	21.67	23.09	18.63	
5	36.67	33.96	33.76	
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	

Pearson chi2(8) = 32.7763 Pr = 0.000 Cramér's V = 0.0689

Table 4 Preferences of European solidarity and range of friendships in other EU countries (results in percentages)

Solidarity	No foreign country	One country	Several countries	Total
1	12.09	10.14	8.13	11.65
2	10.65	7.57	6.02	10.05
3	25.77	27.38	25.30	25.91
4	19.82	21.26	18.37	19.90
5	31.67	33.66	42.17	32.49
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson chi2(8)=288.354 Pr=0.000 Cramér's V=0.0501

The relation between European solidarity and patterns of cross-border practices displays a complex outlook (table 5). The fine-grained LCA analysis shows that the cleavage in terms of attitudes towards European solidarity is not between locals and transnationals. Still the results make sense: the least likely from showing solidarity with other Europeans are the tourists, even more so than locals. Tourists are characterized by non-committed, consumption-oriented mobility experiences. This observation confirms previous theoretical arguments according to which visiting foreign places and enjoyment of travel do not necessarily lead to the formation of self-aware cosmopolitans (Calhoun 2002). In a similar vein, this analysis shows that cross-border interactions in the form of tourism does not bring about a moral responsibility towards the other Europeans. As in the case of those who feel strongly European, transnationals are the group with the lowest proportion among those who clearly oppose transnational solidarity. Nonetheless, they are also quite numerous among the neutrals.

Table 5 Preferences of European solidarity and transnational behaviour (results in percentages)

Solidarity	Trans- nationals	Virtual transnati onals	Visitors	Tourists	Returnees	Locals	Total
1	8.09	10.63	10.72	11.93	11.37	12.46	11.51
2	8.38	9.33	9.60	12.79	7.80	9.65	10.10
3	26.88	21.69	29.12	27.67	26.09	24.31	26.01
4	24.57	18.22	21.92	22.75	17.17	17.46	19.88
5	32.08	40.13	28.64	24.85	37.57	36.11	32.48
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson chi2(20)=1050689 Pr=0.000 Cramér's V=0.0689

## A statistical assessment of European solidarity

The previous analysis shows that European identity and diverse transnational friendships are positively associated with transnational solidarity, while the role of cross-border mobility is not straightforward. However, these associations may be actually determined by respondent's national context and individual characteristics such as ideology, level of education, occupation, income, age and gender. Moreover, as it has already been argued in the theoretical section, transnational friendships and patterns of cross-border mobility may be indirectly correlated to social solidarity. They are significant for the formation of European identification, which, in turn, positively influences the endorsement of transnational forms of solidarity. Table 6 presents the regression results of two models seeking to solve these questions. More specifically, Model 1 tests the significance of European identity, patterns of cross-border mobility and range of transnational friendships by controlling for individuals' ideology, socio-economic status and country of residence. Models 2 examines the significance of cross-border mobility patterns and range of transnational friendships without controlling for identification.

Table 6 European solidarity: ordered logistic regressions with robust standard errors

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef/se		Coef/se	
European identity (base Only national)				
National and European	0.41***	0.11		
National and European	0.53***	0.14		
Strongly EUR	0.34	0.30		
Number of European friends CoR (Base	none)			
One country	-0.00	0.09	0.00	0.09
Several countries	0.22*	0.09	0.25**	0.09
	Andal 1		Madala	
	Model 1		Model 2	
Patterns of cross-border mobility (base Virtual transnationals	-0.08	0.10	-0.07	0.09
Tourists	-0.08 -0.09	0.10	-0.07 -0.07	0.09
Transnationals	-0.09	0.03	0.07	0.04
Visitors	-0.03 -0.12	0.07	-0.07	0.08
Returnees	0.07+	0.03	0.09*	0.03
Ideology and SES				
Ideology (base left)				
Centre	-0.27*	0.12	-0.27*	0.13
B: 1.	-	0.42	O 44**	0.44
Right	0.42***	0.12	-0.44**	0.14
No ideology	-0.21	0.21	-0.25	0.22
Education (base Less than high-school)		0.00	0.14	0.00
Secondary education	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.08
Tertiary education	0.19*	80.0	0.21*	0.09
Occupation (base workers)	0.05	0.12	0.00	0.12
Managers	0.05	0.12	0.06	0.13
Professionals	0.14	0.10	0.16	0.10
Technicians and associate	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06
professionals Socioeconomic status (base Very	-0.09	0.06	-0.09	0.06
difficult situation)				
Difficult situation	0.24**	0.08	0.26***	0.07
Make ends meet	-0.09	0.08	-0.06	0.07
Comfortable financial situation	0.16	0.10	0.21*	0.10
Very comfortable financial situation	0.16	0.09	0.21	0.08
Age	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Female	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.00
I CITIAIC	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.03

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef/se		Coef/se	
Country of residence (base Germany)				
Denmark	0.43***	0.05	0.35***	0.03
UK	0.35***	0.06	0.20***	0.02
Italy	1.69***	0.16	1.70***	0.17
Romania	1.01***	0.15	0.97***	0.16
Spain	1.73***	0.14	1.73***	0.14
R-squared				
N. of cases	5434		5434	
+p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0	.001			

Identification with the EU is a significant predictor for the support of a European conception of solidarity, confirming hypothesis one (Model 1). Thus, in relation to national citizens those who claim to identify with Europe (in combination with national identification) are more likely to endorse a transnational conception of solidarity. After computing predicted probabilities the results look as follows: the probability of scoring 1 on the 1-5 solidarity scale decreases from 0.12 to 0.108 when European identification changes from only national to European and national and all other variables are kept at their means. The probability of scoring 5 on the 1-5 solidarity scale increases from 0.24 to 0.31 when identification with Europe changes from 1 to 3 and all other variables are kept at their means.

Regarding H2a, social contacts in other EU countries affect positively support for European solidarity. As models 1-2 show, having friends in at least two European countries is a relevant predictor even after controlling for respondent's degree of identification with the EU. Given that the coefficients of the variables decrease from Model 3 to Model 2, the effect of transnational friendships on solidarity is both direct and indirect, mediated by respondent's level of identification. However, as Model 1 indicates, only a diverse community of foreign friends, spread in at least two countries, has a direct effect on the support for a European conception of solidarity.

The various patterns of cross-border practices do not have a direct effect on solidarity, except for returnees. As previously discussed in this report, cross-border mobility inside the EU has a positive role in fostering identification with Europe, but it does not affect directly respondent's support for transnational solidarity. In other words, physical mobility inside the EU does have a role for the support of transnational forms of solidarity, provided that it has a positive effect on the formation of a European identity. In this sense, H2b is confirmed only in the limited case of returnees.

Respondent's ideology plays a significant role in the formation of attitudes towards European solidarity independently of European identification. Placement on the right of the ideological scale is associated with a negative conception on European solidarity. This may be explained by the fact that far-right parties tend to have an anti-European

discourse, especially in terms of redistribution at the European level or toward foreignborn residents and therefore offer negative cues to their voters.

More educated Europeans also tend to be more solidary, even when controlling for the effect of identification, while occupation does not seem to make a difference. Income is significant only when comparing respondents with a difficult financial situation with those with a very difficult financial position. Gender and age do not stratify the preferences in terms of European solidarity.

The results also show that in comparison to German respondents, all the others tend to support European solidarity to a larger extent. Nonetheless, there are clear differences between Nordic and Mediterranean respondents.

## **Concluding remarks**

Transnational solidarity is a concept of reference in European treaties and policy documents. Yet, the understanding of present-day solidarities is still anchored in nationally-bounded societies both in the public and academic discourse (Borgmann-Prebil and Ross 2010). It is for this reason that social sciences are equipped with few theoretical and empirical lenses in order to understand the phenomenon beyond the borders of the national states. Normative and legal scholars made important advances in meaningfully theorizing solidarity in the modern EU context (Ross and Borgmann-Prebil 2010; Calhoun 2002; Habermas 1996; Delanty 2010). Complementary to these works, this paper offers a first cut into explaining individual support for financial solidarity in the context of the EU.

The previous findings show that in spite of being a weak and non-salient type of identity (Diez-Medrano 2010), identification with Europe matters for fostering attitudes of solidarity among European citizens. However, it is not only the abstract forms of identification what make people endorse a European form of solidarity, but also emotional attachment constructed through social interactions. The argument is supported by the significance of transnational friendships. The more diverse is the spectrum of European friends, that is, the larger the number of countries they come from, the greater the propensity to support transnational forms of solidarity. These findings point to classical sociological and philosophical ideas about solidarity. As Weber (1922/1978) has already argued decades ago, it is through social interactions and emotional ties at the micro-level that people become to embrace attitudes of solidarity. Or, in more recent postmodern language, Rorty (1989) argues that is the 'sensitivity' to others what makes people's sense of solidarity grow.

Among the various forms of cross-border mobilities, returnees seem to develop a moral outlook in what regards the European communities. This finding suggests that it is not necessarily the frequency or intensity of physical border-crossing to determine a conception of transnational solidarity, but an enduring, long-term and emotional immersion in another society. In this regards the formation of responsibility bonds among Europeans is a slow and long-term process which does not immediately follow to the removal of border controls.

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## Transnational Mobility, Attachment to the EU and Political Participation in Europe<sup>24</sup>

#### Introduction

Are EU nationals more likely to cast a vote in general elections of their respective countries as opposed to European elections? Though extreme-right wing politicians in some EU member-states peddle Euro-skepticism in the hopes of claiming greater share of the votes in national elections, we know very little about the implications of citizens' supranational attachment on their decision to participate in national elections<sup>25</sup>. This is important because decision-making processes on national political platforms have a notable impact on EU's bid to build an ever-closer union.

Existing studies on voting usually invoke domestic factors to explain why ordinary citizens go to the ballot box when they actually have little to gain in return. The list of usual suspects is long. Factors that increase the likelihood of participating in national elections include higher socio-economic status (Lijphart 1997), altruism (Fowler 2006), education (Gallego 2010), face-to-face mobilization (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009), age (Jankowski and Strate 1995, Goerres 2007), marital status (Kingston and Finkel 1987; Solt 2008), national loyalty (Hirschman 1970) and family background (Plutzer 2002). Yet, these studies focus exclusively on domestic dynamics and assume that voter turnout in the general elections is primarily influenced by individual experiences in one's native context. However, increased cross-border mobility and supranational engagements adds a new dimension to these dynamics. Most notably, the emergence of a new group of Europeans with supranational attachments to the EU introduces new challenges to participation in general elections by way of anchoring additional political commitments beyond national borders.

Based on EUCROSS data, this paper finds a positive and robust relationship between attachment to the EU and decision to cast a vote at the national ballot box. This is an important finding with notable implications. Specifically, the study demonstrates how a sense of European attachment increases the likelihood of active political participation. On one hand, the findings suggest that factors beyond domestic dynamics may explain voter turnout and prompt ordinary citizens to rely on public platforms to induce change. On the other hand, excessive reliance on national political platforms may leave supranational platforms in the hands of extremist political parties, as the recent European parliament elections suggests.

## Political attachments and national political participation in a supranational context

The European experience presents a complicated picture. Recent survey results reveal that member-country nationals exhibit a dual attachment to national and supranational entities. In fact, some citizens score equally high on national and supranational

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Fulya Apaydin vom Hau and Juan Diez Medrano.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> For declining level of public support for the EU based on a 2013 Eurobarometer survey, see http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/394854/Support-for-the-EU-plunges-to-all-time-low-across-Europe.

attachment measures. Surely, European institutional arrangements accommodate and encourage the coexistence of dual attachments where supranational bodies work towards enhancing emotional ties between the member-country nationals and the EU, and actively support programs that incubate a shared European identity and commitment to European solidarity. Despite these efforts, the relationship between national and European attachments may not be entirely frictionless (Egeberg 1999) given possible clashes and contradictions between these two different types of commitments (Delanty 2003: 124). In that sense, the co-presence of dual attachments is curious, especially in a supranational context.

#### Political attachment

Political attachment is a deeply affective and voluntary connection to a political entity based on a sense of belonging/ identification (Dowding et.al. 2000) and is not simply limited to offering sheer political support. The intensity of attachment may be borne out of cultural, historical and social experiences that are not necessarily political in character. Together, these components give reasons to individuals for a voluntary commitment to an entity that is recognized as legitimate by its members (Delanty 2003: 125). In that sense, emotional attachments also constitute a basis to justify political passions.

## Attachment to the EU and participation in elections

Political attachment to the EU is a manifestation of an emotional commitment to a supranational entity. Supranational attachments may discourage participation in national elections when it directly competes with citizens' national attachments. When this is not the case, European attachment may generate the opposite effect by encouraging citizens to influence national-decision making processes—at the very least through voting—because political decisions taken at the national level have a direct impact on the wellbeing, efficiency and survival of the EU.

A willingness to participate in national elections among EU champions may also explain why voter turnout in European parliamentary elections is steadily on the decline since 1979, despite respondents' favourable statements that endorse European ideals. Existing works that explain this lack of interest in European elections put the emphasis on the weakness of European identification and absence of emotional commitment, and argue that those who least identify with Europe are less likely to participate in European parliament elections (Studlar et al. 2003). These studies predict that citizens with such a profile are more likely to voice their political preferences on national platforms (Carey 2002). Others invoke cognitive mobilization hypothesis, suggesting that those who are more informed about European politics and exhibit a fundamental understanding of how decision-making processes work are likely to turn up at the European ballot box (Inglehart and Rabier 1978). This argument assumes that those who lack similar skills exhibit more parochial types of political engagement. In reality, however, this relationship may be more complex than it appears: member-state nationals who exhibit a strong attachment to the EU may not show up at the supranational ballot-box if national institutions are perceived to offer more powerful tools to influence decision-making processes in Brussels. Under these circumstances, a strong attachment to the EU may push citizens to voice their concerns on national political platforms.

#### Voting behaviour in a supranational setting

The data for this research was collected between June and October 2012 as a part of the EUCROSS project, and is based on 6000 phone interviews with randomly contacted German, Danish, Romanian, Italian, Spanish and UK nationals. The survey includes a wide range of questions that measure physical and virtual mobility practices, political participation, European identification, solidarity, cultural preferences, income, and occupation of the participants, and also provides information on the demographic background of the respondents. The dependent variable in the model is a binary variable and assesses national political participation. To measure this, the respondents were asked whether they voted in the last general elections in their country of residence. To analyse the impact of supranational attachment on national political participation, we asked the respondents how they would feel in the face of dissolution of the European Union.

## New challenges

Unlike their counterparts in much of the rest of the world, EU nationals can freely relocate to live and work in a member state other than their own at a significantly lower cost. This opportunity to travel beyond national borders is further sponsored by EU-funded schemes. At the same time, increased transnational mobility of citizens pose new challenges to political participation at the national level especially when they move their residence to a different member-country.

Often, EU citizens cross borders in two ways: physical and virtual. In the first case, individuals move from one location to another by means of transportation. These activities require substantial investment and pre-planning. The experiences based on physical mobility also have a notable impact on how individuals add meaning to context and structure their emotional response. On the other hand, virtual cross-border activities include less costly and spontaneous activities such as online shopping, communication via web-based platforms, resource transfers and cultural consumption. These practices may influence the motivation to vote in distinct ways. For example, frequent physical cross-border engagement may push individuals to draw comparisons about economic and political circumstances at home and elsewhere and prompt them to take action by casting a vote in the ballot box. On the other hand, lesser frequency of these practices may breed political apathy especially at the supranational level, and push voters to either ignore or show limited interest in electoral participation.

In order to test the diverse impact of physical and virtual mobility practices, we explore their impact on voting behaviour separately. In doing so, we constructed an additive index for physical mobility, based on responses to the questions on experiences that involve actual border crossing. Similarly, we constructed a virtual mobility index based on cross-border experiences that do not involve any form of physical moving across the national borders. The diverse impact of physical moving across the national borders.

## Socio-economic factors

Another factor that appears robustly associated with higher voter turnout is the level of income (Verba and Nie 1972, Brady et al. 1995). Since many respondents may not give accurate answers when directly asked about their income level, we used a different question that allows them to self-assess their economic wellbeing. Specifically, the respondents answered the question "Which of the following descriptions comes closest to how you feel about how well off your household is today?" based on the following five

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Values for this index range between 0 and 12. The index includes the following questions: Have you ever lived in another country for three or more consecutive months before you turned 18? (Yes=1, No=0); Please think about all your journeys abroad before you turned 18 (e.g. with your parents, other relatives, school or alone). How many countries did you visit before you turned 18? (None=0, One=1, Two=2, Three-Five=3, Six-Ten=4, More than ten=5); "Have you lived in another country for three or more consecutive months since you turned 18? (Yes=1, No=0); Have you ever (e.g. as student or during your professional career) participated in an international exchange program that has been funded or co-funded by the European Union? (Yes=0, No=1); Please think of trips abroad which included at least one overnight stay. How many of these trips have you had in the past 24 months? (None=0, One=1, Two=2, Three-Five=3, Six-Ten=4, More than ten=5).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Values for this index range between 0 and 30. The index includes the following questions: Please think about the last 12 months: How frequently did you talk to family members, in-laws and friends abroad by phone or using your computer? (Everyday=4, At least once a week=3, At least once a month=2, Less often=1, Never=0); How frequently did you communicate with them by mail or e-mail? (Everyday=4, At least once a week=3, At least once a month=2, Less often=1, Never=0); And how frequently via social networks? (e.g. Facebook, Hi5, Google+ etc) (Everyday=4, At least once a week=3, At least once a month=2, Less often=1, Never=0); Please think about all private and business related messages you received by email and, if you use them, via social networking sites during the last 12 months. Approximately which percentage of them came from abroad (excluding spam and junk messages)? (1= "Between 0-25%" 2="Between 26-50%" 3="Between 51-75%" 4 ="Between 76-100%") In the last 12 months, have you in your spare time been active in any organization or group which is oriented towards other countries or cultures? (e.g. voluntary relief organizations, cultural associations, Salsa clubs etc.) (Yes=1, No=0); Do you ever send money abroad for reasons other than purchasing goods or services? (Yes=1, No=0); How Often? (At least once a month=3, At least once a year=2, Less than once a year=1, None=0); In the last 12 months, have you received money from someone who is living in another country?-From partner (Yes=1, No=0), From close relatives (Yes=1, No=0), From other relatives (Yes=1, No=0), From other persons (Yes=1, No=0); Thinking about the last 12 months, have you purchased any goods or services from sellers or providers who were located abroad? That is, for example, via websites, mail, phone, etc. (Yes=1, No=0); And do you follow sports on an international level or in another country (e.g. watching matches of the German Bundesliga or the Formula-One world championship)? (Yes, at least once a week=3, Yes, at least once a month=2, Yes, but less often=1, No=0); How often do you watch TV content which is in another language and has not been dubbed, either directly on TV or via the Internet? (Every day=4, At least once a week=3, At least once a month=2, Less often=1, Never=0); In your work, how often did you interact with people (e.g. business partners, clients, colleagues) who are located in another country than [CoR] during the last 12 months? (Every day=4, At least once a week=3 At least once a month=2, Less often=1, Never=0).

options: (1) We find it very difficult; (2) We find it difficult; (3) We make ends meet; (4) We are living comfortably on the money we have; (5) We are living very comfortably on the money we have.

Relatedly, class backgrounds of the respondents are also documented as strong predictors of voting behavior. Some argue that parental education and income status leaves indelible marks on one's political orientation in later stages in life (Sandell and Plutzer 2005, Pacheco 2008), suggesting that these factors are positively correlated (Smets and van Ham 2013: 352). Therefore, the model controls for this by including three indicators on the family background of the respondent: education level of the mother, education level of the father and income status of the household when the respondent was 14 years old.

Another social factor that may influence voting behavior is marital status. Some argue that married couples are more likely to vote in national elections because they are more likely to endorse models of good citizenship and civic duty (Denver 2008; Smets and van Ham 2013). Others highlight practical barriers to political participation, such as having children, and suggest that marriage could have a negative effect on participating in national elections due to time limitations and family commitments (Solt 2008). The model accounts for these debates by controlling for marital status.

Age plays a notable role in predicting citizen participation in national elections. Existing studies suggest that older voters are more likely to show up at the ballot box while younger voters are habitually absent (Jankowski and Strate 1995; Goerres 2007). Others argue that as adults withdraw from social life due to old age, their likelihood to participate in elections also declines (Cutler and Bengtson 1974: 163). Under these circumstances, the relationship between age and voting may be curvilinear rather than linear (Smets and van Ham 2013). Therefore, we include age-squared into the model to control for this effect.

Finally, some scholars suggest that political participation is highly gendered, arguing that women are less likely to participate in political affairs due to cultural and economic limitations (Smets and van Ham 2013). The model controls for this by including gender as an additional variable.

#### Political orientation

The position of an individual on a left-right spectrum may also predict his/her voting behavior. According to this line of argument, those who are on the left end of the spectrum are more likely to participate in national elections while those who are on the right are less likely so. The model controls for this by including a variable that assesses the political orientation of the respondents based on their answer to the following question: "In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Which of the following positions best describes your political outlook? The categories are (1) Left; (2) Centre-left; (3) Centre; (4) Centre-right; (5) Right; (6) Left and right do not exist anymore.

## Citizenship

Finally, citizens of some countries may be more likely to go to the ballot box than in others. This may be due to several factors such as formal rules that require citizens to

vote or a political culture that values participation in national elections. The model accounts for this by including five dummy variables for German, Italian, Romanian, Spanish and UK citizenship, keeping Danish citizenship as the base.

#### Results

European attachment and national political participation

The respondents in the sample exhibit a high level of supranational attachment with a mean of 2.40 (sd. 0.90) on a scale between 0 and 3, with 0 being least attached and 3 being most attached (See Figure 1). This suggests that the majority of EU nationals are emotionally passionate about the survival of the EU.




Figure 1 Distribution of attachment to the EU among the sample

The logistic regression results reveal that there is a positive relationship between European attachment and national political participation, and this is robust in the presence of different control variables. As Table 1 reveals below, the base model tests the impact of European attachment on voting in the national elections in the absence of control variables, and reveals that greater political attachment to the EU increases the probability of a member-country national to cast a vote in general elections. The relationship is positive and the coefficient is highly significant at p  $\leq$ 0.01. This coefficient remains highly significant in all models with theoretically relevant control variables. The direction of the relationship is positive in all tests, which reveals that supranational political attachments do not reduce the probability of participating in national elections. Among the EU member countries in the sample, German, Italian, Romanian, Spanish and British nationals are less likely to vote in national elections in comparison to the Danes, with the Romanians being least likely to go to the ballot box, followed by the British.

Table 1 Political participation and attachment to the EU (dependent variable: voting in national elections)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Attachment to		0.212	0.175	0.159	0.170	0.186
the EU	***	***	***	***	***	***
Minter al	(0.0372)	(0.0378)	(0.0422)	(0.0471)	(0.0593)	(0.0610)
Virtual mobility		-0.0327 ***	-0.0139	-0.0209 **	-0.0264 **	-0.0152
mobility		(0.00748)	(0.00852)	(0.00919)	(0.0111)	(0.0116)
Physical		0.0878	0.0784	0.0658	0.0544	0.0126
mobility		***	***	***	**	
		(0.0149)	(0.0170)	(0.0192)	(0.0236)	(0.0262)
Income			0.220 ***	0.289 ***	0.270 ***	0.228 ***
			(0.0397)	(0.0450)	(0.0558)	(0.0578)
Education			0.329 ***	0.298 ***	0.351 ***	0.411 ***
			(0.0502)	(0.0574)	(0.0699)	(0.0714)
Marital status			0.505	0.466	0.494	0.495
			***	***	***	***
			(0.0885)	(0.0979)	(0.122)	(0.124)
Gender			0.0349	-0.00904	-0.0209	0.0130
			(0.0808)	(0.0883)	(0.108)	(0.109)
Age			0.137	0.150	0.153	0.159
			***	***	***	***
			(0.0137)	(0.0154)	(0.0187)	(0.0191)
Age2			-0.000958 ***	-0.00111 ***	-0.00111 ***	-0.00118 ***
			(0.000134)	(0.000150)	(0.000182)	(0.000185)
Mother's				0.0375	0.0661	0.0428
education						
				(0.0444)	(0.0532)	(0.0547)
Father's				0.0238	0.0222	0.0262
education				(0.0415)	(0.0493)	(0.0499)
Household				-0.0499	-0.0191	-0.0411
when 14				0.0.55	0.0101	0.0.11
				(0.0482)	(0.0598)	(0.0606)
Political					0.0473	0.0704*
orientation						
					(0.0412)	(0.0428)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
German						-0.770 ***
						(0.214)
Italian						-0.836 ***
						(0.223)
Romanian						-1.351 ***
						(0.232)
Spanish						-0.835 ***
						(0.220)
British						-1.072 ***
						(0.223)
Constant	1.256 ***	1.270 ***	-4.648 ***	-4.794 ***	-4.984 ***	-4.239 ***
	(0.0922)	(0.103)	(0.366)	(0.447)	(0.567)	(0.597)
N	6,016	6,016	5,859	5,152	4,232	4,232

Logistic regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1




Figure 2 Predicted probabilities of voting in national elections for different levels of European attachment (based on Model 12)

The mean predicted probability of voting in national elections for someone who exhibits no European attachment is .85. This is quite high, probably because of the combined positive effects of socio-economic factors. Nevertheless, Figure 2 also shows that for one point increase in the level of attachment, the mean probability of voting in national elections increases steadily and reaches around 0.90 for member-nationals that score the highest. This suggests that greater emotional ties to the union increase the probability of voting in national elections, but the magnitude of this effect appears somewhat small.

Perhaps not so surprisingly, income appears as highly significant (at  $p \le 0.01$ ) and is positively correlated with voting in national elections in all models. This resonates well with the findings of earlier studies that predict a positive relationship between higher socio-economic status and political participation. Surprisingly, however, the family background plays no significant role. Neither the education level of the father nor the mother predicts the future voting behaviour of the respondent. Similarly, income level of the household when growing up has no significant relationship with the dependent variable.

Demographic factors present a curious pattern. Confirming earlier expectations, there is a decline in political participation rate as respondents get older: old age decreases the likelihood of voting in national elections for very senior citizens. Relatedly marital status appears to have a significant (at  $p \le 0.01$ ) and positive relationship with national political participation in all models. This observation is in line with arguments that associate marriage with a natural disposition to perform civic duties and goes against Solt's (2008) expectations otherwise. The results also reveal that gender plays no significant role in participating in national elections. Finally political orientation has a somewhat weaker influence on voting behaviour: individuals who place themselves on the right end of the spectrum are slightly more likely to vote.

Curiously, transnational mobility does not appear to be systematically associated with voting in national elections. While the relationship between physical mobility and voting is highly significant and positive in models 2, 3, 4 and 5—confirming earlier expectations—the introduction of citizenship eliminates the significance of this variable. Furthermore, virtual mobility practices have an even more interesting impact: the relationship between voting in national elections and virtual mobility is negative in models 2, 4 and 5. This suggests that virtual cross-border practices may decrease individual motivation to participate in politics. It must be noted that the significance of this relationship disappears with the introduction of citizenship in Model 6. Overall, the relationship between transnational mobility and national political participation seems less robust.

#### Conclusion

The findings of this study reveal that there is a positive relationship between attachment to the EU and voting in national elections, which suggests a complementary rather than a mutually exclusive relationship between supranational and national attachments. Interestingly, however, greater mobility enjoyed by the EU member nationals has a less robust relationship with the propensity to vote in national elections. While virtual mobility decreases the chances of voting, physical mobility increases the likelihood of

national political participation. Moreover, the positive relationship between attachment to the EU and voting in national elections suggest that EU loyalists may see national elections as the primary means to initiate a change in European politics. Under these circumstances, citizens may not view participating in European elections as an effective means to instigate change. The shortcomings of European political institutions and democratic deficit due to lack of effective accountability arrangements may be one reason behind why citizens choose national platforms to voice their political preferences.

Relatedly, a point that calls for a more careful assessment is the relationship between declining trust in the EU, European attachments and voting in national elections. Since 2008, support for the EU institutions is on a steady decline and has spread beyond the well-known Euro-skeptics like the UK. However, this may not necessarily indicate a decline in the level of attachment to the EU. This is because lack of trust in the institutions does not eliminate political attachment at all costs: a citizen may have a very low level of trust in the government as a political institution, yet may still show willingness to participate in politics in order to induce change because of emotional connections. In that sense, while declining support for the EU institutions may be alarming for Brussels, this may not go hand-in-hand with a willingness to abandon supranational commitments.

On a final note, the diverse impact of citizenship on voting in national elections suggests reasons to have a closer look into how distinct configurations of national political institutions for interest aggregation, representation and political administration influence individual preferences to vote. While this paper exclusively focuses on individual-level variables, the precise effect of contextual variables—such as national culture, political institutions, economic well-being—needs a more careful consideration.

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# Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism: Europe and the global in everyday European lives<sup>28</sup>

In this chapter, we will take another look at the data our study provides on what might be called "everyday transnationalism" among ordinary European populations. European integration has provided for an extraordinary range of rights enabling ordinary European citizens to benefit from participation in a wide and open European space, whether for economic and business reasons, leisure, tourism and consumption, or in terms of wider knowledge and interest in countries around the region. Transnationalism has become a commonplace feature of everyday life for ordinary citizens across the continent.

In academic analyses of Europe, however, it has become routine to argue that European integration most benefits elites and upper classes—the people most likely to have international connections — while being of much less benefit to lower classes (Fligstein 2008). This is then linked to the widespread mistrust and (sometimes) hostility among ordinary citizens to the European project in political and identification terms. Other sociologists (i.e., Beckfield 2006) have presented evidence that European integration is causing more inequality in the context of global economic change.

Related to this perception—and which also threatens the integrity and future of the EU—is growing Euroscepticism among people who may feel themselves to be the "losers" of European integration, especially in countries which are politically and economically important to the European project's success. Among our countries, we are able to take a close look at the often openly Eurosceptic UK and Denmark, but also consider countries which have had high levels of support, but where there is now growing doubt.

Our question is whether these attitudes make sense in terms of the growing transnationalism in these same countries? Firstly, we might be interested to know something about the relative scale of transnationalism across Europe, and whether it is strongly associated with more privileged social positions. Secondly, we might ask about the geography of this transnationalism: whether it can be classified a European transnationalism, and how it relates to the rest of the world (i.e., globalisation). Thirdly, we would be curious to know if and why such transnationalism might be related to cosmopolitan values, which would both point to a progressive global outlook, as well as concurring with the European promoting of particular values: its so called "normative power" agenda (Manners 2002). In this way we might be able to look into the apparent paradox of highly transnational yet supposedly Eurosceptic nations, as well as assessing to what extent the EU can take credit for the spread of cosmopolitan values alongside the "everyday transnationalism" it has facilitated.

All of the above questions can be answered initially with the quantitative data gathered in the first round part of the research, the EUCROSS survey. Yet another part of our mission in EUCROSS was to generate qualitative data, through follow up in-depth interviews with a sub-sample of the original survey, the EUMEAN survey. We are thus able here to offer a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Adrian Favell, David Reimer and Janne Solgaard Jensen.

first analysis of the different meanings and nuances given to these questions by members of different European member states. Here, starting from the in-depth findings of our own country case, Denmark, we offer some preliminary comparisons and contrasts with understandings in Germany, Spain and the UK. The qualitative interviews, certainly, put more of an accent on what we might call the varieties of European transnationalism and cosmopolitanism, while in our reading of the quantitative analysis we stress more the close commonalities of Germany, Denmark and the UK (i.e., of both "core" and "outsider" EU member states), and their overall difference from the Southern and Eastern European member states on these measures.

#### A note on reference literature

Our goal in this chapter is not to pursue theoretical questions from the literature, but rather to offer a straightforward descriptive analysis of the data on European transnationalism and cosmopolitanism, as well as some analysis about how it is determined by obvious social markers such as class and education. We are pursuing these questions in other publications aimed at scientific journals (i.e., Favell and Reimer 2013; Favell and Reimer 2014b; Solgaard Jansen and Favell 2014). We have also published one policy brief which shadows closely this chapter (Favell and Reimer 2014a).

EUCROSS builds on and expands the study on German nationals published in a monograph by Steffen Mau (2010). This was noteworthy for shifting the debate on transnationalism in Europe away from migrants and elites, and examining instead the everyday "ordinary" national populations of a core European member state. It found remarkable evidence for the transnationalisation of the German population since its heyday as a self-contained welfare state in the 1960s. Already to simply replicate Mau's study for more European countries would be a significant advance. Moreover, our study also relates to two other works, with similar goals, but different methodologies. Savage et al. (2005), a mixed methods study of the ordinary middle and working class populations of Northern England, similarly showed how deeply transnational practices and cosmopolitan values have been integrated routinely into the lives of quite average British populations, although with a distinctive geography that intersects less with the European mainland. A further recent study by Andreotti, Le Galès and Moreno (2013), on urban dwelling upper bourgeoisies in France, Spain and Italy, found that while embracing many of the opportunities (i.e., financial and social) of transnational lifestyles, they retained a strong sense of place and involvement in their home cities. They were highly "mobile" but not "migrant". Our survey goes substantially beyond Eurobarometer techniques, including the one that has most delved into similar subjects, Eurobarometer 65.1 (as operationalised by Kuhn 2011, 2012; Mau and Mewes 2012; Delhey et al. 2014).

These various studies above provide important indicators of what we expect to find among our European populations. A further key reference that we put to use here is Díez Medrano's earlier work (2003) on the variety of perceptions of Europe. In his mixed methods study of British, German and Spanish "framings" of Europe, he pinpoints strong geographical, historical and psychological differences underpinning each country's general understanding of the European identity question. Our study is particularly relevant in this sense as we are able to look at the same three countries, while adding a

Nordic variant, Denmark.

## **Quantitative findings**

Without a doubt, general support for the EU has suffered considerably as a result of the recent economic crisis in Europe and a negative perception of the EU's handling of the situation. On this, Eurobarometer measures are sufficient to gauge the backdrop of change in the continent, provoking a widening gap between political opinion and everyday practices. When asked in Eurobarometer 2012 (EB 77.3), it was found that EU citizens continue to support, or are at least neutral about the idea of the EU, but are now much less happy about "the present direction of the EU".

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Regarded Reg

Figure 1 Attitudes towards image and present direction of European Union across 5 EU countries

Source: Eurobarometer 77.3, 2012

Across the continent, it is clear that European citizens feel that the EU is not working as it should. In this context, the Danish and British results, for example, can be seen less as outliers. In fact, formal measures in Denmark continue to suggest that Denmark has maintained a relatively positive view of the EU despite the temper of its media debates. Britain posts the most negative results to the other member states, suggesting an implacable Euroscepticism in well over half the population. In other similar measures, from both Eurobarometer and EUCROSS, about attachment to the EU or whether a person would be sad if the EU were gone tomorrow, Danish percentages are remarkably

close to Germany, Italy and Spain, which are all considered more core, supportive members of the EU. British results confirm it as an outlier in overt political hostility toward the EU.




Figure 2 Attachment to European Union and reaction to European Union dissolution scenario across 5 EU countries (per cent)

Source: (1): Eurobarometer 77.3 (2012); (2) EUCROSS Survey.

What is puzzling about all this is that the EU explicitly and implicitly stands for cosmopolitanism, and when we relate these issues to the level of cosmopolitanism in these two countries compared to others using results from EUCROSS, there is little to suggest that the British, let alone the Danes, are out of step with the solidly European norms and values of their neighbours (as shown in Gerhards 2007). Some of these cosmopolitan measures are distinctive to the European conception of the good society and polity, such that they are also a mark of a European "civilisational" influence quite distant from, say, North American or East Asian alternatives (Therborn 1995).

A first kind of measure concerns the widespread acceptance or tolerance of diversity. On these measures, whether we take a first question about the make up of society by different ethnic, religious or cultural origins as a good or bad thing, or a second question about whether foreign forms of media and culture are a bad thing for the national culture, Britain scores high on cosmopolitanism, close to its other West European neighbours. Danes meanwhile obviously feel provoked by the first formulation of cosmopolitan diversity, posting a much lower acceptance, while being more comfortable than other countries about the second, the influx of foreign media and cultural products.

Moving to a third measure – identification with the world as a global citizen – Denmark, Britain and German all post similar mid level identifications, somewhat less overtly cosmopolitan than their southern neighbours. Regarding then a fourth dimension of cosmopolitanism, about feeling responsible for other nation's fortunes, a further distinction becomes apparent. The British are just a little less solidaristic than their rich Northern European neighbours. But enter the EU into the question ("the EU should bail out member states in times of crisis"), and figures fall quite dramatically for the British, but also for Denmark and Germany, with the Germans (probably in the light of Greece's debt crisis) even more hostile than the Britain. Only the Southern Europeans retain a sense of European solidarity through thick and thin.

Table 1 Cosmopolitan Attitudes (% of "yes" responses) and Cosmopolitan Index across 5 EU Countries

	Feel citizen of the world	Different ethn./culture/ rel. good for society	Exposure to foreign film/music/bo oks good for culture <sup>1</sup>	Help of EU country stuck by disaster by all EU countries	Pooling of state funds to help EU member state in crisis <sup>2</sup>	Cosmopolitan Index³ (range 0-1)
Denmark	46	53	72	90	42	0.57
UK	49	68	70	82	38	0.64
Germany	47	76	69	86	32	0.62
Italy	64	71	71	94	71	0.70
Spain	80	73	68	94	76	0.74
Spain	70	60	68	94	54	0.72

Source: EUCROSS Survey. <sup>1</sup>In the original question the formulation "damaging for culture" was used. The item was reversed so that it fits in the direction with the other items. <sup>2</sup> The original item was dichotomized so that the values 4 and 5 on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) represent agreement with the statement. <sup>3</sup> Based on an additive index of the five cosmopolitanism dummy variables divided by five.

These findings can be added into a simple additive index (see last column in Table 1). Whether this is made up of all five measures cited or the first three (i.e., minus the supranational and EU governance questions), the Italians and Spanish score as more overtly cosmopolitan, through no doubt this is pushed up by an aspirational wish to feel they are first class global citizens as well as high minded solidarians with struggling neighbours. What is interesting though is that Britain and Denmark average out with a middling score, always very close to that ostensibly much "more European" – and certainly more overtly post-national – core member state, Germany. And on some measures, either Britain or Denmark seem to exemplify some of the highest aspirations of what is often referred to as the EU "normative power" agenda (Manners 2002); while consistently disliking the framing of these influences in terms of the EU.

There is enough a puzzle here to suggest that we need to take a much closer look at British and Danish transnational practices to see if these differ from other member states,

particularly the core state, Germany. In the analysis here, we present twelve basic questions of transnationalism from the EUCROSS survey. We distinguish between transnational travel/mobility (six items), transnational social relations (friends and family, two items), transnational communication and consumerism (three items), and transnational human capital (languages, foreign language television, 2 items). In these analyses and later regressions we are also able to put in the figures for Romania, although the nature of their transnationalism may be somewhat different.

Table 2 Dimensions of transnationalism (in per cent) across 6 EU countries

Type of Transnationalism	Denmark	UK	Germany	Italy	Spain	Romania
Travel & Mobilities					-	
Familiarity with one or						
more foreign countries	60	64	66	42	49	24
Lived in another country						
before turning 18	7	8	6	4	5	1
Visited at least three						
countries before turning	63	44	56	24	18	2
18						
Lived in another country						
for at least 3 month after	23	24	15	12	14	11
turning 18						
Participated in EU						
sponsored exchange	4	3	4	5	7	3
program						
3 or more overnight trips						
abroad in last 24 months	56	37	39	22	21	5
Social Relations						
Know somebody living						
abroad	49	64	49	58	66	79
Partner with foreign						
citizenship at birth	3	7	7	4	5	1
Communication &						
Consumerism						
At least 10% of all received						
messages from abroad	23	27	33	21	26	33
(email/phone etc.)						
Sent money abroad (for						
reasons other than	15	11	10	12	11	4
purchasing	15	11	10	12	11	4
goods/services)						
Purchased goods abroad	40	32	27	17	20	13
Human Capital						
Command of at least one						
foreign language*	90	36	74	63	64	56
Watch foreign TV once a						
month or more	63	8	17	13	18	35

Source: EUCROSS Survey. \*Note: Command of the language is defined as speaking the language at least at the "just so" level.

Transnational practices of course may not be restricted to a European scale: certain kinds of cross-border transaction or tie may be linked to growing global interconnections. Yet thought of this way it is striking how much more transnational European populations have become, and how much more transnational are countries that are often seen at the edge of the (inherently transnational) European project. These questions may thus not necessarily be restricted to Europeanised practices, but they do indicate general levels of internationalisation. We see here a high degree of internationalisation across the board: markedly in Germany (which we would expect, following Mau) but also especially in Denmark and Britain, there is a higher experience of living abroad, familiarity with foreign countries or knowing people in other countries.

This practical transnationalism does not disappear, however, when we ask about practices more obviously linked to European integration. For example if we ask about whether they have bought goods abroad in the last 24 months, or look into the number of overnight trips to other countries in the last 24 months (two questions with a certain specificity to the regional scale of European mobilities), it turns out that the Danes are by far the highest, with Germany and Britain closely matched, and the Italians and Spanish much further behind. Only when we put in data related to a specific EU sponsored programme do the figures drop down towards the less EU inspired, as we would expect in Denmark and Britain (although similar to Germany), with Italians and Spanish more Europeanised in this sense. Danes also possess the most transnational human capital, measured in their ability to speak foreign languages — whereas few British speak another language than English. On the classic question of whether respondents are willing to move to live and work in another country, not surprisingly the Southern Europeans post high percentages: but over 50% of Germans and over 40% of Danes and British are willing to "get on their bikes" too—hardly consistent with their professed Euroscepticism.




Figure 3 Willingness to move abroad (per cent yes-answers)

Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012

These various indicators illustrate concrete effects of European integration that may in fact suggest a certain Europeanisation of everyday life in Danish and British society, even if these populations often express negative opinions about it or are unlikely to explicitly identify with it. To formalise these results though, we put together a complete additive index of transnational practices (not shown), consisting of thirteen items, collapsed into an overall score ranging from 0-13.

Table 3 Transnationalism Index across five EU countries

DK	UK	GER	IT	ESP	ROM
4.98	3.65	4.03	2.93	3.22	3.16

Source: EUCROSS Survey. Based on additive Index of 13 binary variables. Range for Index 0-13.

What these results display is that on a O-13 scale Danes score 4.98 – considerably higher than Italians and Spanish, whereas Germans and British are closely matched somewhere in between. Given that we do not have an equal amount of items for each dimension of transnationalism, the dimension "physical" mobility particularly receives more weight in our index (6/13=46%) compared to the other dimensions. While we think our first index is a plausible operationalisation of transnational practices, weighing the items equally across all dimensions leads to very similar results in terms of average levels of transnationalism across countries. There is in sum here a strong indication that everyday Europeanised practices in Denmark and Britain far outstrip the conscious identification with or support for the European project.

The principle objection to these findings are likely to be related to parallel work by Mau and Mewes using Eurobarometer (2012): that these kinds of differences might be accounted for by country level differences, for example relative wealth, or by geographical and cultural specificities in relation to the wider world. While some of this challenge remains outside the scope of this chapter, we are able to control for standard education, occupation and demographic variables to check that these results hold across social groups in the various countries.

Certainly there are similar relative differences between class or educational groups (it tends to hold for both variables) in terms of transnationalism. In very broad terms, one can indeed read this in terms of Fligstein's thesis in *Euroclash* (2008), which presents a stark portrait of the winners and losers from European integration. However, EUCROSS results suggest nuances need to be suggested to this rather crude polarised view of the European crisis. Interestingly, in highly transnational countries such as Denmark and Germany, respondents with mid level education have reached levels of transnationalism similar to those of the highly educated in the lower ranked transnational countries. There is some evidence here for a broader "massification" of the effects of European integration in some countries, in opposition to the simple polarisation suggested by Fligstein. It is widely reported that middle class Danes and British (i.e., not just "elites") are some of the most enthusiastic in utilising their European free movement rights: in terms of buying

property abroad or retiring in the South of Europe (Favell 2014). In order to follow up on these claims we explore to what extent each of the 13 different transnational practices reported in table 2 is unequally distributed across different social groups in the six EUCROSS countries. To that end we chose to calculate "odds ratios" that express the relative degree of inequality in access to or performance of a certain practice. An odds ratio of 2 for "familiarity" in Germany means that respondents with tertiary education are 2 times more likely to be familiar with another country than respondents with less than tertiary education (e.g. secondary and compulsory education). Note this may be relative to large percentages or small (see Long and Freese 2006).

8 Familiarity 7 Lived in another country before 18 6 5 Visited at least three countries before turning 18 4 Lived in another country for at 3 least 3 month after turning 18 2 Participated in EU sponsored exchange program 1 3 or more overnight trips abroad in 0 last 24 months DK **GER** IT ROM **ESP** UK


Figure 4 Educational Inequality in transnational mobilities across six countries. Odds-ratios between holders of tertiary degree vs. everybody below

Source: EUCROSS Survey.

Given that in most cases the odds ratio is well above 1 indicates that that the higher educated respondents display a higher degree of mobility across all six practices. There is some variation across the type of mobility practice in terms of inequality. The figure suggests that the more resource-craving types of mobility practices are more unequally distributed in each of the six countries (e.g. three or more overnight trips in the 24 months, travel to many countries before the age of 18). Finally, it seems like there is not very much variation between the six countries in terms of the degree of inequality across items, although Romania seems to standout at least with respect to some mobility practices.


In a next step we take a look at the other specific forms of transnationalism.

Figure 5 Educational Inequality in transnational relations across six countries. Odds-ratios between holders of tertiary degree vs. everybody below



In Figure 5 we see that transnational relations are not very stratified across levels of educational attainment in the EUCROSS countries. Both the measure for knowing somebody abroad and having a partner with foreign citizenship hardly surpass an oddsratio of 2 in any of the selected countries. Again, with the exception of Romania, levels of inequality are quite similar across all of the countries. In the following analysis (Figure 6) we then look at financial relations across borders. Level of education plays a bigger role in Romania when it comes to "middle class" consumerism, which is indicated as quite routine among West Europeans across all educational groups. Sending money abroad does not seem to be particularly related to educational background whereas receiving messages from abroad seems more prevalent among the respondents with higher education.

Figure 6 Educational Inequality in transnational consumerism & communications across six countries. Odds-ratios between holders of tertiary degree vs. everybody below



Finally, looking at consumption and ability to participate transnationally because of language skills (human capital), we get the results of figure 7.

7 6 5 Command of at least 4 one foreign language 3 Watch foreign TV once a month or more 2 1 0 DK **GER** ΙT ROM **ESP** UK

Figure 7 Educational Inequality in transnational human capital across six countries. Odds-ratios between holders of tertiary degree vs. everybody below


Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012

Here, not surprisingly there is a much stronger stratification across education relationship, regarding language (which is of course correlated with higher levels of education), although less in Germany and (surprisingly) the UK. There is a quite consistent relationship in terms of cultural consumption of foreign products (here TV).

In a final step, we dichotomize the summary index of transnationalism into a high transnationalism group (scores 6-13, 22 percent of the pooled sample) and low transnationalism group (scores 5 and below, 78 percent of the pooled sample) to gain an impression of how education, class and gender are related to transnationalism across Europe.

In terms of educational level inequality in "high transnationalism" almost linearly increases from North to South. The UK, the country next to Spain with the highest level of inequality, does not quite fit this pattern however. We might infer that these countries are more likely to sustain the Euroclash type reading, while countries with less inequality of access to transnationalism, Denmark and Germany, may be showing more signs of massification. Figure 8 also reveals that stratification in transnational practices seems to be much more related to education than to class. Possibly this can be interpreted in a way that transnational practice is to a lesser extent a direct consequence of financial resources or social prestige (i.e., class) and to a larger extent associated with a more international outlook and attitude that gets typically fostered in the higher education environment (access to which may of course be stratified by class or not). Finally, with the exception of Romania, age is almost not related to transnationalism, while women slightly less often display high levels of transnationalism than men.

Figure 8 Inequality in high transnationalism (scores 7-13 on the index of all 13 items) across Education (tertiary vs. lower) Class (High ISEI Score – 68 and above vs. lower)<sup>29</sup> and Gender (Male vs. Female)



Source: EUCROSS Survey.

As regards geographical specificities, there is a wealth of data available from the survey, regarding the particular relationships of certain countries with others around the globe. To take our first example, Denmark, it is possible to analyze these relationships in terms of familiarity with foreign countries, travel, and social networks abroad. These data presented in table form are the equivalent of the Google world maps that have been constructed from internet data that map out each country's particular geographical relations in the world.<sup>30</sup> The following figures are based on a follow up question with regards to which country specific forms of transnational practice are related. Since respondents in the EUCROSS survey were allowed to name multiple responses in case they for example are familiar with more than one foreign country, the following figures present cumulative frequency counts of all named countries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> This cutoff follows Ganzboom and Treimann (1996: 214) coding of the service class according to the Erikson-Goldthorpe class scheme based on ISEI scores.

For a look at how Google represents this kind of data, see the following website: http://www.facebookstories.com/stories/1574/interactive-mapping-the-world-s-friendships.

Fig 9 Knowledge: Which countries are you familiar with?




Fig. 10 Travel. Which countries did you live in for more than three months?







Fig. 11 Social relations. Where are the people you know located?





Figs 12/13 Which countries are you familiar with? North-West and South-East countries grouped.





Figs 14/15 Why are you familiar with these countries? (absolute numbers)





Unsurprisingly, familiarity is clearer with more contiguous neighbours, but in terms of travel and social networks the USA and even some Asian countries loom large in Denmark. Where we have some interesting results is in putting alongside these results for Denmark with other member states. In fact a clear North-South distinction can be found if we group these nations into "North-West" and "South-East" Europe, with Denmark, Germany and the UK resembling each other much more than they resemble the Southern European forms of transnationalism. We choose one of these questions as an illustration: familiarity with other countries.

Of course, identifying inequalities between the North and South in Europe overlooks other structural inequalities that might be found across Europe, between social classes. This in itself might be a feature of Europeanisation, and is certainly the challenge at the heart of Fligstein and Beckfield's argument: that European integration is feeding off inequalities, and leading to a more individualised and fragmented European society, for all its egalitarian talk about citizenship or the proud boasts in the Lisbon Agenda elsewhere of being able to achieve growth with sustainability and social cohesion. Our study therefore moves in its final quantitative stage to a full analysis of the relation to cosmopolitanism in terms of various socio-economic controls.

In this last step we explore whether transnational practices observed in our sample of countries can be systematically related to cosmopolitan values by regressing the cosmopolitan index on transnational practices. We go beyond previous work by four dimensions of transnationalism (mobility, consumerism/communication and capital) separately in the model. Furthermore we can account for a richer set of control variables that might mediate the relationship between transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. In addition, we ran separate models for high vs. low education respondents to explore whether the strength of the relationship between transnational practice and cosmopolitan values is of equal relevance across educational levels. One could hypothesize that transnational practices are more common among the wealthy and privileged, but are more beneficial (i.e., make more of a positive difference) for the development of cosmopolitan attitudes for respondents with lower levels of education.

Table 4 OLS Regression of Cosmopolitan Index on four Dimensions of Transnationalism and Socio-demographic Control Variables

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 2a	Model 2b
			Educ=High	Educ=Low
Transnationalism <sup>1</sup> :				
Mobility	0.090*	0.059	0.044	0.067*
Relations	0.053**	0.049**	0.039	0.053*
Communication/Consum.	0.086**	0.066*	0.071*	0.064*
Human Capital	0.077**	0.049*	0.035	0.060*
Country (Reference: UK)				
Denmark	-0.078***	-0.051**	-0.089***	-0.025
Germany	-0.049***	-0.028**	-0.053***	-0.006
Italy	0.205***	0.217***	0.198***	0.247***
Romania	0.051**	0.064***	-0.007	0.116***
Spain	0.243***	0.255***	0.223***	0.286***
Female	0.020	0.018	0.028*	0.012
Age	-0.028	-0.042	-0.047	-0.045
Place of birth (Reference: Ctry. of res.)				
EU country	-0.019	-0.014	-0.006	-0.022
Outside EU country	0.002	0.001	0.009	-0.007
Partner citi.ship not COR at birth	-0.023	-0.019	-0.034	-0.010
Education (Reference: Compulsory)				
Secondary		0.040		
Tertiary		0.117*		
ISEI (imp.) <sup>2</sup>		0.059*	0.054*	0.061**
R <sup>2</sup>	0.121	0.136	0.120	0.117
N	5408	5408	2061	3347

Source: EUCROSS Survey \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Note: <sup>1</sup> Each dimension of transnationalism is based on an additive index based on the dummy indicator variables presented in table 2, divided by the number of items for each dimension.

Table 4 reports unstandardized coefficient estimates from four OLS regression models based on our pooled country sample. In the first model transnational practices, a set of basic demographic controls (age, gender place of birth) as well as country dummy variables are included. To test whether a potential association between transnational practices and cosmopolitanism cannot be simply attributed to respondents' socioeconomic position, we introduce measures for respondents' education and occupational status (ISEI) in a second model. The estimates from Model 1 show that each dimension of transnationalism is significantly related to cosmopolitan attitudes. As would be expected, in Model 2, controlling for occupational status and education reduces the coefficient size for all dimensions of transnationalism. Nevertheless, all coefficient estimates remain statistically significant with the exception of transnational mobility. These results are in line with previous studies showing that the effect of transnational practices on cosmopolitan attitudes (Mau et al. 2008) or European identification (Kuhn 2012) cannot be simply attributed to socioeconomic control variables. The coefficients for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Missing ISEI values for 1172 observations were imputed using STATA's impute command using country, age, gender, place of birth and citizenship of partner at birth.

the country dummy variables (Britain is the reference category) indicate that net of transnationalism and sociodemographic controls, pronounced and statistically differences in cosmopolitanism between countries remain: The British have higher net levels of cosmopolitanism than the Danes and the Germans, and lower levels than Italians, Romanians and Spanish. It follows that while cross-border transnational practices do seem to influence cosmopolitan orientations in the expected direction, they cannot account for the observed country differences. Finally we run model 2 separately for respondents with higher education (model 2a) and lower levels of education (model 2b). Comparing the two education-specific models reveals that all of the coefficient estimates for transnationalism remain statistically significant in the model for respondents with lower levels of education, the opposite is true for the "higher education model" where only the coefficient estimate for consumerism/communication is significantly different from zero. These results point in the direction that travelling and engaging in other forms of transnational activities might potentially have more of an impact on individuals with lower levels of education. These are tentative conclusions, however and we should also point out that the coefficient estimates for the different types of transnational practice in the "lower education model" are not drastically higher compared to the "higher education model".

The above analyses offer a guide to the strongly emergent transnationalism among ordinary European populations, as well as some indication of how this relates to expanding cosmopolitan values that have been influenced by the European project in the context of regional integration and globalisation, albeit without necessarily always being connected explicitly to political support for Europe. The cosmopolitanism expressed in generic questions, however, may not always have the same meaning in every European context. As we have seen, transnationalism has its own geographical varieties, and following Díez Medrano (2003) we would expect that the cosmopolitanism found in each country might also have its own distinctive expressions, according to "local" (i.e., national) differences in each country's relation to Europe and the World. Accordingly then, we are able to here supplement the quantitative analysis above with below a first qualitative analysis of the in-depth interview material gathered in the EUMEAN survey. We will focus selectively on evidence from (as in Díez Medrano) Germany, Spain and the UK, in relation to our reference country Denmark.

#### **Qualitative findings**

Díez Medrano (2010) argues that Eurobarometer type surveys rarely help us to understand the dynamics of European integration at the national level, because there are marked qualitative differences in the way the European project is perceived and understood in different member states. He speaks of this in terms of the way Europe is "framed" differently in different places. This could be related to the historical specificities and trajectories of different member states, as much as their geographical location. In his work he considers the fairly obvious contrasts in this respect of Spain, Germany and the UK, also delving into internal regional differences within these countries.

The Danes

Taking this as an inspiration, we began our analysis of the EUMEAN data with the Danish case. Prominent among the Nordic states, Denmark reveals itself as an ideal test ground for exploring the paradoxes of nationalism, Europeanisation and globalisation in Europe today. Long known for its affluence, its high ratings in terms of levels of globalisation, and for being allegedly the happiest people on Earth, Denmark is an archetypal small nation that has known well how to position itself for success in the currents of international politics and economy. Yet in recent years, its golden image has become tarnished by both a fairly intransigent attitude towards European cooperation — a version of Euro-scepticism — as well as a quite harsh anti-immigrant politics grounded in a kind of "common sense" populist xenophobia. ISSP data from 2004 on national identity shows that Danes, comparatively more than their Scandinavian friends in Norway and Sweden, want to live in Denmark rather than any other country (81%). This clarifies the continuous importance of the national scale in the Danish case.

We are interested in how these issues show up in the everyday life of ordinary Danes. As part of the research for EUCROSS, in additional to the large N telephone survey, a small number of follow up interviews were made with Danish residents. Crucially, we opted for a wide sprad of locations in different parts of Denmark, some very far out in the regions away from the metropolitan centre, Copenhagen, even though the major part of this small sample were rated as "high transnationalism" in the original survey. In particular, we see our work as contributing to the effort to develop new qualitative methods and instruments in European identity research after Díez Medrano (Duchesne 2010; Duchesne et al. 2013), as well as studies about the empirical human dimension of international mobilities and globalisation in everyday life (Savage et al 2005; Mau 2010). Counter to their politically expressed Euroscepticism and nationalism, ordinary Danes of a variety of backgrounds engage in a wide range of European, global and cosmopolitan practices in everyday life, which nuance their obviously expressed range of "banal Danish-isms" (Billig 1995; Jenkins 2011). We also share the effort in the recent sociological and geographical literature (i.e., Andreotti et al. 2013) to shift discussions on mobility away from the limited numbers of obvious movers in Europe to more settled, mass populations.

We connect the investigation above into the relation of cosmopolitan attitudes and transnational practices to perceptions of space, place and belonging on the other. In part this implies investigating the experience and choice of residential place within Denmark as well as how Denmark as a collected space is negotiated and constructed in a changing global context in the lives of these ordinary citizens, in the light of a seemingly large range of differentiated transnational practices such as leisure travel, work related mobility and/or experiences of the effects of globalisation, i.e. immigration, new technological possibilities and increased personal international connections. From such stories, we further show how and when different scales, such as the city, the national, the European and the global are invoked to make sense of the world they live in. In the Danish context, the city of Copenhagen has a special role as a spatial reference in strategies of "elective belonging" (Savage et al. 2005) and a sense of self, in contrast to living in Jutland (the mainland) where choices concerning residency are mainly linked to family questions. Variations in cosmopolitan attitudes and transnational practices may be linked with these belonging strategies, but crucially we find that the geographical periphery is not any less transnational than Copenhagen, only sometimes differently transnational; social class too

– frequently cited as the main factor in explaining opportunities for transnationalism or cosmopolitanism – does not seem to determine the kind of cosmopolitanisms expressed by Danes, and it only affects certain transnational practices. Most Danes are in many ways comfortably transnational and cosmopolitan in banal ways that would satisfy anyone looking for proof of Europe's cosmopolitan "normative power" agenda (Manners 2002; Beck and Grande 2007). However, when questions are linked with immigration or the European economic crisis (and especially issues of the common currency or identification with the EU), the national scale is immediately re-invoked and defended, particularly with reference to the superior democratic capacity of the Danish state, as well as its fragility as a small nation likely to be swamped by European or global problems. Our findings thus suggest some interesting particularities of the everyday effects of Europeanisation and globalisation in Denmark, and how various types of mobilities expressed and embodied by Danes in their everyday practices are quite separate from their political opinions and values.

To summarise our findings, our data portrays a group of Danes as a peculiar mix of politically and culturally engaged citizens at local, national, European and global scales alike. Yet the fluidity of different scales in everyday life is highly contrasted both among the group of interviewees, but also in different contexts. Denmark is a nation with what seems to be a general well-travelled population and consequently the effect of class as well as the centre/periphery hypothesis do not seem to hold as much as they might do in other countries; at least not when it comes to the intensity of transnational practices or cosmopolitan attitudes. Dependent on the context, choice of life style and self-perception seem to be the most decisive factor in determining the most significant difference among this group of interviewees when negotiating transnational practices in everyday life. While the periphery is no less transnational than people living in Copenhagen, this data indicates differences in the form of integration of these practices and as well as the reason for crossing borders or buying products online. For example, one respondent living in the North East of Jutland and classified "low transnational" in fact was highly aware about the benefits of global flows and how she benefitted from the EU. Her use of the Internet, for instance, is a good indication of how the EU has certainly made it easier to live in a small town and she told a lot about the use of (particularly) Amazon in Germany which consequently created a very pragmatic and economic relationship to crossing borders as the next quote indicates.

We feel that [closeness] even more with Hamburg though. We go there a lot. And that's simply what we pick, and we pick that over Copenhagen actually [...]. We do actually [like it better than going to Copenhagen]. From here and then on the high way, it takes no time [...]. In the beginning when we talked about it, it was like: "But that's another country, that's Germany". But there isn't anyone at the border anymore, you don't even notice passing it.

This was mainly part of their belonging strategies behind choosing residential placement as well as their motivation for travelling. Place and perceptions of place in a variety of ways seem to depict a certain cultural status and profile – as we saw in the perceptions of a travel-hierarchy that existed among some of the interviewees, where Europe is simply the most "ordinary" travel destination in some cases, so ordinary that going there seems less a "serious" trip than if you cross the Atlantic to the West or the Ural Mountains to

the East. Hence, this is witness to the fact that the banal integration of transnational practices might very well be established in the European space.

The data also show that the national scale is in fact intertwined with many other experiences of being European and using Europe as well as the world; that is, in the context of travels and other practices as part of social distinction, individuality, residence and general "free living". At the same time, identification with Europe and the EU is also affected by the experience of being clearly part of a national community which currently seems to be invoked mostly due to the economic crisis or when talking about immigration. Such stories indicated that the wish to uphold the national was mostly in a political context; on these issues, there is a decrease in (EU)ropean attachments, an attachment which had been so vividly expressed as an almost second home earlier when travelling had been the focus. Thus what interviews also clarify is the importance of untangling experiential frames of, at once the local and the city, the national, the European and the global scales, which show not only what the European or the national might be, but more significantly when the different scales are invoked and thus when they become meaningful (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). In this case we can therefore assign the European space much more credit than might be the case if we only measured the political convictions about the EU that would be expressed in a quantitative survey. The transnational and cosmopolitan Danes are more visible when they are not talking about politics.

Denmark is a good place to start as a case in Europe, because it is ideal typical of a highly globalised, highly affluent, yet highly cohesive and relatively homogenous society. It is routinely rated as one of the most highly globalised societies on Earth (Dreher et al. 2008). Yet it combines high levels of social transnationalism with high levels of national loyalty: mobilities are not an "exit" issue in terms of brain drain or the flight of capital, and Danes are very rarely driven to move themselves or their activities outside of the country for reasons of pure economic disadvantage. It is, in other words, the epitome of the privileged and economically successful North-West of Europe, which has combined growth and affluence with a high level of welfare and social protection, and in which mobilities are more a matter of choice, consumption and lifestyle, yet highly diffused across society. We see European transnationalism under ideal conditions; yet we also see through our analysis that high levels of practical Europeanised behaviour is not necessarily accompanied by high levels of support for the European project.

#### The Spanish

How do things look in contrast, in the South of Europe? In contrast to Denmark, the Spanish history of travelling abroad is not dating as far back as to the 50s; at least not for the majority of the population. As one respondent says:

I don't know how young people have it these days because maybe things are not better or worse, they are just different, but I don't think that there is so much difference from my time. Bear in mind that when I went abroad I was 17, it was in 1963, and Spanish were not used to travelling abroad during summer. But there were some who did it, anyway, it was not very common.

As in the other Mediterranean countries the sun shines in their own country and summer holidays are therefore also likely to be at their *own* coast and without crossing any

borders. This would partly explain the low Spanish numbers on mobility and trips in the past 24 months (Table 2). This is obviously a different story than among the Northern Europeans who line up every year on the German highways to go South. Some of the older interviewees in Spain tell stories about how few travelled around Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, but also how they as tourists were blacklisted due to the international view on Franco-ruled Spain. However, having experienced the change from when Franco was still alive, this seems to have had an effect on how the Spanish people today enjoy their freedom to speak and travel, which can be seen in terms of certain "international choices" and general reflections that still seem to be enhanced in the light of the Spanish past.

Advancing in language proficiencies is especially something that the older population is very focused on in relation to the new global opportunities. From such discussions it also become clear that what we could refer to as Spanish cosmopolitanism is based on more virtual mobilities than the Danish hard-core physical mobility. Also Spanish respondents seem more pragmatic in their openness as learning languages in both in terms of travelling to new places, but also increasing opportunities to be involved in new and other work-relations with foreign countries.

There is a clear difference between the Danes and the Spanish on the front of physical mobility, especially when it comes to "leisure movement" or moving "without a reason" and there is a tendency among the Spanish to go to countries close to their own. Though there surely are interviewees from Spain who are extremely well travelled as well, what travelling means to them appears a lot more modest, and to what extent this is relevant to their self-perception, is also less evident than in the Danish cases.

Lack of language proficiency might be one explanation as this was not even a topic in the Danish interviews: there was much frustration among Southern European populations at how they were bad at making themselves understood in other languages. Hence, in this respect, the Spanish seem to perceive themselves as somewhat more restricted in the places they are able to travel to because of language. The Danes also appear less restricted in their talks about being mobile. It is not questioned anymore, whereas a profound part of the Spanish population still remembers the past and did not "grow up" with travelling. The economic crisis since 2008 has also changed the character of mobility as people are indeed leaving Spain to find work, which is mentioned in the interviews and inevitably gives mobility with a more pragmatic character. Whereas freedom to move is mainly only seen as good in Denmark as a personal asset (not in term of immigration), the Spanish are forced to think of the necessity to move because their country is currently in a deep crisis. Mobility is thus in general much more politicised than it is in Denmark. Mobility and politics goes together in Denmark only when you talk about immigration; otherwise it is associated with dreams, opportunities and self-development. In Spain, the historical pathway of the country have left mobility and therefore also their cosmopolitan outlook with a very different character. In Spain, mobility is today as it has been in the past, as much about politics as it is about leisure, except for the narrower group of those who can easily afford it and prioritise it.

The Spanish clearly position themselves geographically in a different way. Latin America, unsurprisingly, is close. The same goes for places like Morocco, France, Italy and Portugal

(even to some extent Switzerland), countries which are often talked about as self-evident travel destinations. This is different from Denmark, Germany and Britain — colonialism certainly plays a role in these differences. Something indicates in the Spanish interviews that they are quite used to people coming from Morocco as immigrants and the distance is small.

Sure. It is obvious that I have more things in common with a Spanish person or a European (than a Japanese person) because we are nearer, we have more contact, we share the currency... But anyway, I have less in common with a Pole than with a Moroccan because we're neighbours, even though they are not European. But yes, you will always feel this union with a European, you have this connection.

The European crisis and a growing hostility to "the South" (referred to quite commonly as the PIGS in Europe) is hinted at. Europe has lost some of it "goodness" and sense of solidarity. One interviewee was now very hesitant of drawing any points of identification with Northern European populations and he was extremely reluctant to think of the EU as anything else than German domination, though the EU was still good in terms of facilitating mobility.

If Spain wasn't in the EU it could have done things like depreciating the currency and other similar things. And maybe these would have improved our situation. But we cannot do anything because we are inside and, ok, it is true, when things go well it is great but when things go wrong... We cannot take the risk of letting this happen, what is going on now, it is not worth it. The crisis started when I was about 17 and so I wasn't thinking about economic problems too much. I did not care. I was not thinking about Europe as something economic. I perceived it rather as something more cultural. I enjoyed it, such as the possibility to travel to all these countries. And all these scholarship agreements to study wherever you like. I liked all these things very much and I still like them. But this thing about economic union, I don't see it very clearly.

The Spanish in many cases are openly critical of their home environment and self-perception, but many have only travelled in a more virtual sense, when compared with Danes. In contrast, it is almost the opposite case with Danes, where everybody travels, but where many are also more protective of their residence and home sphere. If place matters in Spain according to this small number of interviews, it seems like there are different varieties of this matter where the choice of place (or belonging to a place) is either pragmatic, forced or based on a feeling about the environment, such as climate. At least for some the crisis have given both the free choice of who they should identify with, as well as posing the question of international mobility. The willingness to move to a different country is therefore also rather large, which confirms the numbers in the EUCROSS dataset. This therefore forces some Spanish to be more pragmatic in their mobility, such as expanding their own global and cosmopolitan opportunities by learning a new language, taking Erasmus scholarships, or leaving to Germany for work (to which more than one was referring).

The relation of place, belonging and the Europe/EU is bound up in many interviews. In the Danish interviews, place and city residence in many cases had a lot to do with self-perception and lifestyle and even their approach to globalization, with contrasts between the peripheries and urban centre. In contrast, place, belonging and self-perception seem explicitly politicized in Spain: everyone is suffering the crisis, and the struggle often translates into regional concerns. Thoughts of mobility are immediately related to the

country's political situation. This might also have something to do with the eyes looking at them from the outside. Spanish respondents seem highly aware of the world and Europe in the sense that they are aware of what others think about them and their politicians and in this sense there are a lot of "cross-border references", whereas Danes are a lot more caught in their own bubble and a bit more careless and confident in their nationality. This is for instance evident when the Spanish talk about reading foreign media to get more or new perspectives on the matter, a further interesting banal effect of globalization as well as the crisis.

In sum, the EU at an economic and political level seems to leave a huge divide among the Spanish. They are ambivalent in their idea of how Europe is today divided between North and South, with Germany placed in the middle as a sometimes too strong or diminant political neighbour, but sometimes as their way out of the crisis, perhaps through using mobility and exit options themselves.

#### The Germans

Regarding Germany, we focused on adding nuances to the extensive picture that Mau and his colleagues have provided on horizontal Europeanisation and transnational practices. The issue of being pro- or anti-EU is much less salient in Germany. However the former East/West divide has a significant effect on citizens' perception on European freedom and Germany identity. Germans like the Spanish evoke the political crisis when thinking about the EU: it is as much a political space as it is an experiential and cultural space. Unlike with the Danes, politics is part of living in everyday Europe and is much more up front.

This qualitative dataset does not reproduce the negative prejudices between the two parts of Germany; if anything some of the interviewees find it absurd that some Eastern and Western citizens are still living with this mental divide even though they were not even born then. However, there are also several references to the divide when we talk about freedom to move and a general globalization that demands cosmopolitan outlooks. A mother with children abroad and living in Western Germany reflected on how Germans should celebrate more the "wonderful" fact of free movement now, and also get over their prejudices to the Turkish population. She is proud her children are "cosmopolitan":

We are getting more open. Let us be happy that the wall is gone.

The possibility of being cosmopolitan citizens is something to be thankful for; and not least because of Germany's own national history – that is the message here. It is not something that can be taken for granted and in this sense, the freedom to move is rather more linked in its connotations to national history, over and above European free movement policies. Moreover, the quote shows a similar "good quality" of the cosmopolitan outlook as we also find in the Danish interviews, where being global and cosmopolitan is a personal lifestyle and asset; something you characterize yourself and others with, that is, as a form of distinction. This is in contrast to Spain where it appeared as a more pragmatic approach to make use of the world's resources of work and a way to upgrade your ability to be part of the world economy.

Another interesting aspect is how being "European" can also be a positive reference point in the sense that "Germanness" does not seem to have clarified meaning – and again, the

old divide shows its face, as in this quote from a former East German, when asked if he felt European:

Well, definitely, more as European than, what do I know, German, I dare to say. Well this is probably because I have lived in different countries and perhaps have not gained ground back here again. As far as the mentality is concerned and so on. And hmm, for this reason rather European than German.

For Germans, there seem to be a fine line between cultural Europe and political Europe, which might be caused by the role that Germany has been given as a consequence of the crisis. This is now also to be found in the attitudes among the German citizens. Moreover, Germans also seem to have a geopolitical location that provides different and many types of transnational networks to the Germans both in a political and personal sense. There is a much more and different references to countries, for example to the Balkans and other East European countries, than in Denmark or Spain.

Germanness is difficult to grasp from the dataset. The feeling may not be so strong, or it may be hidden in the minds of Germans because of their history with nationalism. There is also little reference to other parts of Germany. People seem to be rather local or regional, and intra-national movement is not something that shows up in their talks about neighborhood or residence. In Germany, Berlin is not the obvious big, global city to which all the small time village people flee to evade narrow-minded citizens; at least not as obviously as it is for the Danes with Copenhagen. Instead, every region in Germany seems to have its own big city that would contrast with local village life. Country size and the network of mid-sized cities in Germany surely matters in this respect. On the other hand, the cosmopolitanism of certain Germans seems itself to be dependent on quite typical German traits: for example, a distrust for newpapers and the media, which pushes them to check and compare how the media might be covering it in another country such as the UK.

#### The British

The UK, like Denmark, has a specific national state of mind when it comes to Europe, as well as it comes to travelling. On this front, the Danes, the Germans and the British exemplify their privileged position, incorporating mobility as a more routine or banal factor or everyday life, and the advantage of globalisation, in a different way to the Spanish in the South. Travelling represents a certain lifestyle, and is also about being categorised as such in terms of social distinction. It is not only about working or holidaying, but is also a life lesson in seeing the world or seeking authenticity.

The interviewees were primarily happy about living in Europe, but though they were very open to other parts of the world, thinking about such experiences would also sometimes be the route to expressing oneself about the rest of the world in a less flattering and exclusive way, about what Europe seemed to be or not, or where certain European trademarks would be portrait as "the good way" to do things.

I think that when something daft like the Eurovision song comes to have Israelis in it, that's ridiculous: they're Middle Eastern. I am [also] not so sure I class Turkey as Europe. I know that Turkey wants to be part of the European Union but I don't class it as Europe.

At the same time (and not without self-contradiction), there is of course a distance to

Europe expressed among the British interviewees. Negative comments about European immigrants are now commonplace.

Because we are an island, aren't we? There is going to be a saturation point at some point.

A very typical reflection on European identity goes as follows:

Britain or the United Kingdom is not particularly European really. Everyone in Britain pretty much hates Europe and blames Europe for any problems. I suppose with Western Europe it is quite similar culture, but with Europe it is a vastly different culture... I don't think most people in the North of England will consider themselves European.

The question opens up the way to embracing English nationalism:

The fact that I really do not associate with Britain, lessens the tie with Europe, so I do not consider myself European. But again if I was in American, then again I would be European.

Internal distinctions in the UK do matter: such as its own North/South divide. Non-Londoners, identify London – which is also seen as the main city of UK's fabled multiculturalism and diversity, as is Copenhagen – with being unfriendly, depressing, lonely. A true Briton can even feel a "foreigner" in London, hearing nothing but foreign languages on the tube. Others meanwhile, strongly identify with London.

The British, similar to Danes, are in general satisfied with life in Britain and most people prefer to stay in Britain. There is a sense that people are more flexible with their country of residence in Germany or Spain. To some extent, as also in Denmark, residence is evaluated from a social and family perspective and it therefore becomes a hindrance for moving away. Language (as for the Spanish) is also a major hindrance. We therefore see a similar type of satisfaction with the UK among the British as we find among Danes with Denmark. Many of the interviewees also express this through taking a stand on their neighbourhood and their city, and contrasting it with other cities, then identifying with their country as especially a place where they like to live. Pure Danishness is stronger than being British because the larger category is now highly conflicted with Englishness. There is growing differentiating within the UK, which is mixed up with people's thoughts about the EU, the European region and the UK's place in the global: a self-contradictory mix.

# **Conclusions**

In this chapter, we have offered an analysis of the relation of transnational practices to cosmopolitan values in the EUCROSS survey, investigating how they vary by social position and by national context across Europe. Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism can be found to be very similar in scale and intensity in Denmark, Germany and Britain, which belies the Danish and British Euroscepticism often expressed in these countries in so far as many of these practices are concretely linked to European integration. While finding obvious and unsurprising evidence that transnationalism and cosmopolitanism is associated with higher class positions, we also show some tentative evidence for a broader diffusion of opportunities for mobility across middle classes in Europe than suggested by Fligstein and others (particularly in Denmark and Germany), as well as

evidence that the people whose values change the most in a cosmopolitan direction when exposed to transnational experiences are those from a lower social class background.

In the second part, we offer a first analysis of some the most salient variable meanings and framings found in the qualitative survey EUMEAN. Taking Denmark as the ideal typical successful European society, we see how transnationalism and Europeanisation have become banal, while neither negating strong national affiliation, and defensiveness towards Danish homogeneity. In other respects, the Danes are exemplary cosmopolitans, with Europe a zone of lifestyle choices and easy mobility, but there is a mismatch with their European opinions. Germany and the UK offer views on mobilities and identity that might be closely expected: heavily determined by geographical position and national history. They share similar degrees of cosmopolitanism, but give it very different meanings in relation to national particularities. Meanwhile, it is only the Spanish in our analysis of these four worlds of European transnationalism who are conscious of the primary economic justifications for European mobility rights. Yet they are markedly less experienced and more rooted in their everyday lives.

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# Methodological Report<sup>31</sup>

# **Project overview**

EUCROSS is designed as a mixed-methods research project. As such it consists of two interwoven surveys.

In the first one, computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI) were realised in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain, Romania and the United Kingdom. The target populations in these countries consisted of 1,000 nationals, as well as, 250 Romanian and Turkish migrants respectively. However, due to the low number of Turkish nationals in Spain, only Romanian migrants were included in this country. Hence, the envisioned total sample sizes were 6,000 EU-member state nationals currently living in their country of origin, 1,250 intra-EU migrants (Romanian citizens) and 1,250 migrants from a third country (Turkish citizens).

In the second survey (EUMEAN) qualitative interviews with 10 selected participants from each sample of the first survey were realised in all countries.

# The quantitative EUCROSS survey

## Sample definition

The goal of the EUCROSS project was to collect data on transnational behaviours and orientations of different groups of EU-country residents. To be included in one of the three above mentioned broadly defined samples (nationals, Romanian migrants, Turkish migrants) respondents had to be at least 18 years old at the time of the interview.

Taking into consideration the empirical reality of European countries our definition of the national samples is not based on the assumption of ethnical homogenous societies. Hence, the crucial criterion for inclusion in one of the six national samples was citizenship in its strictly legal sense. In using this formal aspect as sampling criterion EUCROSS sets itself apart from other definitions which consider only such individuals as part of national populations who have been born in the country of residence (CoR) or whose families already lived there for a given number of generations (excluding so-called migration background). A consequence of the provisions made in EUCROSS is that naturalised migrants (including persons originally from Romania or Turkey) can be part of the national population samples, too. Hence, migration experience is considered only one socio-demographic aspect in a contemporary society among others, such as diverse degrees of formal education and different income levels. Nevertheless, language served as an additional indirect filter since interviews with the national populations were conducted in the predominantly used official languages only.

Citizenship is central in the definition of the EUCROSS migrant samples, as well. All respondents of these samples had to be Romanian respectively Turkish nationals living in one of the surveyed countries without holding the country of residence citizenship, at the same time. However, these criteria alone would not have assured that participants were

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Steffen Pötzschke, Irina Ciornei and Fulya Apaydin vom Hau.

in fact migrants, since citizenship laws in a number of countries — especially the still only superficially eased *ius sanguinis* principle in Germany — result in large sub populations of people born in the country of residence without receiving (unconditionally) the respective citizenship. In public discourse these persons are often addressed as migrants although they never left their country of origin (CoO) for longer periods. However, the inclusion of these individuals in the migrant samples would have been counterproductive since EUCROSS is specifically designed to measure possible results of personal mobility experiences on individual identification. Therefore, in addition to the stated citizenship requirements, only such persons were eligible for the migrant samples who were not born in the country of residence. This means in consequence that the term migrant, if used with respect to EUCROSS data does indeed and exclusively refer to people who moved from one country to another (i.e., persons who are in the literature often referred to as so-called first generation migrants).

# Questionnaire development, translation, pre-test

The first step in the development of the EUCROSS questionnaire was constituted by a thorough literature review focussed on previously used instruments to measure cross-border activities and (trans)national identification. The direct outcome of this work was an operationalisation document which summarised current best practise examples and proposed new instruments to operationalise the respective concepts and to measure independent variables (Hanquinet and Savage 2011). Subsequently, a second review process was conducted which concentrated on the identification of tested questionnaire items. A wide range of questionnaires were included in this process. Important sources were general surveys of the European population (e.g., Eurobarometer, European Social Survey), studies which specifically investigated the identification with the European Union (e.g., Bruter 2005), studies which focussed on transnational activities and networks (e.g., Mau 2010) and migrant surveys (e.g., Recchi and Favell 2009; INE, 2009).

The main questionnaire, which was designed in English, built heavily on these preliminary efforts. Consequently it incorporated a number of previously used items in their original form. Not least in order to ensure the comparability of research outcome. Furthermore, a large number of items in the questionnaire were inspired by other studies, too, but considerably modified in their wording or with respect to answer categories and scales. Finally, a significant number of innovative items were developed specifically for EUCROSS.

The questionnaire itself consists of four parts, starting with an introductory screening section and ending with the collection of socio-demographic data.<sup>32</sup> The two main parts are inquiring cross-border practices, on the one hand, and European identification and cosmopolitan values, on the other (for detailed information on the rationale behind item design and combination of items see: Pötzschke 2012).

In order to assure a high level of comparability of the data gathered on nationals and migrants the questionnaire for all samples mainly consists of the same items. This means it includes only a limited number of questions which are tailored specifically for migrants (e.g., inquiring the year of settlement in the CoR). Instead of using alternative items in most cases additional answer categories were added in order to adopt the questionnaire

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> The EUCROSS questionnaire is included in appendix I of this chapter.

to the social realities of all samples. Using different filters, migration specific data were not only collected on the 'official' migrant samples, but also on nationals with migration experience.

Following the preparation of a first questionnaire draft small scale in-house pre-tests in all countries were scheduled in order to assess the feasibility of the instrument. The questionnaire designed for the survey of national population was therefore translated by all teams from English into the respective official CoR language. Already existing translation of items (which were borrowed from other surveys, like Eurobarometer or the European Internal Movers Social Survey) could be used after they had been double checked by the respective research teams. Each team conducted approximately 16 interviews in which the samples were stratified by gender, age (over and under 45) and education (university level and below university level). The pre-tests in all countries were realised between March 10 and March 26, 2012. After their conclusion all teams reported their findings and observations. This first series of pre-tests not only allowed the identification of weaknesses of single items from a purely methodological point of view. In fact, keeping in mind the intercultural nature of the survey, they also provided the researchers with important hints as to which issues and items (more precisely, which formulations) had to be paid special attention to during the translation process. The draft questionnaire was adjusted where necessary and further developed into the English master questionnaire which also included migrant sample specific filters, answer categories and items.

The translations of the English master questionnaire into Danish, German, Italian, Romanian, Spanish and Turkish were organised by the different teams. However, they were coordinated by the GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. Furthermore, all teams followed the same methodological principals. Central in this regard was the team translation approach (Behr 2009). In compliance with this strategy each translation was prepared in two stages: First, two separate translations of the questionnaire were realised. At least one of them was done by a professional translator, the other either by another translator or by a member of the research team in the respective country. In a second step, those individual translations were than to be merged into a final translation. This was done in a work meeting in which both translators and members of the respective country teams compared the two translations, discussed differences, pending issues or unfamiliar formulations and decided on the final wording of each item. All translations (i.e., both individual translations and the final one), translator remarks, points of discussion and the reached conclusions were documented in a standardised translation template which was then forwarded to GESIS. In a final step, the GESIS team compared the adjustments and notes in order to ensure the consistency of the questionnaire across all languages. This strategy combined the professional knowledge and experience of translators and social scientists in the development of a high-quality cross-cultural survey instrument.

Following the completion of the main questionnaire and its implementation into CATI software by the field institute the latter carried out a number of pre-tests, the first of which was realised on May 18 and 19, 2012 with British nationals. One of the main conclusions of this pre-test was that respondents reacted very suspicious to the phone

calls. Furthermore, the refusal rate seemed higher than expected. However, in this regard it has to be taken into account that the small range of the test – only 11 interviews were conducted – did not allow for any reliable predictions of the response rate at that time. Nevertheless, it was subsequently decided to modify the introduction sequence (explicitly stating the name of the EUCROSS partner institution in each country) and to include short descriptions of the project in all survey languages on the project website.

Between July 1 and August 3, 2012 the second wave of pre-tests was carried out in order to test the remaining questionnaire versions (approx. 10 interviews each). The national questionnaires were tested with respondents in the respective countries, while the Turkish and Romanian migrant questionnaires were tested with migrants in Germany. These test resulted in minor changes of wording and/or the correction of grammatical errors, while they did not reveal the need for overall revision.

## Sampling method, fieldwork and realised sample sizes

The quantitative EUCROSS survey was carried out by Sozialwissenschaftliches Umfragezentrum GmbH (SUZ). The computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) were generally conducted by native speakers of the respective language who called the respondents from Duisburg, Germany, where SUZ is located. Only the interviews with Danish nationals had to be realised by a field institute in Denmark, due to the small number of qualified Danish speaking interviewers available to SUZ. Interviews with migrants were conducted by Romanian respectively Turkish language native speakers in Duisburg, too. All interviewers received proper training and were familiarised with the scientific goals of the project.

For practical and economic reasons the survey of each sample could only be conducted in one language. For the national samples this was the respective countries' most widely used official language. Romanian, respectively Turkish was used in the case of the surveyed migrant populations. Therefore, especially in the case of migrants with Turkish nationality, members of ethnic minorities might be underrepresented in the samples.

Random digit dialling (RDD) was used to sample national populations. The sampling of migrants was realised via linguistic screening of names in telephone directories (the so-called "onomastic procedure", Humpert and Schneiderheinze 2000). Only persons who were at least 18 years old, and fulfilled the above mentioned additional sampling criteria, could participate in the study. By default the interviews were conducted with the person in a given household whose birthday was the most recent and who fulfilled all sampling criteria of the respective sub-study.

The EUCROSS field period started in June 2012 and concluded in April 2013. There are two main reasons for this somewhat large time frame. The first cause is the simple fact that the fieldwork had to be suspended for two months during the summer due the holiday season and the resulting low participation rates.

However, more severe delays resulted from specific problems during the fieldwork. Particularly in the United Kingdom the willingness to take part in the survey was very low. Therefore, the sub-study of UK nationals was amongst the last EUCROSS national studies to be completed, even though it was the very first which went into the field.

While the data collection for all nationals was nevertheless finished by the second week of January 2013, some migrant samples were of especially high concern. Until then the progress in fieldwork for Turkish migrant samples in Italy and Romania as well as Turkish and Romanian migrant samples in the UK was comparatively low. One major problem had been that the total of telephone numbers for Turkish and Romanian migrants identified through the mentioned onomastic procedure was low right from the beginning, especially in these mentioned crucial cases. This was worsened by the fact that, in particular in the United Kingdom, a high amount of telephone numbers – taken from the most recent telephone register - was invalid. The number of potential participants was further reduced by the restrictions of the EUCROSS sampling frame, which excluded naturalised migrants of both nationalities. Since the UK does allow dual citizenship it could be assumed that a higher share especially of Turkish long term immigrants has taken on the nationality of this particular CoR compared to countries such as Germany. Furthermore, in Romania the name-based recruitment procedure had been complicated by a long established Turkish minority and, more generally, by the lack of a comprehensive telephone directory.

To counteract these problems different strategies were applied. In order to realise further interviews with the difficult-to-reach samples, SUZ started refusal conversion attempts and snowball sampling by mid December 2012. At the same time Turkish and Romanian online questionnaires were installed on the project website so that potential respondents who refused to take the telephone interview could participate online. Furthermore, the field institute acquired subsamples of address lists from commercial enterprises. However, all these approaches did not yield the hoped success.

The cooperation rate of CATI interviews for the nationals varied between 9 per cent in the United Kingdom and 38 per cent in Romania. <sup>33</sup> For the Romanian migrants it was between 29 per cent (Germany) and 67 per cent (Denmark). Finally, in the Turkish samples which were completed entirely in CATI mode the cooperation rate was at 23 per cent in Germany and 35 per cent in Denmark. The rates in the other three Turkish samples are significantly higher but as they refer to much smaller CATI samples and would therefore be misleading, we refrain from reporting them.

Ultimately, it was decided to pursue a face-to-face strategy in order to complete the Turkish migrant samples in Italy and Romania as well as both migrant samples in the UK. In all three countries these interviews were organised by members of the respective research teams. In Romania it became clear that almost no quantitative surveys of Turkish migrants had been undertaken before, pushing EUCROSS in a pioneering role. With the help of Ahmet Ecirli, one of the few scholars who had studied Turkish immigrants in Romania (Ecirli, Stănescu, and Dumitru 2011), the planned sample size could finally be realised.

The EUCROSS researchers in the respective countries oversaw the interviewer recruitment and were responsible for interviewer training. Since the face-to-face interviewers ultimately recruited the respondents a standardised set of instructions was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> For the calculation of each samples' cooperation rate the 'number of completed interviews' was divided by the sum of 'number of completed interviews' and 'refusals'.

drafted and had to be respected in order to guaranty data quality. Its central requirements were:

- Compliance with general sampling criteria of the respective sample;
- Inclusion of persons of both genders (samples should, in this regard, reflect the gender distribution of the community of Turks/Romanians in the respective country);
- Variation in terms of educational level and age;
- Limitation of interviews to one person per household.

Furthermore, all interviewers were instructed to sample persons from various backgrounds and not to sample larger groups at single events or venues. While it was sought that all of these interviews were conducted face-to-face, the interviewers in Romania and Italy were, in consultation with the EUCROSS researchers, able to realise a number of interviews in CATI mode.

Face-to-face interviews were conducted in the following cities:

Italy Brescia, Bologna, Como, Genoa, Milan, Modena,

Padua, Perugia, Peschiera del Garda, Rome,

Venice, Verona, Vicenza

UK (Romanian migrants) Brighton, Bristol, London, Manchester

UK (Turkish migrants) Brighton, Leeds, London, York

Romania Bucharest

The same standardised questionnaire – in its respective translation – was used in all interviews which were conducted as part of the EUCROSS study. The interview duration of the CATI interviews was at approximately 25 minutes for nationals and 28 minutes for the migrant samples.

Table 1 gives an overview of the realised samples and the mode in which the interviews were conducted.

**Table 1 Realised EUCROSS samples** 

Sample	CATI (SUZ)	CATI based snow ball sampling (SUZ)	Web based quest.	Face to face (local teams)	Skype or CATI (local teams)	Total
Nationals						
Denmark	1014					1014
Germany	1001					1001
Italy	1000					1000
Romania	1000					1000
Spain	1000					1000
United Kingdom	1001					1001
Romanian migrants in						
Denmark	250					250
Germany	250					250
Italy	250					250
Spain	250					250
United Kingdom	40	2		206		248
Turkish migrants in						
Denmark	250					250
Germany	252					250
Italy	44	5		179	22	250
Romania	17			186	47	250
United Kingdom	126	9	3	110		248

### The qualitative EUMEAN survey

# Sampling

The sampling of interviewees for the EUMEAN survey, the qualitative part of the EUCROSS project, is connected to the quantitative survey carried out beforehand. Its main intention is to gain in-depth knowledge regarding the cross-border activities and attitudes of highly transnational EUCROSS respondents.

The respondents of the EUMEAN qualitative survey were deliberately selected from among those with greater physical and virtual mobility experiences from within the pool of EUCROSS survey respondents. We constructed an additive transnationalism index by summing up the scores related to the following variables from the EUCROSS survey: residence in another country before the age of 18, frequency of trips abroad before the age of 18, residence in another country after the age of 18, frequency of trips abroad after the age of 18, number of friends living abroad (none, few, many), frequency of internet use, frequency of online purchase from another country, having property abroad and frequency of contact with colleagues or business partners in another countries. The

transnationalism index ranges from 0 to 16. However, very few respondents have scores above 10. Therefore, we defined the group of the 'most transnational respondents' as consisting of those individuals who received between 6 and 16 points on the index. Nevertheless, during sampling those respondents with scores higher than 9 were contacted with priority.

In each country, the sample included a balanced selection of respondents with diverse levels of education, gender and age. Educational titles were divided into the two categories "low" and "high". The classification is grounded upon the distribution of educational titles in each sample, that is, approx. 50% of each sample falls into category "low education", the other 50% into category "high education". Dividing the migrant samples into people with high and low education brought with it an additional challenge, since those respondents could have acquired their highest educational title either in the CoO or in the CoR. We therefore built two subsamples for each country and migrant group corresponding to the country (CoO or CoR) in which they received their highest educational title. These subsamples were then divided into respondents with "high" and "low education", as described above. The selection of EUMEAN interviewees was further balanced according to gender, aiming at having an equal number of female and male respondents (see Table 2). Although an equal distribution of age groups across transnationalism, education and gender categories was difficult to achieve, the EUMEAN sample in each country comprises at least one young adult (between 18-25 years old) and one senior respondent (older than 65) respectively.

**Table 2 EUMEAN sampling frame** 

	High transnationalism			
	Male	Female		
Low education	2-3	2-3		
High education	2-3	2-3		

Taken together, a total of 60 member-country nationals (ten in each surveyed country) were interviewed based on these criteria. In addition to these 60 interviews, a total of 50 Turkish migrants (based in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania and the UK) and 50 Romanian migrants (based in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) were interviewed. In a limited number of cases (Turks in Romania), it was not possible to draw respondents from the EUCROSS sample and a new random sample was drawn. The table below summarises the distribution of participants from each country. The interviews were completed between April 1<sup>st</sup> and October 1<sup>st</sup> 2013.

Table 3 Number of EUMEAN respondents by country of residence and origin

	Denmark	Germany	Italy	Romania	Spain	UK
Nationals	10	10	10	10	10	10
Turkish immigrants	10	10	10	10	-	10
Romanian immigrants	10	10	10	-	10	10

#### Guideline construction

The construction of the EUMEAN guidelines is connected to the broad topics covered by the quantitative survey. Nonetheless, the EUMEAN questionnaire aims at unveiling in more detail respondents' stories, emotions, their reasons and intentions for engaging in cross-border activities, as well as their interpretations of what they encounter. In this way, the question-answer information of the quantitative survey is contextualised and complemented by a deeper understanding of respondent's positioning regarding the topics involved. For this reason the questionnaire guide is a list of points to be explored by the interviewer rather than very specific questions applying the methodological principles for semi-structured interviews.

The topical fields of the guidelines are related to the main research hypothesis of the project regarding the connection between physical and virtual transnationalism and European identification.<sup>34</sup> These fields are: travel and holiday, social circle and opinions on cultural diversity, internet use, work and work-related transnational contacts, European identity and the role of the EU in managing the ongoing economic crisis. Although this last topic was not included in the initial definition of hypotheses, the socioeconomic context at the time of the interviews made it an important and salient issue that hinges upon the role of the EU and the different perceptions that exist among Europeans. Moreover, the questions on the European economic crisis are also meant to bring up front issues regarding the political dimension of European citizenship and connect it with respondents' transnational behaviour.

On the opening section (travels), different questions are discussed. The interview starts with a question about the first trip abroad to be followed by a question about first independent (from parents) trip abroad and another question regarding the most memorable trip. The notion of crossing borders is examined in different contexts (air travel vs. others) especially because this notion is very relevant to Turkish migrants. These questions are followed by further probes about emotions regarding the border-crossing and the experiences in the host countries. In the travel section of the qualitative interview a copy of the political map of Europe and the world is placed in front of the respondents and used as a visual aid. The map would be introduced with topics on travels

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> The EUMEAN interview guidelines for nationals and migrants are included in appendixes II and III of this chapter.

and used only if respondents would be happy to engage with it by drawing, talking to it etc. Such a map would also introduce questions about borders and their perceptions.

From the map the interview moves to persons with whom the respondent keeps in touch and to her/his internet use. Different ways of communicating, not explored within the quantitative survey, are addressed during the EUMEAN interview. Questions about foreign friends (persons respondents know best and who are from abroad) are included as well, inquiring how these relationships developed and how ties have been maintained. Since the interpretation of such terms always depend on the context the interviewer is reminded to be cautious when examining what 'person from abroad' could mean to migrant respondents.

The next section of the guidelines focuses on the respondents' work live and environment. It includes different probes regarding the description of the workplace, its diversity and its transnational outlook. Thus, respondents are asked in detail about foreign-born co-workers, connections with workers from other countries and work-related trips. The interviews are meant to capture not only the information on these topics, but rather respondents' perception regarding work in an international/transnational environment, its challenges and positive aspects.

Finally, the interview guide asks about the current crisis, from which it moves to attitudinal questions about the EU, political Europeanisation and political cosmopolitanism. A series of questions are posed in relation to the institutional level at which the crisis should be tackled, European integration and global governance. As specific question regarding knowledge about the EU, the questionnaire brings into discussion the EU Nobel Prize.

Given the time constraints of the qualitative interview, not all topics are given the same priority. More specifically, those topics that are extensively covered by the EUCROSS survey, such as internet use, are discussed in relation to social circles rather than a topic on its own. As well, political questions such as electoral and non-electoral participation in EU affairs are not treated in the interviews. Rather, the EUMEAN interview unveils less known political themes such as respondents' opinions on broader political issues such as economic crisis management, delegation and EU institutional legitimacy.

To sum up, the EUMEAN interviews build upon the EUCROSS survey both in terms of sampling and topics discussed. Nonetheless, the qualitative part of the project is aimed at revealing 'interesting and unique' stories and characters about intra-EU mobility, social connections and EU legitimacy rather than at just collecting detailed information. For this reason the interview follows a guideline and not a set of questions. Probes are given for interviewers, but their role is to detail the topics of the discussion rather than to constrain the respondents. During the qualitative data collection, interviewees' opinions, feelings and attitudes are the main concern and for this reason the guidelines are broadly formulated.

## Qualitative fieldwork

The geographic distribution of interview locations varied by country. In Spain, the respondents with higher transnationalism scores were mostly concentrated in Barcelona

and Madrid. In Denmark, the respondents came from urban areas such as Aarhus and Copenhagen, as well as from less cosmopolitan areas such as North Jutland. In Germany, the participants were mostly based in urban locations such as Berlin, Dresden, Karlsruhe and Leipzig, though some were located in smaller cities. Likewise, in Romania, most of the respondents with higher transnational scores were based in Bucharest, though others from Campina, Buzau, Timisoara, Brasov and Calarasi were also interviewed. In Italy, the geographic location of the respondents was quite disperse, including participants from several smaller cities to bigger and more cosmopolitan places like Milan and Rome.

To help respondents and encourage the use of visual memory, two maps were used: a 2013 World Map with national borders, and a 2013 map of Europe with national borders. In addition to the EU members, the latter map included non-EU member countries such as Turkey, Russia, Norway, Iceland, Ukraine and Belarus. The maps were printed on A3 size paper, and presented to the interviewee during the conversation.

Average duration of the interviews was about 1 hour and 20 minutes. The shortest interview lasted about 30 minutes while the longest recorded interview was about 2 hours and 40 minutes.

All nationals of respective countries were interviewed by native or near-native speakers who are members of the EUCROSS team. All of the interviewers are professional researchers holding or studying towards a PhD. The Turkish and Romanian migrants were interviewed by native speakers who travelled to the relevant countries to conduct face-to-face interviews with the participants.

All nationals of respective EU-member countries were interviewed in the official language of the country where they reside. Turkish migrants were interviewed in Turkish and Romanian migrants were interviewed in Romanian.

The transcription of the interviews were either done by team members of the EUCROSS team, or by native speakers of the language hired for this task. On most occasions, the translations were completed by the interviewers themselves and by bilingual translators where necessary. When the latter was the case, translated texts were double-checked by the respective EUCROSS team, verifying the accuracy of the English text with the original interview transcript.

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### **Appendix**

#### I) EUCROSS questionnaire

italics Comments, examples, answer categories or filters which are

not meant to be read out.

[words/abbreviations in

<<words/formulations/notes

square brackets]

Should be replaced by the corresponding word depending e.g. on the country where the questionnaire is used (e.g. [CoR])

Signal a filter or that the use of a specific formulation is

in angle brackets>> depending on a previous answer (e.g. "Which

<<country/countries>> were you thinking of?" → the use of

singular or plural depends on the pervious answer)

adapted Question just slightly changed (e.g. by adding a new answer

category)

inspired by New or significantly changed question (e.g. new wording of

the question itself and/or of answer categories)

Migrant item Grey shading signals that a specific item/answer category or

filter is used for migrant responds only. These are nationals who stated that they were not born in the CoR (question 1.5 is used as a filter) and all respondents of the migrant samples.

NOTE: INTERVIEWERS ARE REQUIRED TO READ ANSWERS ONLY WHEN INDICATED AFTER THE QUESTION.

### 1. Section: Screening Questions & Introduction

Good morning/afternoon/evening! My name is xxx. I'm calling from the "Social Survey Research Center" in Duisburg, Germany.

We are conducting an international research project on behalf of [consortium member; e.g., the University of York] and the European Commission comparing life and values in different European countries.

Your household has been selected to represent [CoR adjective] citizens.

Your household has been selected to represent [Romanian/Turkish] citizens who live in [CoR].

### 1.1. I would like to talk to a household member aged at least 18 who has the [CoR adjective] citizenship and had his or her birthday most recently?

I would like to talk to a household member aged at least 18 who was born in [CoO] and does not have [CoR] citizenship. Could I talk to the person who belongs to this group and had his or her birthday most recently?

Interviewer: If necessary specify that "adult" means any person that is at least 18 years old.

Not me, but person is coming  $\Rightarrow 1.2b$ ) It's me  $\Rightarrow 1.2$ 

Not available now⇒ Set appointmentNot available within field time⇒ Exit FormulaRefuses⇒ Exit FormulaDoesn't understand⇒ Exit FormulaNo one belongs to this group⇒ Exit FormulaNo private household⇒ Exit Formula

### 1.2. We would like to ask some questions on opinions about every-day life.

The participation in the survey is voluntary. Analysis and reporting of the survey data is completely anonymised. The interview will take about 15 minutes. Your opinion is really important for our research project. Therefore, we would be very grateful for your participation.

Could you spare a few moments to take part in our interview?

Yes 

⇒ 1.3

Not now, but later 

⇒ Set appointment

No 
⇒ Exit Formula

1.2.b) Good morning/afternoon/evening! My name is xxx. I'm calling from the "Social Survey Research Center" in Duisburg, Germany.

We are conducting an international research project on behalf of [consortium member; e.g., the University of York] and the European Commission comparing life and values in different European countries.

Your household has been selected to represent [CoR adjective] citizens.

Your household has been selected to represent [Romanian/Turkish] citizens who live in [CoR].

We would like to ask some questions on opinions about every-day life. The participation in the survey is voluntary. Analysis and reporting of the survey data is completely anonymised. The

interview will take about 15 minutes. Your opinion is really important for our research project. Therefore, we would be very grateful for your participation.

Could you spare a few moments to take part in our interview?

Yes 

□ 1.3

Not now, but later 

→ Set appointment

No 

→ Exit Formula

### 1.3. Firstly, in what year were you born?

19|\_\_|\_|

Only if the respondent states 1995 or a later year as year of birth  $\Rightarrow$  1.3 b

### 1.3.b) I am sorry, Sir/Madam, you are not part of our target group but is there anybody else in your household who is <u>18 years or older</u>?

Yes, person is coming  $\Rightarrow 1.2b$ ) Yes, several  $\Rightarrow 1.3.c$ )

Yes several but none available now 

⇒ Set appointment for the one

who had his/her birthday most

recently.

Not available within field time⇒ Exit FormulaRefuses⇒ Exit FormulaDoesn't understand⇒ Exit FormulaNo one belongs to this group⇒ Exit FormulaNo private household⇒ Exit Formula

### 1.3.c) Could I talk to the one who had his or her birthday most recently?

Yes, person is coming  $\Rightarrow$  1.2b)

Not available now  $\Rightarrow$  Set appointment

Not available within field time  $\Rightarrow$  Exit Formula

Refuses  $\Rightarrow$  Exit Formula

Doesn't understand  $\Rightarrow$  Exit Formula

No one belongs to this group  $\Rightarrow$  Exit Formula

No private household  $\Rightarrow$  Exit Formula

### 1.4. The citizenship of which country or countries do you hold?

Interviewer: As stated in the respondent's valid passport(s) and/or ID-cart(s). Multiple answers possible. Tick the corresponding country/-ies or region(s). If you are unsure to which region a country belongs, write down its name at the end of the list. This question is just about <u>current citizenships</u>, i.e. should the respondent mention that (s)he renounced the citizenship of a state do not tick it.

European Union (EU)		Lithuania		Other countries and areas	
Austria		Luxembourg		Turkey	
Belgium		Malta		Albania	
Bulgaria		Netherlands		Other European country	
Cyprus		Poland		USA	
Czech Republic		Portugal		Canada	
Denmark		Romania		Mexico	
Estonia		Slovakia		Central American country/ Caribbean	
Finland		Slovenia		South American country	
France		Spain			
Germany		Sweden		Australia/New Zealand	
Greece		United Kingdom		Asian country	
Hungary		Non-EU Schengen			
	_	countries	_		_
Ireland		Iceland		South Africa	
Italy		Norway		Other African country	
Latvia		Switzerland			
		(Source: r	iew)		
If not [CoR] but Turkey or Romania are among the countries If neither [CoR] nor Turkey or Romania are ticked				sed	
If [CoR] is one If Turkey/Ron		ked countries (or the only	one)	⇔ End of the interview ➾ Formula ⇔ End of the interview ➾ Formula	

### 1.5. In which country were you born?

Interviewer: Tick corresponding answer and the country or region. If you are unsure to which region a country belongs, write down its name at the end of the list. If the respondent states that (s)he was born in the Soviet Union or Yuqoslavia, please ask for the specific republic. In the case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Soviet Union) tick those, respectively tick Slovenia (Yugoslavia) if it applies. However, for all other republics tick only the corresponding region (e.g. "Other European country" if the respondent states that (s)he was born in the Yugoslav Republic Serbia). Tick United Kingdom if the respondent was born in England, Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. Tick Germany for the Federal Republic and the GDR.

The answer categories consist of the same country list as in question 1.4

# 1.5.1. In which year did you settle in [CoR]? |\_\_|\_\_|\_| (Source: EIMSS)

#### 1.6. What is your current marital status?

Interviewer: If the respondent states that (s)he is not married but in a relationship tick "Single, never been married" and tick "yes" in the next question.

Married / Living in a <u>legally registered</u> civil union	Ш	$\Rightarrow$	1.6.2
Separated (but still legally married)		$\Rightarrow$	1.6.1
Divorced (incl. dissolved legally registered civil		$\Rightarrow$	1.6.1
union)			
Widowed		$\Rightarrow$	1.6.1
Single, never been married		$\Rightarrow$	1.6.1
Don't answer		$\Rightarrow$	1.6.1

(Source: EIMSS, ESS)

#### 1.6.1. Do you currently have a partner?

Interviewer: It is not relevant whether the partner is living in the same household as the respondent or not.

	Yes No		⇒ 1.6.2 ⇒ Next section = 2.1			
		(So	urce: EIMSS, adapted)			
1.6.2.	2. Does your partner currently live in [CoR]?					
	Yes No		<ul><li>⇒ Next section = 2.1</li><li>⇒ 1.6.3</li></ul>			
		(So	urce: EIMSS, ESS F61)			

### 1.6.3. In which country does your partner currently live?

Interviewer: Tick respective country/region. If you are unsure to which region a country belongs, write down its name at the end of the list.

The answer categories consist of the same country list as in question 1.4

(Source: new)

### 2. SECTION: CROSS-BORDER PRACTICES

We would now like to ask some questions on your familiarity with other regions and countries.

	•		you live, are there one or more regions liar with – that is that you know well en					
	Interviewer: Read out list.							
	Yes, one Yes, two or more No Don't know		⇒ 2.2 ⇒ 2.2					
			(Source: new)					
2.1.1.	And why exactly < <is <="" it="" th=""><th>are th</th><th>ey&gt;&gt; familiar to you?</th><th></th></is>	are th	ey>> familiar to you?					
	Interviewer: Multiple answers possible. Tick category/categories which correspond to respondents answer. If the respondent just states that (s)he lived there, ask for elaboration.							
	Work Study Family/partner relationsl Friends Leisure, holidays Other Don't know	hips (ir	ncluding born there; grew up there)					
			(Source: new)					
2.2.			[CoR], are there one or more other countith – that is, that you know well enough					
	Interviewer: Read out lis	st.						
	Yes. one							

Yes, two or more No <i>Don't know</i>		⇒ 2.3/ 2.4 ⇒ 2.3/2.4	
		(Source: new)	
Which < <country countr<="" th=""><th>ries&gt;&gt; v</th><th>vere you thinking of?</th><th></th></country>	ries>> v	vere you thinking of?	
		Tick country/region. Multiple answers poss a country belongs, write down its name at th	-
The answer categories co	nsist o	f the same country list as in question 1.4	
		(Source: new)	
And why exactly is this c	ountry	/are those countries familiar to you?	
•	-	ossible. Tick category/categories which corre espondent just states that (s)he lived there, o	-
Work Study Family/partner relationsh Friends Leisure, holidays Other Don't know	nips (inc	cluding born there; grew up there)	

2.2.1.

2.2.2.

(Source: new)

2.3.	Why did	you decide	to settle in	[CoR]?

Interviewer: Do not read out list. Tick no more than two options in the right-hand column (first two mentioned). If respondent is vague, identify general category (left-hand column) and propose alternatives within that category (right-hand column). If the respondent migrated together with his/her parents when (s)he was a child(i.e. the migration was not his/her decision but the decision of the parents) tick "To live together with members of family of origin (e.g. parents)".

	To look for a job	
WORK	To accept a job offer	
	To start a business	
·	Because of my occupation (already employed)	
	To study in secondary school	
	To participate in a study exchange program (e.g. Erasmus)	
EDUCATION	To study at university level (undergraduate) (regular, not exchange)	
	To study at graduate/post-graduate/specialization level (regular, not exchange)	
	To do an internship	
	To learn [CoR language]	
	To gain new experiences	
QUALITY OF LIFE	To live in a better natural environment, enjoy natural	
	beauty	
	To live in a better/healthier weather, enjoy climate	
	To live in a culturally stimulating place (cultural	
	activities, international community, etc.)	
	To live together with members of family of origin (e.g.	
	parents)	
FAMILY/LOVE	To live together with partner/spouse/children	
	Other	
	Don't know	

(Source: EIMSS)

2.4.	< <apart [cor],="" and="" birth="" country="" from="" of="" your="">&gt; Have you ever lived in</apart>
	another country for three or more consecutive months before you turned
	18?

Yes	
No	⇒2.5

(Source: new, inspired by EUMARR)

#### 2.4.1. In which country or countries?

Interviewer: Don't read out list. Multiple answers possible. Tick all mentioned countries/regions. If you are unsure to which region a country belongs, write down its name at the end of the list. If the respondent states that (s)he lived in the Soviet Union or Yuqoslavia, please ask for the specific republic. In the case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Soviet Union) tick those, respectively tick Slovenia (Yugoslavia) if it applies. However, for all other republics tick only the corresponding region (e.g. "Other European country" if the respondent states that (s)he lived in the Yugoslav Republic Serbia). Tick Germany for the Federal Republic and the GDR.

The answer categories consist of the same country list as in question 1.4

(Source: new, inspired by EUMARR)

If respondent stated one country	⇒ 2.4.2 a
If respondent stated more than one country	⇒ 2.4.2 b

### 2.4.2. A) When did you live in this country?

Interviewer: Note year (e.g. 1998) or period (e.g. from 2003 to 2005). Note just the longest period, if the respondent stayed several times in the same country.

In	I_	_ _	(e.g. 1998	3)			
From _	_ _	_	to _	_	_ _	<u> </u>	

(Source: new)

### B) In which of these countries have you lived the longest and when did you live there?

Interviewer: Tick country and note year (e.g. 1998) or period (e.g. from 2003 to 2005). Note just the longest period, if the respondent stayed several times in the same country. Note the last one, if the respondent stayed abroad for several periods of the same duration.

The answer categories consist of the same country list as in question 1.4

In   _	(e.g. 1998)
From	to  _ _
	(Source: new)

	Interviewer: Read list. "All of birth.	broad" mear	ans all countries other than [CoR] and cou	ıntry	
	None				
	One				
	Two				
	3-5				
	6-10				
	More than 10				
	Don't know				
		(Source	ce: new)		
2.6.	<< Apart from [CoO] and	[CoR],>> H	Have you lived in another country for		
	three or more consecutive months since you turned 18?				
	Yes No	□ □ ⇒2.7	.7 / 2.8		

### 2.6.1. In which country or countries?

Interviewer: Don't read out list. Multiple answers possible. Tick all mentioned countries/regions. If the respondent states that (s)he lived in the Soviet Union or Yuqoslavia, please ask for the specific republic. In the case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Soviet Union) tick those, respectively tick Slovenia (Yugoslavia) if it applies. However, for all other republics tick only the corresponding region (e.g. "Other European country" if the respondent states that (s)he lived in the Yugoslav Republic Serbia). Tick Germany for the Federal Republic and the GDR.

(Source: EIMSS, adapted)

The answer categories consist of the same country list as in question 1.4

(Source: EIMSS, adapted)

If respondent stated one country	⇒ 2.6.2 a
If respondent stated more than one country	⇒ 2.6.2 b

### 2.6.2. A) When did you live in this country?

_	
	Interviewer: Note year (e.g. 1998) or period (e.g. from 2003 to 2005). Note just the
	longest period, if the respondent stayed several times in the same country.
	In     (e.g. 1998) From   to
	(Source: new)
B)	In which of these countries have you lived the longest and when did you live there?
	Interviewer: Tick country and note year (e.g. 1998) or period (e.g. from 2003 to
	2005). Note just the longest period, if the respondent stayed several times in the
	same country. Note the last one, if the respondent stayed abroad for several
	periods of the same duration.
	The answer categories consist of the same country list as in question 1.4
	In      <i>(e.g. 1998)</i> From    to

### 2.6.3. Why did you move there?

Interviewer: Do not read out list. Tick no more than two options in the right-hand column (first two mentioned). If respondent is vague, identify general category (left-hand column) and propose alternatives within that category (right-hand column).

(Source: new)

	To look for a job	
WORK	To accept a job offer	
	To start a business	
	Because of my occupation (already employed)	
	To study in secondary school	
	To participate in a study exchange program (e.g.	
	Erasmus)	
EDUCATION	To study at university level (undergraduate) (regular,	
	not exchange)	
	To study at graduate/post-graduate/specialization level	ı 🗆
	(regular, not exchange)	
	To do an internship	
	To learn [CoR language]	
	To gain new experiences	
QUALITY OF LIFE	To live in a better natural environment, enjoy natural	
	beauty	
	To live in a better/healthier weather, enjoy climate	
	To live in a culturally stimulating place (cultural	
	activities, international community, etc.)	
	To live together with members of family of origin (e.g.	
	parents)	
	To live together with partner/spouse/children	
FAMILY/LOVE	To live together with partner/spouse/children	
FAMILY/LOVE	Other	
FAMILY/LOVE	·	
FAMILY/LOVE	Other Don't know	
FAMILY/LOVE	Other	
	Other  Don't know  (Source: EIMSS)	
2.7. If you could	Other  Don't know  (Source: EIMSS)  significantly improve your work or living conditions, we	
2.7. If you could	Other  Don't know  (Source: EIMSS)	
2.7. If you could be willing to	Other  Don't know  (Source: EIMSS)  significantly improve your work or living conditions, we move back to your country of birth?	
2.7. If you could be willing to	Other	
2.7. If you could be willing to	Other	
2.7. If you could be willing to	Other	
2.7. If you could be willing to	Other	
2.7. If you could be willing to	Other	
2.7. If you could be willing to	Other	ould you
2.7. If you could be willing to	Other	ould you
2.7. If you could be willing to	Other	ould you
2.7. If you could be willing to 2.8. If you could be willing to	Other	ould you
2.7. If you could be willing to 2.8. If you could be willing to birth>>?	Other	ould you
2.7. If you could be willing to be willing to birth>>?	Other	ould you
2.7. If you could be willing to be willing to birth>>?	Other	ould you
2.7. If you could be willing to be willing to birth>>?	Other	ould you

	•	-	out programs as part o CoR] if born abroad).	of which the responde
Yes		П		
No.				
	't know			
		(Soi	rce: new)	
Imagine you ha months or more			lren, would you like t ry?	hem to spend three
Interviewer: Red	ad out list.			
Yes, d	lefinitely			
Mayb	e			
N1	ot at all			
No, n				
	know			
Don't	know	(Soi	rce: new)	
Don't Please think of many of these t	know trips abroa	(Sol	included at least one in the past 24 month	s?
Don't Please think of many of these t	trips abroatrips have v	(Soo ad which you had ountries	included at least on	s? vhich included at leas
Please think of many of these think of trone overnight st	trips abroatrips have verips other coay. How ma	(Social Social S	included at least one in the past 24 month than [CoR] and [CoO] v	vhich included at leasin the past 24 months
Please think of many of these think of trone overnight st.  Interviewer: Record of birth.	trips abroatrips have verips other coay. How ma	(Social Social S	included at least one in the past 24 month than [CoR] and [CoO] wese trips have you had ans all countries other	vhich included at leasin the past 24 months
Please think of many of these to the one overnight state of birth.	trips abroatrips have verips other coay. How ma	(Sociation	included at least one in the past 24 month than [CoR] and [CoO] wese trips have you had	vhich included at leasin the past 24 months
Please think of many of these to the one overnight state of birth.  None One	trips abroatrips have verips other coay. How ma	(Sociated which you had ountries any of the road" me	included at least one in the past 24 month than [CoR] and [CoO] wese trips have you had ans all countries other	vhich included at leasin the past 24 months
Please think of many of these to the please think of the control one overnight state of birth.  None one Two	trips abroatrips have verips other coay. How ma	(Sociated Spour Hades)  ountries  any of the  road" me	included at least one in the past 24 month than [CoR] and [CoO] wese trips have you had ans all countries other	vhich included at leasin the past 24 months
Please think of many of these to the one overnight state of birth.  None One Two 3-5	trips abroatrips have verips other coay. How ma	(Sociated which you had ountries any of the road" me	included at least one in the past 24 month than [CoR] and [CoO] wese trips have you had ans all countries other	vhich included at leasin the past 24 months
Please think of many of these to the please think of the control one overnight state of birth.  None one Two 3-5 6-10	trips abroatrips have varips other cay. How ma	(Sociated Spot Spot Spot Spot Spot Spot Spot Spot	included at least one in the past 24 month than [CoR] and [CoO] wese trips have you had ans all countries other	vhich included at leasin the past 24 months
Please think of many of these to the please think of the control one overnight state of birth.  None one Two 3-5 6-10	trips abroatrips have verips other cay. How man ad list. "Aba	(Sociated which you had ountries any of the road" me	included at least one in the past 24 month than [CoR] and [CoO] wese trips have you had ans all countries other	vhich included at leasin the past 24 month

2.9. Have you ever (e.g. as student or during your professional career)

### 2.11.1. Which country or countries did you visit?

	Interviewey Tiels all montioned source	tuing/uggiang NAultinla maguyan nagibla	<u> </u>		
	Interviewer: Tick all mentioned countries/regions. Multiple answers possible. If you				
	are unsure to which region a country belongs, write down its name at the end of the list.				
	the list.				
	The answer categories consist of the	same country list as in question 1.4			
	(Sour	ce : new)			
2.11.2	2. Which were the main reasons for th	ose trips?			
	Interviewer: Multiple answers possib	le			
	Vacations (including short and week-end	d trips etc.)			
	To visit friends and/or relatives				
	Other <u>private</u> reasons				
	Professional reasons (e.g. business trips	conferences)			
	Education (e.g. language classes, interns	hips)			
	Volunteering (e.g. doing unpaid work fo	r an NGO)			
	Other				
	Don't know				
	(Source: Transnationalisierung sozia	ler Beziehungen [Steffen Mau], adapted)			
	Placeholder: Item 2.12 was delete and not included in the field version	d from the questionnaire after pre-te on.	sts		
	•	bers, in-laws and friends you have whow many are originally from other	10		
	Interviewer: Read out list.				
	A lot				
	A few				
	None $\square$				
	Don't know □				

I would like to know						
Interviewer: Read out lis	st one by	one.				
How many are originally from you of birth?	ur country		lot <i>i</i>	A few	None	Don't know □
And how many are from [CoR]? And how many are originally fron countries?	n other		]			
	(Source: n	ew, inspire	ed by EIM	SS)		
2.14. Do you have any family [CoR]?	y memb	ers, in-la	aws or	friends	s who l	ive outside
Yes No			⇒2.21 ource: ne	ew)		
2.15. Please think about thosother countries.	se famil	y memb	ers, in-	-laws a	nd frie	nds who live in
Interviewer: Read out I question and country lis		-				
	A lot	A few	None	Don't	know	In which country or countries are they living?
How many are originally from your country of birth and also live there?					]	
How many are from your country of birth but live neither there nor in [CoR]?				C	]	<ul><li>             ⇒ country list q             1.4 (Multiple             answers             possible.)         </li></ul>
How many are originally from [CoR] and live in another country?					]	⇒ country list q   1.4 (Multiple   answers   possible.)
And how many are from other countries than [CoR] << and your country of birth >> and live in other countries than [CoR]?					]	⇒ country list q 1.4 (Multiple answers possible.)

Please think about all family members, in-laws and friends you have who live in [CoR].

(Source: new, inspired by EIMSS)

## 2.16. Please think about the last 12 months: How frequently did you talk to family members, in-laws and friends abroad by phone or using your computer?

	•				
	Interviewer: Read out list. Tick "never" if the respondent does not use any of these ways of communication in general. By communication using a computer we are				
	, , ,	pe or Google talk, including video chat etc.			
	Every day				
	At least once a week				
	At least once a month				
	Less often				
	Never				
	Don't know				
	(Source:	new)			
2.17.	And how frequently did you commur	nicate with them by mail or e-mail?			
		if the respondent does not use any of these nis question is still referring to the last 12			
	Every day At least once a week				
	At least once a week  At least once a month				
	Less often				
	Never				
	Don't know				

(Source: new)

### 2.18. And how frequently via social networks? (e.g. Facebook, Hi5, Google+ etc)

Interviewer: Read out list. Tick "never" if the ways of communication in general. This quenonths.	•
Every day At least once a week At least once a month Less often Never Don't know (Source: new)	
2.19. How well did you speak [CoR language] v	vhen you arrived here?
Interviewer: Read out list.	
Almost as well as native language Quite well Just so-so Poorly Not at all Don't know	
(Course FIMSS ada	ntadl
(Source: EIMSS, ada	ptea)
2.20. And how well do you speak [CoR language	ge] now?
Interviewer: Read out list.	
Almost as well as native language Quite well Just so-so Poorly Not at all Don't know	
(Source: EIMSS,	
2.21. Is [official language of CoR] your native la	anguage?
Is [official language of CoO] your native lang	uage?
Yes No	□

(Source: new)

### 2.21.1. What is your native language?

	Interviewer: Don' list, if it is missing		Tick <u>only one</u> i	language or add it at t	the end of the
Albaniar	1 -	Hungarian		Slovenian	
Arabic		Irish		Spanish (castellano)	
Basque		Italian		Swedish	
Catalan		Japanese		Turkish	
Chinese		Kurdish		Welsh	
Cornish		Latin			
Czech		Latvian			
Danish		Lithuanian			
Dutch		Norwegian			
English		Polish			
Estoniar	1 🗆	Portuguese			
Finnish		Romanian			
French		Russian			
Galician		Scots			
German		Scottish Gaeli			
Greek		Slovak			
		(	Source: new)		

Ask question 2.21.2 only if the respondent was not born in [CoR] (q 1.5) or if [official CoR language] is not his/her native language (q 2.21)

### 2.21.2. Which language do you speak at home most of the time (i.e., with the members of the household you live in)?

Interviewer: Only the language which is primarily spoken in the respondent's household should be ticked. Only if the respondent insists that it is impossible for him/her to determine one language that is more often used than another tick two.

The answer categories consist of the same language list as in question 2.22.1

(Source: new)

le	n general, irrespective of the level of you earned any other language besides < <you anguage="" cor]?<="" of="" th=""><th></th><th></th></you>		
o	n general, irrespective of the level of your krother language besides << [official language ond [official language]		
	Yes	•	
	No	ļ	⇒ 2.23
	(Source: new)		
2.22.1.	Which other language or languages have yo	u lear	ned?
	Interviewer: Don't read out list. This quest respondent might have learned at any point of current knowledge in them. Tick all mention at the end of the list.	of his	/her life, irrespective of the level
	The answer categories consist of the same la	nguac	ge list as in question 2.22.1
L	(Source: new)		γ
	If the respondent stated one language		⇒ 2.22.3 ⇒ 2.22.3
	If the respondent stated two or more languages		⇒ 2.22.2
2.22.2.	And which of these do you speak best?		
	Interviewer: Tick only one language.		
	The answer categories consist of the same la	กฐนลดู	ge list as in question 2.22.1
2.22.3.	And how well do you speak this language?		
	Interviewer: Read out list.		
	Almost as well as native language Quite well Just so-so Poorly Not at all		
	Don't know		
	(Source: EIMSS, adap	oted)	

	Please think about all private <u>and</u> business related messages you received by e-mail and, if you use them, via social networking sites during the last 12 months. Approximately which percentage of them came from abroad (excluding spam and junk messages)?						
	Interviewer: Note estimated percentage. If necessary specify that respondents should think about all their accounts (e.g. private as well as professional ones) and that she/he does not need to give an accurate number but an estimate only.						
	Approximately   _	_   %					
	I don't use the Internet						
	In the last 12 months, have you in your sorganization or group which is oriented to cultures? (e.g. voluntary relief organization etc.)	towards other countries or					
	Yes						
	No						
	(Source: new,						
	Do you ever send money abroad for reas or services?	sons other than purchasing goods					
	Interviewer: This does not include donations.						
	Yes						
	No	□					
	(Source: National Immigrant Surv	ey [Spain], adapted)					
2.25.1	How often?						
	Interviewer: Read out list.						
	At least once a month At least once a year Less than once a year Don't know						
	(Source: National Immigrant Survey [Spain], adapted)						

### 2.25.2. Who do you send money to?

			latives.	
Partner				
Close relative	es (i.e. parents, siblings, children)			
Other relative	es			
Other person				
To an own ba	ank account			
	(Source: National Immigrant Survey [			
	months, have you received mountry? If yes, could you tell mo	•		ie who is liv
Interviewer:	Multiple answers possible.			
Yes, from				
	my partner			
	close relatives (i.e. parents, sibli	ngs, chil	ldren)	
	other relatives	0 /	,	
	other persons			
No				
	(Source: new)			
Do you < <or country?</or 	(Source: new) your partner>> own property i	in [CoO	], [CoR] or a	nother
country?		in [CoO	], [CoR] or a	inother
country?	your partner>> own property i	in [CoO	], [CoR] or a	
Interviewer:	your partner>> own property i		⇒2.28, if "	in another
Interviewer:	your partner>> own property i		⇒2.28, if " countr ⇒2.28, i	in another y" is not ticke f "in ano
Interviewer: Yes, in [CoO] Yes, in [CoR]	your partner>> own property i		⇒2.28, if " countr ⇒2.28, i	in another y" is not ticke f "in ano
Interviewer:  Yes, in [CoO]  Yes, in [CoR]  Yes, in another	your partner>> own property i		⇒2.28, if " countr ⇒2.28, i countr	in another y" is not ticke f "in ano
Interviewer: Yes, in [CoO] Yes, in [CoR]	your partner>> own property i  Multiple answers possible.  er country		⇒2.28, if " countr ⇒2.28, i	
Yes, in [CoO] Yes, in [CoR] Yes, in anothe	your partner>> own property i  Multiple answers possible.  er country  (Source: EUMARR, adap		⇒2.28, if " countr ⇒2.28, i countr	in another y" is not ticke f "in ano
Yes, in [CoO] Yes, in [CoR] Yes, in anothen	your partner>> own property i  Multiple answers possible.  er country  (Source: EUMARR, adap	□ □ □ □ □ □ ted)	⇒2.28, if " countr ⇒2.28, i countr	in another y" is not ticke f "in ano y" is not ticke
Interviewer: Yes, in [CoO] Yes, in [CoR] Yes, in anothen	your partner>> own property i  Multiple answers possible.  er country  (Source: EUMARR, adap	ted)	⇒2.28, if " countr ⇒2.28, i countr ⇒2.28	in another y" is not ticke f "in ano y" is not ticke

(Source: new)

	Thinking about the last 12 m services from sellers or provexample, via websites, mail,	iders w	no were loc			. •	
	Interviewer: This question is just about goods/services the respondent purchased her-/himself while being physically located in [CoR]. Neither purchases made by family members nor shopping trips abroad etc. are included.						
	Yes l No l		⇒2.29				
	(Source: in	spired by l	Eurobarometer	69.1)			
2.28.1	. In which countries were thes	e sellers	or providers	locat	ed?		
	Interviewer: Multiple answers	possible	. Tick respec	tive c	ategor	ry/categories.	
	The answer categories consist of	the same	country list o	as in qu	ıestion	1.4	
	(Source: ins	spired by E	urobarometer	69.1)			
	Do you, in general, follow sp internet)?	orts in t	the media (	e.g., 1	√V, ra	dio, newspapers,	1
	Interviewer: Read out list. If broadcasts on TV	necessai	ry give as ex	cample	e: e.g.	by watching spor	rts
	No Yes, at least once a week Yes, at least once a month Yes, but less often Don't know			- ] ] ]	<ul><li>⇒ 2.</li><li>⇒ 2.</li></ul>		
		(Source	e: new)				
2.29.1	And do you follow sports or [CoO] and [CoR] (e.g. water Formula-One world champion	hing m				_	
	Interviewer: Read out list.						
	No Yes, at least once a week Yes, at least once a month Yes, but less often Don't know	/Saurea		] ] ]			
		(Source	. new)				

2.30. The following question is about TV content (e.g. movies, sitcoms, news broadcasts etc.) in other languages than [official CoR language] << and your native language>>:

The following question is about TV content (e.g. movies, sitcoms, news broadcasts etc.) in other languages than [official CoR language] <<, your native language>> and [official CoO language]:

How often do you watch TV content which is in another language and <u>has not been dubbed</u>, either directly on TV or via the Internet?

Interviewer: Read out list. Content which is subtitled BUT NOT DUBBED also counts as foreign language content. DVD content is included as well.					
Every day					
At least once a week					
At least once a month					
Less often					
Never					
Don't know □					
(S	ource: new)				
On a scale from one to five, who	ere one means "Not at all" and five means				

2.31. On a scale from one to five, where one means "Not at all" and five means "Very much", how much do you like the following kinds of music?

Interviewer: Read out list one by one. Tick "don't know" also if the respondent does not know any songs of the type.

	1 Not at all	2	3	4	5 Very Much	Don't know
World music (e.g. Brazilian, African, Caribbean, Middle Eastern)						
Classical music						
Jazz and Blues						
Traditional and folk music from [COR]						
Traditional and folk music from other European countries						
Metal						
Pop						
Rock Hip-hop and R'n'B						
THE HOP GHO IT IT D	_	_	_	_	_	_

(Source: new, inspired by EUMARR)

### 2.32. Please think about foreign cuisine, i.e., all which is originally from outside [CoR]. Which national cuisines do you like best?

Interviewer: Multiple answers possible. Tick the first three countries (or respective regions) mentioned. Regarding nationals the CoR and regarding migrants the respective CoO are not valid answers. However, you can tick the CoR in the case of migrant respondents.

The answer categories consist of the same country list as in question 1.4				
I don't like/eat any foreign dishes Don't know				
(Source: new, inspired	by EUMARR)			

2.33. On a scale from one to five, where one means very dissatisfied and five means very satisfied: How satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays - all things considered?

1	2	3	4	5	
very dissatisfied				very satisfied	Don't know

(Source: EIMSS, ESS, adapted)

# 3. SECTION: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION AND COSMOPOLITAN VALUES

3.1. On a scale from one to five, where one means "strongly disagree" and five means "strongly agree", please tell me how much you agree with the following statements?

Interviewer: Read out list	one by or	ne.					
	1 strongly disagree	2 Agree	3 Neither agree nor disagree	4 Disagree	5 strongly agree	Don't know	
el as a citizen of the town where I							
el as a citizen of the [region] ere I live							
ere rilve el [CoR] el European el as a citizen of the world							
	(Source: El	UMARR, a	dapted)				
2. Do you consider yoursel	f as being	g					
Interviewer: Read out list	·						
[CoR] only [CoR] and European and European only Don't know	[CoR]						
above and states instea	Interviewer: If the respondent <u>refuses</u> to choose any of the categories mentione above and states instead one of the following, tick the corresponding option <u>HOWEVER</u> , <u>DO NOT READ THESE OPTIONS!</u>						
Regional identity European and Regional only (e Country of birth European and Co	egional ide .g., [examp and Europ ountry of b	ntity (e.g le]) ean	-				

Interviewer: Read out list.						
[CoO] only [CoO] and European European and [CoO] European only Don't know						
Interviewer: If the respondent <u>refuses</u> to choose any of the above and states instead one of the following, tick the <u>HOWEVER, DO NOT READ THESE OPTIONS!</u>	_					
Regional identity (e.g., [example]) and European European and Regional identity (e.g., [example]) Regional only (e.g., [example]) [CoR] and European European and [CoR] [CoR] only [CoO] and [CoR] [CoR] and [CoO]						
(Source: EIMSS, Eurobarometer, adapted)						
3.3. If you hear the term "Europe", which of the following to your mind first?	3. If you hear the term "Europe", which of the following is most likely to come					
Interviewer: Read out list. Tick just one answer!						
The European continent The European Union A shared European culture and history The Christian Religion None of these Don't know						
(Source: new)						

Note: Item 3.4 was not included in the Turkish questionnaire.

3.4.	Did you vote in the last elections of the	European Parliament in Ju	ne 2009?
	Yes		
	No		
	Don't know		
	(Source: EIMSS,	Muxel)	
3.5.	Did you vote in the last general election	ns in [CoR] in [month and ye	ear]?
	Yes		
	No		
	Don't know		
	(Source: EIMSS,	Muxel)	
3.6.	Please think about the last seven days. Union or an image of the flag during the	,	European
	Yes		
	No		⇒ 3.7
	Don't know		
	(Source: ne	N)	
3.6.1	. And where did you see the flag of the Eu	ropean Union?	
	Interviewer: Multiple answers possible.		
	ag as such (e.g., in front of a public building, ewspaper picture)	during a TV broadcast, in a	
<u>Pi</u>	ictogram		
	on <u>license plates</u> of cars		
	on money (i.e., EURO paper money	and coins)	
	on passport, <u>ID cards</u>		
	on <u>drivers licenses</u>		
	in official publications or documen	ts of state or EU institutions	П
	(i.e., everything that has been publ	ished by those institutions)	Ц
0	ther		
	(Source: ne	N)	

3.7.	In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Which of the
	following positions best describes your political outlook?

Interviewer: Read out list. Tick "left and right do not exist anymore" only if the respondent makes an explicit statement in this sense (i.e., this differentiation is not						
relevant anymore etc.). If the respondent is	simply unable or reluctant to chose one					
of the existing categories - without ques	tioning them in general - tick "don't					
know".						
Left						
Centre-Left	Ш					
Centre						
Centre-Right						
Right						
Left and right do not exist anymore						
Don't know						
(Source: EIMSS, ESS, a	dapted)					

3.8. On a scale from one to five, where one means "strongly disagree" and five means "strongly agree": Please tell me how much you agree with each of the following statements.

Interviewer: Read out	t items one	by one.				
	1 strongly disagree	2 Agree	3 Neither agree nor disagree	4 Disagree	5 strongly agree	Don't know
It is a good thing for a society to be made up of people from different ethnic groups, religions and cultures.						
Increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging national and local cultures.						

(source: EUCROSS WP #2, p. 42; ISSP 2013)

3.9.	The European Union has various aims. On a scale from one to five, where
	one means "not at all important" and five means "very important", please
	tell me for each of them how important they are from your point of view.

1	2	3	4	5	Don'
strongly disagree	Agree	Neither agree nor	Disagree	strongly agree	knov
	strongly disagree	strongly Agree disagree	strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree	strongly Agree Neither Disagree agree nor disagree	strongly disagree Agree Neither Disagree strongly agree nor disagree

3.10. On a scale from one to five, where one means "strongly disagree" and five means "strongly agree": Please tell me how much you agree with each of the following statements.

Interviewer: Read o	out list one by	y one.				
	1 strongly disagree	2 Agree	3 Neither agree nor disagree	4 Disagree	5 strongly agree	Don't know
The EU should not continue to accept new member states.						
EU institutions should transfer some of their decision-making power back to the member states.						

(source: new)

3.11	3.11. I am now going to read to you the names of some countries. Please tell me whether you think that it would be a good or bad idea to admit each of them to the European Union. Please use a scale from one to five, where one means "very bad idea" and five means "very good idea"							
	Would it be a go	ood or a bad i	dea to adn	nit				
	What about	Turkey Croatia	1 Very bad idea □ □	2	3	4	5 Very good idea	Don't know
	and and	Ukraine Norway	□ □ (source:	new)				
3.12	3.12. Now, still using the same scale, I would like to ask you a similar question in retrospect: For each of the following countries, do you think that it was a good or a bad idea to admit them to the European Union.							
	Was it a good o	r a bad idea to				_	_	5 /·
			1 Very bad idea	2	3	4	5 Very good idea	Don't know
	What about and and	Finland Greece Poland Bulgaria	□ □ □ (Source:	□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □	_ _ _		_ _ _	_ _ _
3.13. Imagine that another [country's relevant administrative district or region] was struck by a natural disaster. Who do you think should make financial contributions to its reconstruction?								
	Interviewer: Ro		•	efers to	any oth	er regior	in [CoR] t	han the
	Only the respective [country's relevant administrative district or region]  [CoR] as a whole  Don't know							

(source: new, inspired by EUMARR)

3.14. Now please ima struck by a natu contributions to	ral disaste	r. Who do			•	
Interviewer: Red	ıd list					
Only the respective country All member states of the European Union Don't know					_ _ _	
(Source: new, inspired by EUMARR)						
3.15. The EU member states are currently pooling national state funds to help EU countries having difficulties in paying their debts. On a scale from one to five, where one means "strongly disagree" and five means "strongly agree": Please tell me how much you agree with this measure?						
1 strongly disagree	2	3	4	5 strongly agree	Don't know	
0, 0		(source	:: new)	0, 0		
3.16. If you were told would you be so					n dissolved,	
Sorry Indifferent Relieved <i>Don't know</i>						
(Source: Eurobarometer, adapted)						

### 4. Section: Demographics

Finally, we would like to ask some questions about you and your family members' education and occupation.

⇒ 4.1 a ⇒ 4.1 b ⇒ 4.1 a

#### 4.1. What is the highest level of education you have achieved? Note: This battery was adapted for each country. Not completed primary education П Primary education **GCSEs** П A or AS Levels **GNVQ** or Apprenticeship Undergraduate Degree П Post-Graduate Degree Don't know (source: EIMSS, ESS, adapted) 4.2. Which of these descriptions applies best to your CURRENT situation? Interviewer: Read out underlined words. Tick the corresponding of the first two options also if the respondent is working without a regular contract. In full time paid work(or away temporarily) (employee, self- □ ⇒ 4.4 employed, working for your family business, military service, civil/community service) In part time paid work(or away temporarily) (employee, self- $\Box$ ⇒ 4.4 employed, working for your family business, civil/community service) <u>In education</u>, even if on vacation (not paid for by employer) П Unemployed П Retired Doing housework, looking after children or other persons Other (e.g. permanently sick or disabled) П Don't know (Source: EIMSS, ESS adapted) 4.3. Have you ever had a paid job? П ⇒4.4 Yes П ⇒4.7 No (Source: inspired by EIMSS) 4.4. In your main job you <<are/were...>>? Interviewer: Read out list. An employee Self-employed П Working for your family business Don't know

214

(Source: EIMSS, ESS F12)

	Siah (naufaus				
Interviewer: If not mentioned, ask for details on content of activities) and position in the work place (organizational rabut teacher of math in high school; not clerk, but cashier in sergeant of infantry; not blue-collar worker, but building for	nnk). E.g.: not teacher, n a bank; not soldier, but				
Don't know					
(Source: EIMSS, ESS)					
If the respondent does currently not have a paid work (q 4.2)	<b>⇒</b> 4.7				
In your work, how often did you interact with partners, clients, colleagues) who are located in anoth during the last 12 months?					
Interviewer: Do not read categories. Tick corresponding specify that this question is not about the nationality of colleagues etc. but just about their location. This questions physical meetings but also telephone and e-mail contact expressions.	of the respective clients, stion is not only abou				
Every day					
At least once a week					
At least once a month					
Less often					
Never					
Don't know					
(Source: new)					
What was the national citizenship of your father at his	s birth?				
• •					
Interviewer: Don't read out list. Tick respective country/r possible. If you are unsure to which region a country below at the end of the list. Tick Germany for the Federal Republi	region. Multiple answer ngs, write down its name				
possible. If you are unsure to which region a country belor	region. Multiple answer ngs, write down its name c and the GDR.				
possible. If you are unsure to which region a country below at the end of the list. Tick Germany for the Federal Republi The answer categories consist of the same country list as in que	region. Multiple answer ngs, write down its name ic and the GDR. stion 1.4				
possible. If you are unsure to which region a country belor at the end of the list. Tick Germany for the Federal Republi	region. Multiple answer ngs, write down its name c and the GDR.				

4.5. What <<is/was>> the name or title of your main job?

### 4.8. What is the highest level of education your father has achieved? Note: This battery was adapted for each country. Not completed primary education П Primary education **GCSEs** A or AS Levels П **GNVQ** or Apprenticeship Undergraduate Degree Post-Graduate Degree Don't know Note: For the migrant surveys the Romanian/Turkish battery was used and the following interviewer instruction included. Interviewer note: If the respondent's father did not receive his highest degree in Turkey, ask the respondent to state the Turkish educational title which is the equivalent of it. (Source: EIMSS, ESS) 4.9. What was the national citizenship of your mother at her birth? Interviewer: Don't read out list. Tick respective country/region. Multiple answers possible. If you are unsure to which region a country belongs, write down its name at the end of the list. Tick Germany for the Federal Republic and the GDR. The answer categories consist of the same country list as in question 1.4

(Source: new)

Don't know

# 4.10. What is the highest level of education your mother has achieved? Note: This battery was adapted for each country. Not completed primary education П Primary education П **GCSEs** A or AS Levels **GNVQ** or Apprenticeship Undergraduate Degree Post-Graduate Degree Don't know П Note: For the migrant surveys the Romanian/Turkish battery was used and the following interviewer instruction included. Interviewer note: If the respondent's mother did not receive his highest degree in Turkey, ask the respondent to state the Turkish educational title which is the equivalent of it. (Source: EIMSS, ESS) 4.11. When you were 14, did your father or your mother contribute financially the most to the household income? Father Mother □ ⇒ 4.14 Other □ ⇒ 4.14 Don't know (source: new) 4.12. When you were 14, was your << father/mother>> ...

Interviewer: Read out list.	
An employee	□
Self-employed	□
Not working	□ ⇒ 4.14
<i>Don't know</i>	□ ⇒ 4.14

(Source: EIMSS, ESS F46, adapted)

# 4.13. What was the name or title of <<his/her>> job then?

Interviewer: If not mentioned, ask for details on content of j activities) and position in the work place (organizational ran but teacher of math in high school; not clerk, but cashier in but sergeant of infantry; not blue-collar worker, but building	k). E.g.: not teacher, a bank; not soldier,
(Source: EIMSS, ESS F12)	
Don't know	
4.14. Which of the following descriptions comes closest to your how well off the household you were living in was when y old?	
Interviewer: Read out list.	
We were living very comfortably on the money we had We were living comfortably on the money we had We made ends meet We found it difficult We found it very difficult Don't know	
(Source: inspired by ESS)	
Interviewer: If the respondent is neither married/living in a registered civil union (screen another romantic partnership (q1.6.1) skip the following questions 4.15–4.22 and go	01 1 /
4.15. Is your partner male or female?	
Male Female	
(Source: EIMSS)	leter 2
4.16. Since when have you and your partner been in a relations	nip?
Less than one year	
(Source: ISSP 2012, N34, adapted)	

# 4.17. What was the national citizenship of your partner at <<his/her>> birth?

Interviewer: Don't read list. Tick respective country/region. Multiple answers possible. If you are unsure to which region a country belongs, write down its name at the end of the list. Tick Germany for the Federal Republic and the GDR.

The answer categories consist of the same country list as in question 1.4				
Don't know				
(Source: new)				
4.18. What is the highest level of education your partner has achieved?				
Not completed primary education				
Primary education				
GCSEs				
A or AS Levels				
GNVQ or Apprenticeship				
Undergraduate Degree				
Post-Graduate Degree				
Don't know				
Note: This battery was adapted for each country. The Romanian/Turkish battery of				
educational titles was used if the answer to item 4.17 was R	omania (Romanian migrant			
sample) or Turkey (Turkish migrants sample).				
Not completed primary education				
Primary education				
GCSEs				
A or AS Levels				
GNVQ or Apprenticeship				
Undergraduate Degree				
Post-Graduate Degree				
Don't know				
(Source: EIMSS)				

# 4.19. Which of these descriptions best describes your current partner's situation?

	Interviewer: Read out underlined words. Tick the corresponding of the first two options also if the respondent partner is working without a regular contract.					
	In full time paid work(or away temporarily) (employee, self- employed, working for your family business, military service, civil/community service)		⇒ 4.21			
	In part time paid work(or away temporarily) (employee, self- employed, working for your family business, civil/community service)		⇒ 4.21			
	In education, even if on vacation (not paid for by employer) Unemployed Retired					
	Doing housework, looking after children or other persons Other (e.g. permanently sick or disabled) Don't know					
	(Source: EIMSS, ESS adapted)					
4.20. Has your partner ever had a paid job?						
	Yes					
	No		4.23			
	(Source: new)					
4.21.	4.21. In < <his her="">&gt; main job your partner &lt;<is was="">&gt;</is></his>					
	Interviewer: Read out list.					
	Self-employed	<u> </u>				
	Training for may her running addition	_ _				
		_				
	(Source: EIMSS, ESS F12)					

# 4.22. What <<is/was>> the name or title of your partner's main job?

act but	erviewer: If not mentioned, ask for details on convivities) and position in the work place (organizational teacher of math in high school; not clerk, but cashier is geant of infantry; not blue-collar worker, but building for	rank). E.g.: not teacher, in a bank; not soldier, but			
Don	't know				
	(Source: EIMSS, ESS)				
	ch of the following descriptions comes closest to leave well off your household is today?	how you feel about			
Inte	erviewer: Read out list.				
We We We	are living very comfortably on the money we have are living comfortably on the money we have make ends meet find it difficult find it very difficult are know				
	(Source: ESS, adapted)				
	4.24. Have you ever felt discriminated against in [CoR] because you were born in another country?				
Inte	erviewer: Read out list.				
Yes Yes	never , sometimes , frequently n't know (Source: EIMSS, adapted)				
4.25. Are	you male or female?				
	erviewer: ASK ONLY IF NECESSARY BUT TICK IN ANY CAS	SE			
		<u></u>			
Mal Fem					
	(Source: EIMSS, ESS)				

# Semi-structured interview questions for nationals EUMEAN GUIDELINES FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS (for Nationals)

#### Notes to the interviewer:

- EUMEAN is the second stage of the EUCROSS project, which examines the
  relationship between the activities of EU residents (nationals, mobile EU citizens,
  and third-country nationals) across the borders of nation states and their
  collective identities. In the first stage, a quantitative survey was carried out among
  nationals, intra-EU movers (Romanian citizens) and third-country nationals
  (Turkish citizens) who reside in six European countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy,
  Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom). In the second stage of this project, our
  goal is to explore and unpack the meaning given by individuals to cross-border
  practices, their collective identifications, and the role that the European Union,
  globalization, and the nation play in these personal narratives.
- We will be interviewing nationals of <COUNTRY> as well as Turkish and Romanian migrants. The questions are relevant for participants from all three groups.
- Throughout the interview, our specific goal is to <u>identify an event/story</u> that involves a transnational experience and unpack the <u>reasons</u>, <u>emotions</u> and <u>intentions</u> attached to it.

# 1) Introduction (3-5 minutes)

[[To the interviewer: Introduce yourself and your organization, briefly summarize the goals of this study. Begin with some general questions to get to know the respondent and establish a rapport with him/her]]

# Probes:

*Information about the EUCROSS consortium*: participating institutions

**<u>Process</u>**: Confidentiality; no right or wrong answers; audio recording

Subject: Transnational experiences, broadly defined

# 2) Travel practices / Leisure time activities

# Travel

[[To the interviewer: Place the map on the table before the conversation. Make sure to ask Qa, b, c, d. Try to maintain a natural flow of the conversation, and make use of the probes as necessary. Be sensitive to the type of trip the respondent is talking about—and be ready to probe into another, more meaningful trip.]

Now, we would like to know more about your travel experiences.

a. Please tell me about the first trip/stay abroad that you can remember well.

# Probes:

- How did you go there?
- How did it feel to move between countries?
- Who was traveling with you?
- Where did you stay?
- What did you like and did not like in the place?
- What did you do there?
- Was this a good or bad experience?
- How did you get around?
- What did you like and did not like about the people in this country?
- Did you think about similarities and differences between this country and your country?
- Did anybody from your group meet new people in the country that you were visiting?
- Did you do any shopping? What did you buy, if anything?
- b. Tell me about the first trip/stay abroad independently/as a young adult (i.e. without your parents)

# Probes:

- How did it feel to travel independently? [Anxiety, happiness....];
- How did you go there?
- How did it feel to move between countries?

- Who was traveling with you?
- Where did you stay?
- What did you like and did not like in the place?
- What did you do there?
- Was this a good or bad experience?
- How did you get around?
- What did you like and did not like about the people in this country?
- Did you think about similarities and differences between this country and your country?
- Did anybody from your group meet new people in the country that you were visiting?
- Did you do any shopping? What did you buy, if anything?
- Did you miss not being home?
- More generally, reflecting back on your experience growing up, how did your parents react to your traveling abroad?
- c. Tell me about your most memorable trip/stay abroad.

Probes:

What makes it memorable or different from other trips?

- d. Are there countries where you would not travel? Why?
- e. Here's a map of the world. You may find it useful or not; feel free to use it.

What are the foreign countries that you have visited?

What geographic areas would you say that you are familiar with because of your past trips?

Where do you like to travel best? Can you tell me why?

f. [[If the respondent did not point to any country in Europe while using the world map, turn the page and show the map of Europe]]

Here's another map, feel free to use it if you wish.

What are the places that you have visited? Can you show me?

What geographic areas would you say that you are familiar with because of your past trips?

Where do you like to travel best? Can tell me why?

g. Are there countries in the world that you would like to visit that you have not visited before? Where would you like to go, for example? Can you tell me why?

# Taste

[To the interviewer: recap what we know about the respondent's cultural tastes based on his/her answers in the quantitative survey and try to unpack the history of how the respondent developed his/her cultural taste(s).]

In the survey you have mentioned that you like [foreign films/ music/cuisine—choose based on the survey]. At what point in your life did you start liking these [foreign films/ music/cuisine]? What do you think makes you like [foreign films/ music/cuisine] them?

# 3) Social circle and exchanges with foreign residents

[[To the interviewer: if the respondent has no acquaintances with nationalities other than his/her own in <COUNTRY> and abroad, move to the questions on the use of Internet and opinions on diversity]]

Now we would like to talk about your social circle, contacts with friends and relatives.

[To the interviewer: recap what we know about the respondent's social circle based on his/her answers in the quantitative survey]

We know from the survey that you completed that some of your friends/acquaintances (here and/or abroad) are not from <COUNTRY> and we are interested in how these relationships develop.

Now, please think of a person with a <u>different nationality other than your own, living in this country</u>, and whom you know well.

Probes:

[[To the interviewer: refer to the following questions as necessary to unpack a notable event/story about this relationship]]

- How did you become acquainted?
- How important is this acquaintance/friendship to you?
- What kinds of activities do you do together?
- Do you have special memories connected to this acquaintance/friendship?
   Could you tell me more about this? [[To the interviewer: we are primarily interested in memories that involve a transnational dimension, i.e. memories related to traveling across borders, exploring different cuisines, going to concerts and the like. If the respondent mentions such an event, focus on unpacking it. ]]

Now, think of a person from a <u>different nationality other than your own, living abroad</u> and whom you know well.

- How did you become acquainted?
- How important is this acquaintance/friendship to you?
- What kind of contact do you maintain with each other?
- Do you have special memories connected to this acquaintance/friendship? Could you tell me more about this? [[To the interviewer: we are primarily interested in memories that involve a transnational dimension, i.e. memories related to traveling across borders, exploring different cuisines, going to concerts and the like. If the respondent mentions such an event, focus on unpacking it.]]
- Would you say that it's easy or difficult to develop and sustain friendships with people from other countries? Why?

# **Use of Internet in maintaining social contacts:**

[[To the interviewer: To make a smooth transition, recap respondent's answers to relevant questions in the quantitative survey. Refer to the following questions to explore whether the respondent has an interesting experience/story regarding his/her use of Internet]]

- In general, would you say that Internet is important/relevant to your social life?
- Is it important/relevant for communication with people you know who live abroad?
- Is Internet important/relevant when you organize trips/stays abroad?

- Are there specific people/organizations/companies/web sites whom you contact when you plan a trip/stay abroad?
- Do you read foreign newspapers or follow foreign media? [If yes] Can you tell me more? What media? How often? Why?

# On diversity

- This country, like many others in the world, is becoming more diverse in terms of people's origins. What do you think about these changes? Can you explain why?
- Is there anything that you don't like about it?
- How happy are you living in this city? What are some of the things that you like and don't like about it?
- Do you like this neighborhood? What are some of the things that you like and don't like about it?

# 4) Work

Now, we would like to talk about your daily experiences at <work>/<university>/<organization>/<voluntary network>.

[To the interviewer: questions will be adapted for people studying or involved in organizations /university/voluntary work. Start with questions about the workplace/ organizations /university...and subsequently move to explore the respondent's experience with the crisis.]

# Probes:

- How big is/was your <workplace>/<organization/university>/<voluntary network>?
- How many people work/study there? How many people are involved?
- Are there foreign nationals among the workers/students/volunteers?
- How many?
- Where do they come from?

[[If foreigners are mentioned]]

o Do you have contact with them in performing specific tasks?

- o How would you evaluate this contact/work together?
- o Do you get together with them on a social basis?
- Does your organization do any business with firms and/or cooperate with individuals from other European countries?
- Where do your customers/providers/cooperators come from, mostly?
- Would you say that it is easy or difficult to cooperate and/or work/do business/with people/organizations in other countries? Why?
- Do you have meetings with them? Where?
- Do you travel for professional/education/voluntary work related reasons?[If yes]
  - O What do you like or don't like about those trips?
  - Can you tell me more about your interaction with your foreign partners in these trips?
  - Is language a barrier to communication in these trips?

# On Crisis:

- How would you describe the situation in your workplace/business/organization these days?
- How has the crisis affected your firm/organization?
- And you personally?
- Did your family and/or friends experience the current economic crisis in anyway? If so, can you tell me more about this?
- Who do you think is responsible for the current crisis?
- Can the EU contribute to solve the crisis?
- Would EU with more power be better able to deal with the crisis? Can you tell me why you think so?
- Would you say that people/government have shown enough solidarity toward each other in addressing the crisis?

- In 2012, the EU was awarded the Nobel peace prize. How do you feel about this?
- Is there anything else you would like to tell us about what you think of Europe?

# III) EUMEAN guidelines (migrants)

# Semi-structured interview questions for MIGRANTS EUMEAN GUIDELINES FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

(Adapted for Turkish and Romanian Migrants)

#### Notes to the interviewer:

- EUMEAN is the second stage of the EUCROSS project, which examines the
  relationship between the activities of EU residents (nationals, mobile EU citizens,
  and third-country nationals) across the borders of nation states and their
  collective identities. In the first stage, a quantitative survey was carried out among
  nationals, intra-EU movers (Romanian citizens) and third-country nationals
  (Turkish citizens) who reside in six European countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy,
  Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom). In the second stage of this project, our
  goal is to explore and unpack the meaning given by individuals to cross-border
  practices, their collective identifications, and the role that the European Union,
  globalization, and the nation play in these personal narratives.
- We will be interviewing nationals of <COUNTRY> as well as Turkish and Romanian migrants. The questions are relevant for participants from all three groups.
- Throughout the interview, our specific goal is to <u>identify an event/story</u> that involves a transnational experience and unpack the <u>reasons</u>, <u>emotions</u> and intentions attached to it.

# 5) Introduction (3-5 minutes)

[[To the interviewer: Introduce yourself and your organization, briefly summarize the goals of this study. Begin with some general questions to get to know the respondent and establish a rapport with him/her]]

#### Probes:

Information about the EUCROSS consortium: participating institutions

Process: Confidentiality; no right or wrong answers; audio recording

Subject: Transnational experiences, broadly defined

# 6) Travel practices / Leisure time activities

# Travel

Now, we would like to know more about your travel experiences.

[[To the interviewer: Place the map on the table before the conversation. Make sure to ask Qa, b, c, d. Try to maintain a natural flow of the conversation, and make use of the probes as necessary. Be sensitive to the type of trip the respondent is talking about—and be ready to probe into another, more meaningful trip.]

h. Please tell me about the first trip/stay abroad that you can remember well.

# Probes:

- How did you go there?
- How did it feel to move between countries?
- Who was traveling with you?
- Where did you stay?
- What did you like and did not like in the place?
- What did you do there?
- Was this a good or bad experience?
- How did you get around?
- What did you like and did not like about the people in this country?
- Did you think about similarities and differences between this country and your country?
- Did anybody from your group meet new people in the country that you were visiting?
- Did you do any shopping? What did you buy, if anything?
- i. Tell me about the first trip/stay abroad independently/as a young adult (i.e. without your parents).

# Probes:

- How did it feel to travel independently? [Anxiety, happiness...];
- How did you go there?
- How did it feel to move between countries?
- Who was traveling with you?
- Where did you stay?
- What did you like and did not like in the place?
- What did you do there?
- Was this a good or bad experience?
- How did you get around?
- What did you like and did not like about the people in this country?
- Did you think about similarities and differences between this country and your country?
- Did anybody from your group meet new people in the country that you were visiting?
- Did you do any shopping? What did you buy, if anything?
- Did you miss not being home?
- More generally, reflecting back on your experience growing up, how did your parents react to your traveling abroad?
- j. Tell me about your most memorable trip/stay abroad.
  - What makes it memorable or different from other trips?
- k. Are there countries where you would not travel? Why?
- I. Here's a map of the world. You may find it useful or not; feel free to use it.
  - What are the foreign places that you have visited?
  - What geographic areas would you say that you are familiar with because of your past trips?
  - Where do you like to travel best? Can you tell me why?
- m. [[If the respondent did not point to any country in Europe while using the world map, turn the page and show the map of Europe]]

Here's another map, feel free to use it if you wish.

What are the places that you have visited? Can you show me?

What geographic areas would you say that you are familiar with because of your past trips?

Where do you like to travel best? Can tell me why?

n. Are there countries in the world that you would like to visit, but have not yet done so? Where would you like to go, for example? Can you tell me why?

#### Taste

[To the interviewer: recap what we know about the respondent's cultural tastes based on his/her answers in the quantitative survey and try to unpack the history of how the respondent developed his/her cultural taste(s).]

In the survey you have mentioned that you like [foreign films/ music/cuisine—choose based on the survey]. At what point in your life did you start liking these [foreign films/ music/cuisine]? What do you think makes you like [foreign films/ music/cuisine] them?

# 7) Social circle and exchanges with foreign residents

[[To the interviewer: if the respondent has no acquaintances with nationalities other than his/her own in <COUNTRY> and abroad, move to the questions on the use of Internet and opinions on diversity]]

Now we would like to talk about your social circle, contacts with friends and relatives.

[To the interviewer: recap what we know about the respondent's social circle based on his/her answers in the quantitative survey.]

We know from the survey that you completed that some of your friends/acquaintances (here and/or abroad) are not from <COUNTRY> and we are interested in how these relationships develop.

Now, please think of a person with a <u>different nationality other than your own, living in this country</u>, and whom you know well.

#### Probes:

[[To the interviewer: we are primarily interested in exploring the respondent's interactions with non-nationals other than the natives of <COUNTRY>. If the respondent mentions such a relationship, focus on unpacking it using the following probes as necessary to identify a notable event/story about this relationship. If the respondent only mentions interactions with natives of <COUNTRY>, refer to the same set of questions to map out the dynamics of this exchange]

- How did you become acquainted?
- How important is this acquaintance/friendship to you?
- What kinds of activities do you do together?
- Do you have special memories connected to this acquaintance/friendship?
   Could you tell me more about this? [[To the interviewer: we are primarily interested in memories that involve a transnational dimension, i.e. memories related to traveling across borders, exploring different cuisines, going to concerts and the like. If the respondent mentions such an event, focus on unpacking it. ]]
- Would you say that it's easy or difficult to develop and sustain friendships with nationals from this country? Why?

Now, think of a person from a <u>different nationality other than your own, living abroad</u> and whom you know well.

- How did you become acquainted?
- How important is this acquaintance/friendship to you?
- What kind of contact do you maintain with each other?
- Do you have special memories connected to this acquaintance/friendship? Could you tell me more about this? [[To the interviewer: we are primarily interested in memories that involve a transnational dimension, i.e. memories related to traveling across borders, exploring different cuisines, going to concerts and the like. If the respondent mentions such an event, focus on unpacking it. ]]
- Would you say that it's easy or difficult to develop and sustain friendships with people from other countries? Why?

# *Use of Internet in maintaining social contacts:*

[[To the interviewer: To make a smooth transition, recap respondent's answers to relevant questions in the quantitative survey. Refer to the following questions to explore whether the respondent has an interesting experience/story regarding his/her use of Internet]]

- In general, would you say that Internet is important/relevant to your social life?
- Is it important/relevant for communication with people you know who live abroad?
- Is Internet important/relevant when you organize trips/stays abroad?
- Are there specific people/organizations/companies/web sites whom you contact when you plan a trip/stay abroad?
- Do you read foreign newspapers or follow foreign media? [If yes] Can you tell me more? What media? How often? Why?

# On diversity

- This country, like many others in the world, is becoming more diverse in terms
  of people's origins. What do you think about these changes? Can you explain
  why?
- Is there anything that you don't like about it?
- Now, you've been living here for some time already. What are the things that
  you like and do not like about this country and its people? Are there things
  that you find peculiar, surprising, or interesting about this country and its
  people? Can you tell me why? Have you ever felt or do you feel treated
  differently by people in this country? Can you tell me why you think so?
- How happy are you living in this city? What are some of the things that you like and don't like about it?
- Do you like this neighborhood? What are some of the things that you like and don't like about it?

# 8) Work

Now, we would like to talk about your daily experiences at <work>/<university>/<organization>/<voluntary network>.

[To the interviewer: questions will be adapted for people studying or involved in organizations /university/voluntary work. Start with questions about the workplace/ organizations /university...and subsequently move to explore the respondent's experience with the crisis.]

### Probes:

- How big is/was your <workplace>/<organization/university>/<voluntary network>?
- How many people work/study there? How many people are involved?
- Are there foreign nationals other than your own among the workers/students/volunteers?
- How many?
- Where do they come from?

[[If foreigners are mentioned]]

- o Do you have contact with them in performing specific tasks?
- How would you evaluate this contact/work together?
- Do you get together with them on a social basis?]
- Does your organization do any business with firms and/or cooperate with individuals from other European countries?
- Where do your customers/providers/cooperators come from, mostly?
- Would you say that it is easy or difficult to cooperate and/or work/do business/with people/organizations in other countries? Why?
- Do you have meetings with them? Where?
- Do you travel for professional/education/voluntary work related reasons?

[If yes]

- O What do you like or don't like about those trips?
- Can you tell me more about your interaction with your foreign partners in these trips?
- Is language a barrier to communication in these trips?

# On Crisis and the EU:

- How would you describe the situation in your workplace/business/organization these days?
- How has the crisis affected your firm/organization?
- And you personally?
- Did your family and/or friends experience the current economic crisis in anyway? If so, can you tell me more about this?
- Who do you think is responsible for the current crisis?
- Can the EU contribute to solve the crisis?
- Would EU with more power be better able to deal with the crisis? Can you tell me why you think so?
- Would you say that people/government have shown enough solidarity toward each other in addressing the crisis?
- In 2012, the EU was awarded the Nobel peace prize. How do you feel about this?
- Is there anything else you would like to tell us about what you think of Europe?